


**THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN  
HISTORY**

# **INDO-AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 1980-1992**



**THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
In  
HISTORY**

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Date: 18.8.2001

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# Contents

Preface	i
Introduction	1
Pakistan as a Factor in Indo-American Foreign Relations.	49
The Great Power Triangle and Indo-American Foreign Relations.	95
Indian Response to American Non-Proliferation Treaty.	138
End of the Cold War and its Implications for Indo-American Foreign Relations.	188
Conclusion.	235
Select Bibliography.	280



# Preface

Indo-American relations have been analysed from a variety of perspectives. Historically, one can see it in different phases. In brief, the Reagan administrations policies toward India changed somewhat over a period of years, as it reflected on what the Carter administration had done from 1976-1980, as it responded to regional events and trends, as it debated policy priorities, and as it learned more about America's own regional and strategic interests and those of the major regional states, India and Pakistan. I contend in this thesis that, by and large, the Reagan administration pursued policies that advanced American interests – both short term and long term. The limited evidence available since the end of the Reagan administration seems to support this assertion.

United States – Indian relations since the end of the 1980s have been conducted amidst multifarious international developments and notable domestic alterations in both countries. Indeed the 1990s may ultimately prove to be a significant watershed for bilateral relations. However, in the short-term, the new environment for bilateral relations has largely sustained the mutual pursuit of accommodation which commenced at the beginning of the preceding decade.

The first objective of the Reagan administration was the containment of Soviet power, the second was the encouragement of Indian strategic autonomy that is lessening of Indian dependence on the Soviet Union and third was the prevention of nuclear proliferation. These three objectives were not equally pressing, nor were they all pursued at the same

time. But all were discussed and eventually adopted at the very highest levels of the American government. Each, in one way or another, represented a departure from established policy. These challenges were largely – but not entirely met by the policy makers in the Reagan administration.

The Reganites renewed military and economic assistance to Pakistan to meet the Soviet threat in Afghanistan. India did not figure significantly in these calculations. Moreover, it heightened India's apprehensions. The nuclear issue remained a key source of United States-Indian friction. The United States has made India one of the principal targets of its non-proliferation strategy since the seventies. India is willing to accept international non-proliferation measures if they are non-discriminatory.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, has provided strong political, economic and even strategic motivations to both India and America to keep their ties on an accommodative track. On the other hand, the urgency being given to stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles and the wider acceptance of extensive non-proliferation commitments have illustrated that United States – Indian relations in these fields are likely to be further exacerbated. Hence, the essence of the mutual pursuit of accommodation in United States - Indian relations during the 1980s was an effort to down play global and regional differences, mitigate outstanding bilateral disputes and build new areas of

cooperation. These goals met a modicum of success. The approach to bilateral relations in the early 1990s has not been appreciably altered by either country, though some adjustments in emphasis and content have occurred. For India, the need to improve its relations with America is compelling with the collapse of its main economic, political and military partner.

The limitation of human beings makes it difficult for even a small task to be completed unaided, and especially to accomplish a work of this magnitude would have been something unimaginable without extraneous help. A lot of thanks are due to everyone, whose contributions have somehow or the other helped me in getting the final shape of this thesis.

The pleasure of writing and accomplishing this thesis is due to my supervisor Dr. N.R. Farooqui, Professor of History, Allahabad University. I express my deep felt gratitude to him for having initiated me into the intricacies of historical research and for his meticulous guidance and advice at every stage of my study. His selfless involvement and remarkable patience in my endeavour was a constant source of encouragement to me. I shall remain indebted to him life long because it is his efforts which are mainly responsible for this work having seen the light of the day.

I extend my thanks to the staff of the Central Library of Allahabad University. I also extend my special thanks to the American Studies Research Center, Hyderabad which made my scholastic pursuit at the library a pleasant and memorable experience. I express my gratitude to Dr. B. Ramesh Babu along with the staff of ASRC who proved to be the

omnipresent reservoirs of knowledge, sources to which I could turn in times of any crisis. I am also grateful to the Director and Staff of the American Center Library, New Delhi.

Words fail me, in my attempt to enumerate my late father, Mr. J.B. Singh's contributions which form the very foundations on which this edifice of my thesis has been built.

I lack adequate words to express gratitude to my mother, Mrs. Chanda Singh, whose love, inspiration and blessings have encouraged me at every step of my academic pursuit since childhood. I cannot forget the indispensable help and cooperation of my husband, Mr. J.P. Singh and my brother Mr. Alok Singh, without which it would have been impossible to complete my work. My sister Dr. Alka Singh deserves special mention as she has been my constant inspiration and has helped me at crucial times during the writing of my thesis. I shall remain indebted to her. I owe my thanks to my friends in bearing with me patiently the tensions and problems faced while getting this work completed. Last, though not the least, I bow in deep gratitude to the Lord Almighty for inspiring me to accomplish this task.

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**Poonam Singh**

## **Chapter - 1**

### **Introduction**

The relationship between the United States and India has reflected a curious pattern of interaction in many ways. At the time of Indian Independence, shortly after the Second World War, there were high expectations on both sides. India, seemed destined to emerge as the world's largest, and Asia's first fully democratic state. Hence, it was assumed that a natural affinity would exist between India and the United States, by far the world's most celebrated democracy, in the domain of international politics. But the anticipated degree of harmony and unanimity was never achieved between the United States and India.

America, as a leader of the Western group of states was preoccupied with containing Soviet expansionism. This led to the Cold War and the forming of two separate power blocs – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw pact. The two blocs wanted to draw the

newly independent states into their global strategies. On the other hand many countries which became independent after the war, wanted to maintain their hard won freedom and keep away from either of the power blocs. This strategy came to be known as Non-alignment. This was a positive, active and constructive policy seeking to maintain peace, security, freedom and co-operation. Non-alignment has remained a major aspect of India's foreign policy much to the disillusionment and frustration of America. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that India was one of the founding fathers of the Non-aligned movement. Let us begin with an analysis of foreign policy itself. It is remarkable that experts on foreign policy have been unable to arrive at a consensus on what foreign policy is. Hugh Gibson defines foreign policy as, "a well rounded, comprehensive plan, based on knowledge and experience, for conducting the business of government with the rest of the world. It is aimed at promoting and protecting the interests of the nation."<sup>1</sup> It is therefore, imperative to have a clear understanding of the interests of the nation along with the resources at a country's disposal. Only then can one talk of a national foreign policy.

It is a well known fact that in the year 1492, Christopher Columbus in the course of his search for a new route to India discovered America. However, formal relations between the two countries were only established when India gained its independence on 15 August 1947. Prior to this, contacts between America and India was through soldiers and seamen who had lived both in the American colonies and in India. During the last

quarter of the eighteenth century several American ships visited Indian ports in connection with trade. In 1792, an American was officially appointed to look after trade interests in India when Benjamin Joy of Boston was appointed the first American consul at Calcutta. Later, both the countries had mutual contacts through various agencies such as missionaries, tourists and intellectuals. In the words of Professor Quincy Wright:

American knowledge of India before World War I was derived mainly from the reports of American missionaries with special interest, from superficial narratives of occasional tourists, from few widely read but highly imaginative literary productions such as the works of Rudyard Kipling.... and from reports of the British Government and Press with a point of view different from that of the Indian People.<sup>2</sup>

The American masses did not get a clear picture of India and its people. Therefore, a proper understanding was not established between the two countries. In 1883, the Brahmo Samaj leader P.C. Majumdar lectured in many American cities, and in 1893 both he and Swami Vivekananda earned the applause of the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago. In 1905, Lala Lajpat Rai was the first Indian political leader to visit the United States. He told the people there of the need for Indian independence. He was much influenced by American life and American democratic institutions. He wrote a book in 1916 entitled *The United States of America : A Hindu's*

**Impression.** The book was published by R. Chatterjee, editor of the Modern Review.

In 1925-26 an American lady Katherine Mayo visited India. She wrote a book entitled ***Mother India*** which was published in 1927. The book presented an extremely narrow view of Indian society and had highlighted such things as the alleged slave mentality of the Indians. The institution of early marriage, the purdah system etc. In her concluding chapter she wrote:

Neither do I wish to imply that some of the most unflattering things here affirmed of India are without counterpart in character and tendency, if not in degree, in certain sections of our Western life. But India has carried the principles of egocentricity and of a materialism called spirituality to a further and wider conclusion than has the West. The result, in the individual, the family and the race, are only the more noteworthy, for they cast a spotlight towards the end of that road.<sup>3</sup>

Hence, a distinctly wrong and erroneous impression was created among the American people of India. They thought of India as a land of Sannyasis, naked ascetics, snake charmers, magicians, bejewelled princes and poor people.

Katherine Mayo's book created tremendous misunderstanding



between India and the United States. In reply to this book, Lala Lajpat Rai wrote something against America in his book *Unhappy India*. He observed that there was a darker side to American life too. There were other retaliatory attacks on America. All this created ill feeling between the two countries. Rabindranath Tagore visited America many times and left an everlasting image of Indian life, literature and culture in that country. He carried back to India many new ideas and impressions from the United States. However, once the immigration authorities treated him so discourteously that he had to cancel his trip to America. To end the American embarrassment, another visit of Tagore was arranged. On the whole the Indians who visited America received courteous treatment.

The influence of America on the events leading to India's independence was certainly limited. The United States was biased in favour of Britain because most of the information about developments in India came from British sources. The people of America were ignorant and indifferent to the nationalist struggle in India. But Mahatma Gandhi made a deep impact on the Americans. They held diverse views about him ranging from admiration for the little man in the loin cloth who was the unquestioned leader of the masses, to distrust of the naked fakir who talked of truth, satyagraha and non-violence and created problems for the British. On the whole, his image was a favourable one among those Americans who were concerned with world events.

The Indian community in America did pioneering work in arousing interest, sympathy and support for the nationalist struggle in India. Some of them were involved in revolutionary activities which became a cause of embarrassment for the American government. In February 1914, the first conference of Indian revolutionaries abroad was held at California. Most of the Indians lived in that State than in any other part of America. The Ghadar party mainly a Sikh revolutionary party had its headquarters in California. The India League of America formed by the Indian community in America did commendable work in stirring up interest in and sympathy and support for the nationalist struggle in India.

The final stages of British rule in India, with the beginning of the second world war, marked a new and significant era in Indo-American relations. A lot of American forces were stationed in various parts of the Indian subcontinent. For the first time India received American attention in a significant and sustained manner. The Japanese were a grave threat to India. They had occupied most of Southeast Asia and with the cooperation of Subhash Chandra Bose had eventually moved inside the borders of eastern India in June 1941. But they were turned back near Imphal in Manipur by the British forces. Subhash Chandra Bose had supported the Axis powers in order to gain independence for India. America was alarmed with these new circumstances as India was an important part of the China-Burma-India theater and moreover

American troops were stationed in the subcontinent. Therefore, President Roosevelt began to put pressure on Winston Churchill to grant some concessions in the form of greater autonomy for India.

Indian nationalists were inspired and encouraged by the reference in the famous Atlantic Charter, agreed upon by Roosevelt and Churchill in their meeting at sea off the Coast of Newfoundland in August 1941, to the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they shall live.<sup>4</sup>

Probably Roosevelt thought that the charter would have a universal application but Churchill had other ideas. Infact very specifically he stated that the charter did not apply to India. Charter's statement provoked a lot of criticism in India, America and even in the British Parliament. Churchill reacted very strongly when in December 1941 Roosevelt raised the question of possible concessions by the British to Indian nationalists. After this the American President never again raised the matter with him verbally. Nevertheless, Roosevelt did send Colonel Louis Johnson to India in 1942 as his personal representative to keep him apprised of the real situation in the subcontinent. At the end of the year he sent William Phillips to India, with the rank of ambassador, with the same mission. Though the British did not object to the mission verbally they viewed it with some apprehension and disapproval. Phillips wanted to meet Gandhi who was then in jail but the British refused.

India appreciated Roosevelt's efforts though he was hesitant to press

the cause of the Indians because of the fear of offending the British. It was because of this that America failed to respond to India's request for food during the terrible famine of 1943. India's goodwill towards the United States continued into the postwar period, during the events leading to India's independence in 1947.

Even before independence, the interim government created in India in 1946, headed by Jawaharlal Nehru established formal contacts with the United States. In 1946 Asaf Ali was appointed by the interim government to be India's first ambassador to the United States, and in July 1947, a month prior to independence, Henry Grady, who had headed a commercial mission to India during World War II, was nominated as the first U.S. ambassador to India.<sup>5</sup>

There was a difference of priorities between the Indian National Congress Party leaders and Roosevelt. For the Nationalist leaders, the top priority was India's independence and for Roosevelt, winning the Second World War was the most important business. Everything else was secondary. Roosevelt did not want to rupture his alliance with the British and therefore he was not so vocal about Indian independence.

One can trace the beginning of India's foreign policy in the various resolutions passed by the Indian National Congress before independence and the speeches and writings of Pandit Nehru, the first Prime Minister of

India. The All-India Congress Committee had declared in Delhi in 1921 that its interests in the field of foreign policy were diametrically opposed to those of Britain. Further in 1927, at the Congress session in Madras, another resolution was passed, which protested against the use of Indian troops in China, Mesopotamia and Persia. It was also against the extensive war preparations which the British Government was carrying on in India.

The sole architect of Independent India's foreign policy and even before that of the Indian National Congress was Nehru. Indeed, the foreign policy of India has come to be identified with the personality of Nehru himself. India's foreign policy was conditioned by the personal complexes of Pandit Nehru and when translated into action, these complexes had become India's foreign policy.

The above mentioned view is quite true but the Indian foreign policy has the framework of Indian culture and tradition which has lasted for thousands of years. It has its roots in Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy and is also grounded in the theory and practice of the foreign policy which Pandit Nehru expounded to India and the whole world. Nehru had once said that in the ultimate analysis a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dares to do anything which in the short and long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of the country.

After gaining independence India found herself in a difficult

position. She needed assistance from abroad to meet her economic needs and required the maintenance of peace to fulfill the task of social and economic reconstruction. This led India to adopt non-alignment and the pursuit of peace as the cardinal features of her foreign policy. The other important objectives of India's foreign policy was to remove the root causes of war by championing the liberation of the subject peoples, eliminating racial discrimination, disease and illiteracy. The Indian Government felt that in order to fulfil these objectives successfully, it must give unqualified allegiance to the United Nations and follow an independent foreign policy.

Franklin D. Roosevelt led the United States for twelve difficult years through the Depression and World War II. Just a month before his death Roosevelt spoke about his concern for colonialism in Asia to Charles Taussig, the State Department adviser. Roosevelt admitted that the Orient resented the rule of a handful of whites. He told Taussig, "Our goal must be to help them achieve independence — 1,100,000,000 potential enemies are dangerous. Churchill doesn't understand this."<sup>6</sup> This very statement summed up the problem Roosevelt faced throughout the war in dealing with India. He was worried about the implications for future relations with India. But Churchill was not willing to grant freedom to India.

After Roosevelt's death Harry S. Truman became the President of the United States. Due to Roosevelt's pressure India was a founder member of the United Nations in April 1945 although still under British rule. It is

generally believed that the pressure of the United States played a role in the British offer of an interim government to India in June 1945. In July 1945 Clement Attlee replaced Winston Churchill as the Prime Minister of Britain. The Labour Party favoured an early handover of power in India. Therefore, the United States felt that now there was no need to pressurize London to end colonial rule in India. Moreover the Truman administration was busy after the Second World War trying to grapple with a host of post-war domestic and foreign policy problems. Hence, South Asia received hardly any notice.

The advice Nehru gave to Asaf Ali, India's first ambassador to the United States in late 1946 revealed Nehru's sensitivities and pride. He said,

The United States are a great power and we want to be friendly with them for many reasons. Nevertheless I should like to make it clear that we do not propose to be subservient to any body.... We have plenty of good cards in our hands and there is no need whatever for us to appear as suppliants before any country.<sup>7</sup>

While India and Pakistan were emerging as independent nations, the United States was shaping the concept of containment of Communism that became the driving force behind the United States National Security Policy for the next 44 years. India's desire to have a foreign policy independent of

the capitalist and communist blocs, that were then forming, did not create too many worries in the State Department. Independent India was not a matter of high priority in Washington.

The Soviet Union exploded an atomic bomb in 1949, and in October 1949 China became a communist country. Therefore, it became necessary for the super powers to extend their influence to the Indian sub-continent. Nehru complied with Truman's invitation and visited Washington in the second week of October 1949. They tried to influence Nehru into a system of alliances but he made it very clear to them the neutralist posture of the Indian foreign policy. Washington was disappointed and they began to look towards Pakistan.

In May 1950, the Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaqat Ali Khan, on an invitation for official talks visited Washington. For its economic development and to safeguard its strategic interests, Pakistan needed a powerful and prosperous ally. Liaqat Ali Khan assured the top authorities in the American Government that Pakistan would be a dependable ally. He even praised the virtues of the American people and the values of the American political system. The American officials and the media were satisfied and happy with the visit of Liaqat Ali Khan. "His visit convinced the Policy makers that Pakistan could promote their interests on the Indian Sub-Continent and naturally, therefore, their interest in and enthusiasm for Pakistan began to increase."<sup>8</sup>



In the initial stages non-alignment was disliked in both the cold war camps. But on several world issues, the non-aligned nations found themselves in agreement with the stand taken by the Soviet Union at the United Nations. America and the Western countries condemned them. While the communist countries perceived the non-aligned countries to be camp followers of the west as they failed to take a more militant stand against certain developments such as the civil war in Malaya. Non-aligned countries were suspected by both because they refused to go far enough to satisfy either.

The opinions of India and America regarding communism were quite different.

The U.S. finds communism to be ideologically and ethically distasteful, inimical to its economic interests, and the chief threat to world peace. The Soviet Union is seen as an aggressive, imperialistic threat and as the main instigator of revolution and terrorism.<sup>9</sup>

Therefore, the United States devised the policy of containment of communism. For this it formed military pacts and built up its arsenal to deter any Soviet attack. It tried to recruit as many States as possible into its bloc system so as to counter the Soviet threat. On the other hand India was less suspicious of the Soviet Union and regarded it as a defensive rather than an aggressive power. India did not ignore the bi-polar conflict but at

the same time gave equal importance to global poverty, inequality, imperialism, racism and disarmament. So, instead of becoming a member of either of the power blocs, India chose to be non-aligned. All this naturally hampered the ties between India and the United States from the very beginning.

The United States felt that India was tilted towards the Soviet Union. Therefore, Pakistan became important in the United States containment strategy. But the first major difference between the United States and India arose over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. At first the United States was reluctant to become involved in the Kashmir problem. Nevertheless the United States cooperated with the British when the Kashmir issue came before the United Nations Security Council. The Security Council adopted a resolution on 21 April 1948 to set up a United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The United Nations did not condemn Pakistan as an aggressor. This was not liked by India.

At first the proposal for a plebiscite and cease-fire was rejected by both India and Pakistan. President Truman tried to urge India to accept arbitration as a way to break the impasse on the plebiscite. The Indians rejected Truman's suggestion. Nehru was adamant about not giving an inch of Kashmir. He rejected the idea of United Nations control of the valley during the plebiscite as well.

For Indians, the question of Kashmir was a central one and an important foreign policy issue. The United States on the other hand, considered the Kashmir problem as a serious dispute between two countries with which the United States had friendly relations. Washington did not want a war between India and Pakistan and therefore wanted the Kashmir issue to be settled amicably. It backed the United Nations call for a plebiscite but gradually they were exasperated by Nehru's stand on Kashmir and the way New Delhi took to formally incorporating Kashmir into the Indian Union.

Though India and America did not see eye to eye with each other on various foreign policy issues, yet Nehru was hopeful about relations with Washington. He felt that the United States would be interested in having friendly relations with India because India now held an important position in Asia. The future of Asia would therefore depend on the future of India. A note Nehru wrote on negotiations for a commercial treaty with the United States spelled out his ambivalent views:

America is the most powerful and richest country in the world and can certainly help India a great deal. There is no reason why we should not get that help and remove causes of friction between us.<sup>10</sup>

At the same time Nehru did not want to tie up too much with the United States. He visited America in October and November 1949. He impressed the

people there and the press praised him as the only hope of Asia especially as China had become a communist country. The official side of the trip did not go off so well as the official leadership in America found Nehru to be stiff and vague. Nehru found Truman to be condescending.

On 25 June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea and the cold war became a hot war. Initially, India voted for the Security Council's condemnation of the invasion and a second resolution calling for a support to South Korea to repel the attack was also voted by India. Nevertheless, India devoted all its efforts to bring about a cease-fire in Korea and to prevent a world war from breaking out. The United Nations forces under the command of America, crossed the 38th parallel in Korea, even though India had warned that such a move would bring the Chinese communists into the war. All this increased the anti-United States feeling in India. In January 1951 A.T. Steele reported that during a two - month stay in India he encountered,

more criticism of the United States than applause. The main criticism, he found, centered round America's policy toward China and Indo-China, its stand on the Kashmir question, its niggardly economic assistance, always extended with strings, the war talk in the United States, the American failure to appreciate the Asian view point and to take full cognizance of Asian sensibilities and inept American propaganda.<sup>11</sup>

Early in 1951, India was faced with acute food shortage. Nehru requested America for substantial shipments of food. On February 12, 1951, President Truman recommended emergency assistance to India. Nehru accepted the American terms for emergency aid and also the beginning of a Russian shipment of a promised 50,000 tons of wheat to India. Relations between India and America improved for sometime. But India became apprehensive when in November, 1952 General Eisenhower replaced Truman. In March 1953, Chester Bowles also had to leave India who was genuinely popular in India.

During the Eisenhower administration a new agricultural commodity bill — Public Law 480— became law. America could now dispose off mounting surplus farm products in return for blocked rupees. For India this was a tempting offer but Washington's response was initially slow. The PL - 480 agreement was signed in August 1956, the first concrete food accord. India was to get up to 5 million tons of foodgrains over three years. The beginning of the Eisenhower administration were bad years for Indo-American relations. On account of its non-aligned policy, India had rejected offers of association with developing United States strategic plans and therefore the United States turned to Pakistan. They entered into a wide-ranging security relationship.

Besides the 1954 U.S. - Pakistani Mutual Security Agreement, these eventually included the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO)

and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) as well as a 1959 bilateral executive security agreement.<sup>12</sup>

India perceived the security ties between the United States and Pakistan as threatening to her security. It could even spur an arms race in the subcontinent and bring the Cold War to the region. It would also hamper India's economic development as now India too would be forced to buy weapons to match Pakistan's acquisitions. The United States rejected India's complaints and Eisenhower emphasized that the security ties with Pakistan were meant to provide security to Pakistan against the Soviet Union and to serve American interests in the Middle East and South East Asia. He tried to assure India that the weapons supplied to Pakistan would not be used against India.

At the same time there was improvement in Indo-Soviet relations. During an official visit to the Soviet Union, Nehru was given the red carpet treatment. The Soviet Union endorsed India's stand on Kashmir and vehemently denounced the Portuguese for hanging on to Goa.

Towards the end of 1956, relations between the United States and India improved and remained so for the next five years. The United States entered into an agreement with India to supply large quantities of farm products out of its surplus supply, largely on a loan basis. India appreciated the efforts of the United States to pressurize through the

United Nations, the British and the French to withdraw their forces from Egypt. In December 1956, Nehru made his second official visit to the United States and his visit was quite successful. In March 1958, America agreed to help India financially as India at that time was facing grave financial difficulties. It also exported large amounts of foodgrains to India to help India meet its food requirements. It also persuaded other Western powers to come to India's aid. In December 1959, President Eisenhower visited India and on his return he said that he had enjoyed his Indian trip more than his visit to any other country.

In 1960, John F. Kennedy was elected as President of the United States of America. Kennedy's election was hailed in India as he was considered a friend to India. Earlier as a senator, he had sponsored a United States Indian Conference in Washington in 1957. He also respected Nehru's role as a leader in India's struggle for independence. The Dulles era in Indo-American relations was over. Kennedy appointed Chester Bowles as Under Secretary of State and Professor J.K. Galbraith as Ambassador to India. The foreign Policy of the Eisenhower administration was shaped and defined by Dulles, who viewed the world in rigid pro or anti-communist terms. So critical was Dulles of non-alignment that in 1956 he had stated,

U.S. security arrangements abolish as between the parties, the principle of neutrality, which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by

being indifferent to the fate of others.... it is an immoral and shortsighted conception.<sup>13</sup>

Kennedy on the other hand perceived the world in broader terms than just either pro-or anti communist. He did not always agree with the foreign policy choices of nonaligned countries but he respected them. He hoped that by supplying India with a substantial amount of foreign aid, he would make India economically stable and this in turn would lead to political stability. This he believed would prevent the advance of communism. Kennedy firmly believed that a strong India was vitally important to a free and politically stable Asia. Pakistan was alarmed at this attitude since it was a staunch ally of the United States. But Kennedy believed that flexibility in foreign affairs was more in the interest of the United States than rigid adherence to a policy of hostility towards nonaligned states. During the Kennedy era, the relationship of the United States with India was sometimes good and sometimes strained.

In aiding India, Kennedy encountered opposition, notably in the Congress. "By 1965, 51.7 per cent of total aid to India in all forms came from the United States, an amount over five times the assistance from any other single donor."<sup>14</sup> Initially the Bokaro Steel Plant was to be funded by America. There was stiff opposition by the critics in Congress. The Indian Government, therefore withdrew its request for aid to the Bokaro effort. Ultimately, it was funded by the Soviet Union in January 1965. In spite of the



fact that the plan to support Bokaro Steel Plant failed, Kennedy actively supported India throughout his administration. He encouraged aid without strings. His support in numerous agricultural projects enabled India to maintain price stability and ultimately to achieve economic growth during the Third Five - Year Plan.

Where India was concerned, Kennedy was confronted with two significant political episodes. Even after the British left India in 1947, the Portuguese remained, claiming rights to Goa, Daman and Diu. Since Portugal was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and was of strategic importance, the United States failed to exert pressure on it to leave India. Though publicly, the United States did say that the Portuguese presence in India was not right. The United States had supported a policy of anticolonialism as was evidenced by its support for newly independent states in Africa. Thus we see that American sentiments were rather mixed about the Goa issue. Nehru's last trip to the United States was on 5 November 1961, at the age of seventy-one. Nehru did not respond much to Kennedy's questions about Vietnam, Berlin and disarmament. This puzzled Kennedy. The meeting was a disaster.

America tried to dissuade India from using force to liberate Goa. Ambassador Galbraith met Nehru several times to persuade him to seek a solution through peaceful means. He tried to tell Nehru that India's reputation would suffer if force was used. However, at midnight on

December 17, 1961, the invasion began. The action was quick and decisive, and the fighting was over in twenty four hours leaving few casualties. The response of the United States though critical was short-lived.

Nehru had recognized the need to maintain friendly relations with China. He had supported China's entry into the United Nations. This had caused tension in the United States - Indian relations during the Eisenhower administration. India had signed a treaty with China known as Panchsheel on April 24, 1954. But China started violating the policies of Panchsheel as early as 1958. It started infringing on India's borders. War officially broke out on October 20, 1962, when Chinese troops began forcibly pushing back Indian troops from their previously established positions.

The Indo-American relations during the late 1950s had become quite friendly much to the annoyance of China. Secretary Dean Rusk had once said, "We must assist the sub-continent of Asia in its competition with Communist China."<sup>15</sup> This type of observation might have had its reaction in China that wanted to build a militant anti-United States front. The China war forced India to embrace the United States. Nehru's formal request for military weapons and equipments from the United States was immediately granted. Soon huge transport planes were ferrying emergency weapons and supplies to India. The Chinese campaign lasted for about a month was a one-sided affair. The Indian army was completely routed. Suddenly China declared a unilateral cease fire along the entire Sino-Indian frontier.

She also announced that starting on December 1, 1962, the Chinese frontier guard would withdraw to positions 20 kilometers behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on November 7, 1959. India had no choice but to accept an outcome that China had imposed at the point of a gun.<sup>16</sup>

China managed to destroy the image of India as an Asian power. Infact China established herself as a major threat to any nation in the area that dared to defy her will. After the cease-fire Kennedy sent a mission led by Averall Harriman to assess Indian defence needs and military aid requirements. This proved that the United States was willing to support a democratic nation at a time of Communist aggression and also wanted to expand its military ties with India. Because of the American ties with Pakistan, the United States was reluctant to take a larger role in India. It wanted to support India in such a way that India herself would be better equipped to handle the Chinese threats.

Kennedy was willing to give military aid to India but four days before the meeting with the National Security Council to discuss the subject, Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963. Nehru died the following year. The decision of the United States to approve the arms program for India was delayed due to pressure from Pakistan. Therefore, in August 1964 India turned to the Soviet Union. Thus we see that during the Kennedy administration, Indo-American relations reached a high point. This was

because of Kennedy's personal interest in India and his efforts to secure aid for India.

Lyndon Johnson became President of the United States in 1963. Johnson was sure footed on domestic matters but he was far less knowledgeable about foreign policy than his predecessor. White House needed to pay attention towards India's requirement for military aid and towards the deteriorating relations with Pakistan. Johnson was interested in containing communism but he was doubtful about favouring India. The major events which had a profound impact on Indo-American relations during the Johnson administration were : the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, the rupee devaluation of 1966, and the self-help / short-tether agricultural aid policies of the Johnson administration.

Serious clashes between India and Pakistan broke out on 9 April 1965 in a desolate and uninhabited marsh land called the Rann of Kutch. Pakistan claimed half the area and began sending military patrols to assert their claim. When India tried to stop them, fighting erupted on 9 April. India withdrew on 27 April as during the rainy season the troops would be cut off when the Rann flooded. India was angry with the United States because it had failed to prevent Pakistan from using United States military equipment against India. Earlier the United States had assured India that the arms would not be used against India. Pakistan justified it by saying that it had used it for self defense. The Johnson administration was not

interested in debating as to who was the aggressor. They were more interested in stopping the fight. In a testy exchange with secretary Rusk on 8 May, B.K. Nehru expressed dissatisfaction with the attitude of the United States.

While India hopes the Kutch question will be resolved, a more important question of principle is involved. U.S. assurances to India against Pakistani misuse of arms had been the foundation of Indian defense policy. If these assurances were eroded, it would be a very serious matter... as far as India was concerned, the U.S. reaction had been inadequate.<sup>17</sup>

Overconfident, Pakistan proceeded to implement operation Gibraltar in order to seize Kashmir. They decided to infiltrate some five thousand Pakistani trained guerrillas across the cease-fire line in order to stir an uprising in Kashmir. India responded by capturing many of the intruders and crossing the Kashmir cease-fire line they captured key passes and terrain features that the Pakistanis were using as infiltration routes. Operation Gibraltar seemed doomed. Pakistan then decided to cut the road that linked Srinagar with India. For this they used Patton tanks supplied by the United States to cross the cease-fire line in Southern Kashmir. President Johnson decided not to use the influence of the United States directly and to leave this to the United Nations. The United States would play a supportive role.

On 6 September the Indian Army struck across the international frontier only twenty miles east of the city of Lahore. The United States continued to rely on the United Nations to stop the war and held back from direct diplomatic intervention. Moscow too decided to support the United Nations efforts to stop the fighting. Finally, on 22 September, the fighting stopped. Both India and Pakistan accepted a demand by the Security Council for a cease-fire. Both sides lost heavily in men and material and neither gained a decisive military advantage but India had the better of the war. In January 1966 the Tashkent agreement was signed by India and Pakistan. Just hours after signing the accord, India's Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri suffered a fatal heart attack.

The policy of the United States during the 1965 war pleased neither India nor Pakistan. India was irked by the failure of the United States to prevent the use of American arms despite repeated promises that it would do so. India was also embittered about the stopping of military and economic assistance to both India and Pakistan. After all it was Pakistan that launched operation Gibraltar. Pakistan was more offended than India because Washington was supposed to be their ally. Therefore Pakistan entered into a close relationship with communist China. During this time the United States became more absorbed in the Vietnam War and therefore South Asia's strategic priorities declined.

In the meanwhile the donor countries especially America were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with India's economic performance. They were concerned that their assistance was not being utilized properly. Therefore in 1964, the World Bank at the initiative of its President George Woods decided to study ways of improving India's economic performance. The International Monetary Fund too felt that this should be done. Bernard Bell, a member of the World Bank Staff, was directed by Woods, to conduct a comprehensive review of the Indian economy and to give suggestions to improve India's economy. By August 1965, Bell's mission had completed the bulk of its task and submitted the report to George Woods. At that time the Johnson administration also wanted to bring about major changes in India's economic policies, in general, and agricultural policies in particular.

In April 1966 Ashoka Mehta, the planning minister, visited Washington and negotiated an agreement with World Bank President Woods. There would be a major liberalization of import controls and simplified procedures to speed up India's system of industrial licensing.

Woods for his part pledged on the Consortium's behalf to attempt to raise the total aid level to \$ 1.6 billion (including \$ 900 million in program assistance) from its previous level of approximately \$ 1.2 billion. Although there was no specific mention of the devaluation of the rupee in the

agreement, both sides assumed that it would be a necessary part of the reform package.<sup>18</sup>

On June 5, 1966, India announced a 58 per cent cut in the exchange rate of the rupee. Bowles, involvement in the devaluation was marginal. Though he strongly favoured devaluation, there is no evidence that he persuaded Indira Gandhi to agree to it. In India, Indira Gandhi and her finance minister Sachin Chaudhari, came under severe attack both in Parliament and in the left wing press, essentially for caving in under the pressure of the United States. It was probably because of this that Gandhi publicly criticized the United States for its involvement in Vietnam and sent Ashoka Mehta to Moscow to obtain pledges of aid. Hence, America, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund failed to get India to alter her economic priorities.

Due to the failure of the monsoons, a drought like condition prevailed in India in 1966. Therefore India was compelled to seek food assistance from the United States. Earlier India had criticized the United States for not being able to prevent Pakistan from using arms supplied by America against India. Further, India had criticized the involvement of the United States in Vietnam. All this had embittered Indo American relations.

The PL-480 Agreement ended on 31 June, 1965. India wanted a new agreement months before the expiry of the old one. But President Johnson



wanted India to fulfil certain conditions before negotiating a new agreement. In the words of President Johnson:

What we call the short tether policy was profoundly unpopular among India's leaders, especially the strong advocates of industrialization. It was hardly popular with those in our own government who considered aid to India essential to the survival of that country and to its continued existence as a democracy.<sup>19</sup>

In early 1966, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited Washington, where she agreed to carry out a number of economic reforms, including changes in India's food procurement and distribution policies, the de-licensing of some industries, and the devaluation of the rupee. Hence, the United States made substantial amounts of foreign aid available for India's continued agricultural and industrial development. During her visit to the Soviet Union in 1966, Gandhi criticised the action of the United States in Vietnam. Herein started the ill-fated short-tether policy. Chester Bowles expressed strong reservations about this policy but he was ignored by the White House. Johnson wanted India to desist from further criticism of America but India stood its ground on the Vietnam issue. In mid 1967, Johnson did release the last shipments of wheat. The short-tether policy had failed. All this made Indian decision makers even more wary and unsure of America's intentions. On the other hand, America felt that at the time of a grave national need, one does not literally snap at the hand that

is providing food. Following the three episodes during the Johnson era, the interest of the United States in South Asia was one of benign neglect.

In January 1969, Richard Nixon replaced Lyndon Johnson in the White House. His main foreign policy concern was to put an end to the unpopular war in Vietnam. After eight years as Vice President under Eisenhower, Nixon was quite an expert on foreign affairs. At the start of his administration, Nixon's aim was to have good relations with both India and Pakistan. In August 1969, he visited India and Pakistan. He was not welcomed very warmly in India and official meetings were low key. In Pakistan, he received a warmer welcome. There he met President Yahya Khan. Pakistan still resented the arms restrictions imposed by the United States. The close ties which Pakistan had developed with China was now utilised by Nixon. He asked Yahya Khan to convey to China his interest in an opening to China. This was followed by two years of secret diplomatic exchanges through the Pakistanis which finally led to Kissinger's trip to Beijing in July 1971. Kissinger wrote:

By 1971, our relations with India had achieved a state of exasperatedly strained cordiality like a couple that can neither separate nor get along. Our relations with Pakistan were marked by a superficial friendliness that had little concrete content.<sup>20</sup>

In March 1971, Indira Gandhi won the general elections and consolidated her control over the Indian political system. In October 1970, Nixon agreed to sell Pakistan 300 aircraft worth about \$ 50 million. India was annoyed at this while Pakistan was quite pleased though it had hoped for more.

Vietnam became a cause of tension when India annoyed America when she talked of raising the level of its diplomatic mission in Hanoi to an Embassy. But after America's warning that it would cut off aid which still remained an important source of foreign funds for Indian development, Indira Gandhi decided not to lose it for an act of political symbolism. Another irritant in Indo-American relations during this period was New Delhi's decision to close down the five centres of United States Information Service (USIS) in India. This was because the United States refused to place the USIS under the auspices of the Indian Council on Cultural Relations (ICCR). While Soviet Union agreed to put the proposed Trivandrum center under the ICCR.

In 1970, the United Nations celebrated its 25th anniversary, Indira Gandhi attended the ceremonies at New York. She gracelessly turned down Nixon's invitation for dinner at the White House. Nixon asked Yahya Khan, the Pakistani President who was planning a trip to Beijing to tell the Chinese leaders that he regarded Sino-American rapprochement as essential. Meanwhile the Soviets formed closer links with India while

border clashes with China in March 1969 brought the Sino-Soviet split to the boiling point. Indo-Pakistani relations were full of tension and suspicion. Moscow wanted Pakistan to have looser ties with China but Pakistan rebuffed Moscow's call. In 1971, the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship was signed.

Gandhi is a pragmatic nationalist. She signed a 20 year Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the Soviet Union on the eve of the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971 to counter balance the United States Pakistan-China alignment.<sup>21</sup>

India and Pakistan went to the polls during the winter of 1970-1971. The pro-East Pakistan autonomy Awami League won a majority in the proposed National Assembly. It won 167 of 169 seats in the east, but won none in West Pakistan. In March 1971, Indira Gandhi won a landslide victory. She won 362 of 520 seats in Parliament. In March, political developments in the two wings of Pakistan culminated in a civil war between East and West Pakistan. As the situation escalated into a full scale war between Pakistani troops and Mukti Bahini - the Bengali freedom force- millions of terror stricken East Pakistanis fled to the neighbouring state of West Bengal in India. Indira Gandhi's government came under a lot of pressure from the Indian people to recognize a free government in Bangladesh, and intervention of the Indian army on behalf of forces of liberation. On 3 December, 1971, Yahya Khan declared war on India.

The war ended on December 19, 1971, when the Pakistani army surrendered unconditionally in Bangladesh. Pakistan had acted as a mediator in normalizing relations between America and China. Therefore it could count fully on the support of both the United States and China. Nixon warned India that his government would not approve of any intervention by India in a Pakistani affair that was strictly internal. Henry Kissinger, then national security advisor to the President, stopped in New Delhi prior to his secret trip to Peking. He informed the Indian government that, "if China entered the fray between India and Pakistan, India must not expect any help from the United States."<sup>22</sup> Therefore, on the eve of the third Indo-Pakistani war, the United States and China stood behind Pakistan while the Soviet Union backed India. Hence, direct intervention on behalf of either party was prevented though it did not stop the war that ended in the dismemberment of Pakistan.

On 2nd December, 1971, Washington announced a suspension of military sales to India. On 6 December, the United States froze its economic assistance to India, including \$ 87.6 million worth of aid already in the pipeline. On 10 December, Nixon ordered a show of United States naval force, directing the aircraft carrier Enterprise with supporting vessels to proceed as task Group 74 from the Far East to the Bay of Bengal. Its stated mission was to aid in the possible evacuation of United States personnel in Dacca. Probably, the Americans wanted to show the Chinese that, if they

entered into a relationship with the United States, they could count on its steadfastness in times of trouble. The policy of the United States angered the Indians. In a scorching letter to Nixon released to the New York Times on 15 December, Indira Gandhi asserted that the United States paid :

Lip service to the need for a political solution, but not a single worthwhile step was taken to bring this about.... we are deeply hurt by the innuendoes and insinuations that it was we who have precipitated the crisis.... We have not received, even to this day, the barest framework of a settlement which takes into account the facts as they are.<sup>23</sup>

In return Nixon rebuked Indira for not finding a peaceful solution to the crisis which could have prevented a war.

The 1971 events had moderate effect on Indo-American foreign relations. The impact of the United States on the dispute was very little, and its outcome had little or no impact on important interests of the United States. The incursion of the Enterprise task force into the Indian Ocean was also of little or no actual importance. Indians were probably supposed to see it as a threat. Indian policies were not affected by it. Public opinion in America and elsewhere sympathised with the people of East Pakistan. They felt that the Bengalis were entitled to separate themselves from Pakistan as they had been discriminated and there was ethnic differences between the two wings of the country. Therefore, for a while Bangladesh

widened the gap between American public opinion that was sympathetic to India's role in the 1971 crisis and the American Government that was highly critical of it.

Infact the most important outcome of the war was that India realized that the United States would not help India against China. The moral support that China and the United States gave Pakistan during 1971, raised Indian fears that the three countries were forming a strategic entente that would threaten India. Hence, India signed the treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union (1971) which alarmed the United States. For the United States the outcome of the war was the deep antipathy that American policies generated in India. By the time the war ended in December 1971, relations between India and America had soured.

On July 3, 1972, the Simla Agreement was signed by Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Both sides agreed to resolve their differences through bilateral and peaceful means. The Simla accord changed the attitude of the United States towards the Kashmir dispute. Washington now supported any settlement the Indians and Pakistanis were able to work out.

Nixon made a modest gesture to improve relations with India. He sent Secretary of the Treasury John Connally, a person whom he greatly respected, to meet Indira Gandhi during an around- the -world trip. Nixon

made a further gesture by selecting as Keating's replacement as ambassador, Daniel Patrick Moynihan. In the opinion of Moynihan, the Bangladesh affair had been messed up by Nixon. Even though Nixon regarded India as a stooge of the Soviets, he could not ignore a big democratic country that is India. T.N. Kaul was nominated as ambassador to Washington.

India was now not willing to request the United States for aid as it was America that had cut off the aid. It was now up to the United States to take the initiative in turning on the aid tap. Infact in 1972 after poor rains, India used scarce foreign exchange to buy wheat from the United States commercially rather than seek a resumption of PL 480 aid.

Another problem that worried Moynihan was that Indian rupees had mounted up in the United States as since 1954, India paid for food aid with rupees deposited into a special interest-bearing account with the Reserve Bank of India. Gradually the deposits grew because of the enormous size of the PL 480 food shipments and the limited possibility for spending the rupees. India was worried that this money could be used by the United States to de-stabilize the Indian economy. Moynihan and Kaul set about to solve the rupee problem. With some difficulty it was finally decided to write off \$ 2.2 billion worth of rupees and retain \$ 1.1 billion for the use of the United States. The formal signing took place in New Delhi on 18 February 1974. Moynihan presented the Government of India a cheque



for \$ 2.2 billion worth of rupees. Both Moynihan and Nixon deserve credit for this. The prospects for a resumption of bilateral assistance improved but before anything was worked out a new problem came up.

On 18 May 1974, India exploded an underground nuclear device at Pokharan in the deserts of Rajasthan. The explosion made India the world's sixth nuclear power. According to a report by the United States House Committee on International Relations.

The effect of the Indian explosion on the U.S. Congress was profound and far - reaching. Indeed, the concern that U.S. peaceful nuclear exports might be diverted for nuclear explosive purposes, as occurred in the Indian case, contributed greatly to numerous congressional initiatives designed to combat such proliferation.<sup>24</sup>

The initial reaction of the United States was to criticize the Indian test as a damaging breach in the non-proliferation wall. Kissinger was of the opinion that since the act was already done, if India was criticized publicly, it would only add to bilateral problems between India and America. Canada was also annoyed as the plutonium used in the test was produced in a research reactor the Canadian's had given India. Hence Canada cut off nuclear cooperation with India.

Shortly afterwards Pakistan announced that it would launch its own peaceful nuclear program. In the United States both the Republicans and

Democrats were not happy about the explosion. The Democrats were more critical and wanted to end nuclear cooperation with India. Nixon resigned in August 1974 and the issue was left simmering. India's attempt to absorb the tiny protectorate of Sikkim further damaged India's image. The action received a lot of publicity as the ruler of Sikkim was married to Hope Cooke a former citizen of the United States.

Gerald Ford succeeded Richard Nixon as President of the United States in August 1974. He had limited experience in dealing with South Asia. His secretary of State Henry Kissinger tried to improve Indo-American relations during his three days stay in New Delhi in October 1974. He stressed the United States acceptance of India as one of the major powers of the world. Indira Gandhi had periodically thrown allegations on the United States for its interference in India's internal affairs. This was denied by Kissinger. During his stay Kissinger and Chavan signed an agreement to establish an Indo-American Joint-Commission.

In 1975, William Saxbe was nominated as the new Ambassador to India. He was known for political independence and public frankness. India wanted to be friendly to the new ambassador. But once again problem arose due to the United States - Pakistan arms relationship. Z.A. Bhutto visited Washington in February 1975. He wanted Washington to lift the embargo on sales of new weapons systems. Since there was a large inflow of Soviet arms to India, Kissinger felt that India had little cause to

complain if Pakistan bought modest amounts of weapons from the United States- perhaps \$ 100 million annually. Hence, on 24th February 1975, the State Department announced the lifting of the embargo.

The reaction in India was very bitter. India felt that this would hamper the process of normalization between India and Pakistan. T.N. Kaul was more vehement in his opposition to the lifting of the arms embargo. Saxbe who liked India became pessimistic about the prospects for better relations. He felt that if India wanted to make an enemy of the United States, there was nothing that America would do. By the mid 1970s India no longer had great strategic importance for the United States.

By 1975, Indira Gandhi stood at the peak of her power. But when she found herself in grave political danger she struck back with all vehemence. The President of India, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad, at the behest of Indira Gandhi proclaimed a national emergency during the night of 24 June 1975. The press was censored and civil liberties were restricted.

While the United States refrained officially from criticizing the eclipse of democracy in India, a great deal of criticism of Mrs. Gandhi and her government was evident in the American press and among influential groups in the private sector.<sup>25</sup>

The biggest advantage which India had was its adherence to democracy. Therefore when India ceased to be a democracy, the interest of the United States in India waned.

Another problem that arose towards the end of the Ford administration in 1976 was the shipping of enriched uranium fuel for the Tarapur nuclear power plant. There was a legal binding supply contract between the United States and Indian Atomic Energy Commission and satisfactory safeguards were in place. But after the May 1974 test, the Tarapur fuel shipments became the focus of controversy. Finally it was decided to delay the decision until after the 1976 United States Presidential elections.

Jimmy Carter became the President of the United States in 1976. The prospects for Indo-American relations were mixed. Respect for human rights was a major principle of Carter's foreign policy. This was bound to collide with the Emergency declared in India. Earlier Carter had criticized Ford's response to the Indian test as too weak. Hence, now he would have to decide how to deal with India. Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brezezinski sketched out a foreign policy agenda that gave India a higher priority than had been the case under Nixon and Ford.

A major irritant in Indo-American relations was removed when unexpectedly Indira ended the emergency, easing restrictions on democratic rights, releasing thousands from jail and scheduling the general elections for March 1977. In February, India's President, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad passed away. Carter sent his mother Lillian Carter to represent the United States at the funeral. Earlier in the 1960s at

the age of sixty she had served as a Peace Corps volunteer for two years near Bombay. This gesture proved that Carter took personal interest to better relations with India.

In the elections, Indira Gandhi and her Congress Party suffered an expected defeat while the Janta Front won a landslide victory. At the age of eighty one, Morarji Desai became India's fourth Prime Minister. Both Carter and Desai owed their victory to popular reaction against major domestic trauma - the Watergate scandal in the United States and the Emergency in India. For America, the results of the elections in India was good news. Similarly, Morarji Desai was friendly towards the United States and critical of the Soviet Union. Robert Goheen born in India of missionary parents was selected as ambassador to India while Nani Palkhivala, a respected Bombay lawyer was selected as ambassador to America.

Carter sincerely believed that the United States should not be in the business of promoting sales of sophisticated weaponry to the subcontinent. Therefore he rejected the Proposal for the sale of A-7, Fighter bomber aircraft to Pakistan. He also considered talks with the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear arms limitations. One idea was to put a total ban on nuclear testing through a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The other was the possible demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. India approved of this though earlier India was opposed to big power naval presence in the region.

Carter visited New Delhi in 1978. Both Carter and Desai emphasized support for democracy and economic development and expressed their opposition to war. Just when Indo-American relations had improved the United States passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.

When the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, or NNPA, became law in 1978, it established new, more stringent non-proliferation conditions for inclusion in new agreement for cooperation and required... the President to initiate a program to seek to update existing agreements to include the new standards.<sup>26</sup>

Where India was concerned she was to place all her nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, then only the United States would export nuclear materials to India. But India refused to accept the full scope safeguards as it was unjust. India would in a way loose her sovereignty. Desai warned the United States that if America blocked the enriched uranium shipment, India would regard it as a breach of the Tarapur contract. The United States did not approve of India reprocessing the Tarapur spent fuel. But then what was India to do with the nuclear waste. Therefore the Tarapur question remained unresolved in 1979.

By early 1979, it became clear that Pakistan was developing a nuclear program of her own. The Carter administration was compelled to invoke

the Symington amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. Hence, the relation of United States and Pakistan deteriorated further. Desai resigned in July 1979, to be replaced by Charan Singh. He adopted a tougher line on nuclear policy than Desai. In the January 1980 elections, Indira Gandhi returned to power.

On 27 December 1979, just a week before the elections, the Soviet Union intervened militarily in Afghanistan. They removed President Amin and installed a more pliable Babrak Kamal regime. For America this was a grave threat to regional stability, international peace and American interests in the Gulf region. Therefore, America took several steps to force the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan or to increase the cost of their military presence in Afghanistan.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had a deep impact on the policy of the United States towards South Asia. From now on, Pakistan became a frontline state. The Carter administration and the Congress decided to unfreeze arms sales to Pakistan as at the moment this was more important for them than non-proliferation. Efforts were made to get around Symington amendment bars and to provide military and economic aid to Pakistan.

Charan Singh expressed his indignation over the Soviet military operations in Afghanistan. Indira Gandhi who came to power in January

1980, did not respond very vehemently. In his statement on 11 January 1980, Indian representative to the United Nations B.C. Mishra, whitewashed the Soviet action.

.... We are against the presence of foreign troops and bases in any country. However, the Soviet Government has assured our Government that its troops went to Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan Government.... will be withdrawn when requested to do so by the Afghan Government.<sup>27</sup>

India had no reason to doubt a friendly country like the Soviet Union. All those who were hoping that India would take an impartial stand were shocked. America took these remarks very seriously. While India tried to explain away the remarks less seriously. On 23 January 1980 Carter declared that any move by the Soviet Union towards the oil rich Persian Gulf would be regarded by the United States as a threat to the vital interests of the United States and would be countered by all means, including the use of force.

The Carter administration's effort to resume United States arms aid to Pakistan during 1980 did not prove fruitful as Pakistani military near General Zia-ul-Haque played hard to get. They wanted maximum benefit out of it. He rejected the proffered \$ 400 million as foreign aid by America as peanuts. In spite of India's stand on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration did not ignore India. They did not want to push



India closer to the Soviets as they felt she might have some influence with the Soviets. Infact where Tarapur was concerned, Carter decided to give the green light for two more enriched uranium fuel shipments for Tarapur. This would have been the last shipment 'legally possible under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act because India had not agreed to full scope safeguards. But the Carter administration faced opposition by the Tarapur opponents.

To conclude it is obvious that at the end of Carter's term in the White House, relations between India and America stood about where they were at the beginning (in 1947). Expectations were high with the end of Emergency in India. With Desai in power, it was hoped that Indo-American relations would run smoothly for quite some time. This was because India was more balanced about non-alignment and Washington distanced itself from Pakistan. Tarapur did cause problems but given time it could have been settled amicably. But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused friction in Indo-American relations.

Relations between India and America worsened when Ronald Reagan won the November 1980 elections. His aim was to stem communism at all costs and he was critical of Carter's policies towards the Soviet Union. During the Reagan era, arms supply to Pakistan received top priority and he was not much concerned about India's reaction either.

## NOTES

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## **Chapter - 2**

# **Pakistan as a Factor in Indo-American Foreign Relations**

India and United States, the two largest democracies of the present time are closely linked for they share a number of aims, ideological postulates and historical experiences and yet ironically there appears to be a sinister gap between them due to the strategic national interest and the Pakistan factor. Pakistan has always been an obstruction in the smooth functioning of the Indo-American relations. It is significant to note that India's relations with Pakistan has been marred ever since partition merely due to intense rivalry and therefore obstinate Pakistan often emerges as a significant factor in straining Indo-American relationships along with several other factors.

The partition of India into India and Pakistan, did eliminate some grave problems but at the same time sowed seeds of hostilities which were of various types. It would not be an exaggeration to say that thereafter the survival of peace and tranquility on the Indian sub-continent seemed a distant dream. Partition has served as a perennial source of wars

(dismemberment of the original state of Pakistan), and great power manipulation (and the vow to maintain perpetual unrest in the area). The initial problems that had arisen due to partition have been stagnating upto date without any signs of solution. Some of the many problems that surfaced were the territorial claims over Kashmir, disproportionate arms acquisition as perceived by the other, the sensitive communal situation as exemplified by the Hindu - Muslim divide in India, for the new Muslim 'Homeland' in the subcontinent which could not carry with it the entire Muslim population, the nuclear question, and last but not the least the psychological hang over which the partition of undivided India left in its wake have acquired a stability that seems impossible to eradicate.

Pakistan did not have a very close relationship with the United States during its first six years of existence and obviously, its impact upon American consciousness was virtually nil. Once an American congressman who happened to visit Karachi soon after Independence was questioned by a Pakistani reporter as to what was the view of the Americans of Pakistan, he said : "My boy, they've never ever heard of it!"<sup>1</sup> Undoubtedly the story is spurious but nevertheless it has a point. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the father of Pakistan was not known as well as the two great leaders of the new Indian states, and died within a very short span of time after Independence. His chief lieutenant Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan's visit in May 1950 gave the officials in Washington an opportunity to procure primary information regarding Pakistan's interests

and policies. None the less it could not inculcate, as much interest or popularity as Nehru's first visit a few months prior to it. Understandably, Pakistan had delved in an effort to lay the foundation of nationhood along with an attempt to deal with urgent internal problems and thus had very little opportunity to participate in world affairs. Until 1953 its foreign policy may be described as 'neutralist'. In 1951 Liaquat Ali Khan stated that, "sometimes we agreed with the Western bloc, and sometimes with the communist bloc, as the situation and the matter under consideration demanded."<sup>2</sup>

It is obvious that there is a lucid difference in perspective with which India and United States approach Pakistan. India lives with the brutal memories of the partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947 wherein social and political tensions had reached its peak due to widespread communal differences and mass migrations. Major issues remain unresolved between India and Pakistan uptil now though a few uneven progress has been registered.

Their persistence has deepened the frustration, distrust, and anxiety that have marked India's approach to Pakistan. Inevitably India's continuing anxiety about Pakistan and the emotional tension between the two countries have affected Indian estimates of American policies toward Pakistan.<sup>3</sup>

The relationship between Pakistan and United States were more or less in an oblivious state upto 1954 for thereafter the two countries indulged in an alliance relationship through four pacts:

- a) Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, May 1954,
- b) SEATO, (South East Asia Treaty Organisation) September, 1955,
- c) Baghdad Pact, September, 1955,
- d) Agreement of Co-operation, March 1959.

The Baghdad Pact was redesigned a Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) when Iraq, after the revolution of 1958, left it. It may be noted that the U.S. was not a formal member of this pact but in practice participated in all its activities.<sup>4</sup>

Initially the Pakistani leaders were gripped by insecurity and instability and so at the very first opportunity turned to the United States for political, economic and military support. In turn, the United States too benefitted with its military alliance with Pakistan. The weakest and most unstable country in South Asia too was strengthened through this alliance. Whereas Pakistan through this found an access to the United States arms market.



A conflict of interest brought about by a drastic difference in the security interests of the United States and India especially pertaining to Southern Asia became evident. United States views security relationship in the region from a global perspective while India views it from a regional and national security standpoint. It is explicit that Pakistan is the very basic cause of this difference in thinking.

United States failed in its attempt to develop a close and friendly relationship with India in the Cold War era and thus naturally this led to it being partial towards Pakistan after the second world war. This was because the Prime Minister of India, Jawahar Lal Nehru was adamant about India's Policy of non-alignment. This annoyed the United States and thus India was viewed as pro-communist. It was thus obvious that Pakistan would then be the ultimate choice as an ally of United States in the region.

On August 9, 1971 the Soviet Union and India signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi expressed her high appreciation of the Treaty, saying that it served the cause of peace and would strengthen the country and the nation. The Soviet Union viewed it as an important factor for peace and international security. The treaty was highly valued by leaders of socialist and non-aligned countries and by progressive public organisations. But the Western press condemned India and alleged that India had renounced its policy of

non-alignment and joined the Soviet bloc. This treaty was one of the most important factors for the evolution of a warm and friendly relation of the United States with Pakistan. With the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, came new incentives to protect regions of the Middle East and the Indian sub-continent from further Russian exploitation and expansion. The invasion, "... gave regional Security considerations a prominence unmatched since 1975. On the sub-continent, these intensified security considerations produced yet new links with Pakistan in the form of military and economic aid."<sup>5</sup> The Reagan administration was willing to provide military and economic aid to any country who was willing to join the United States in its efforts to counter Soviet influence. Within this context, it announced a "\$ 3.18 billion arms and economic aid to Pakistan in 1981. The arms package proposed the sale of forty long-range F16 fighter bombers to Pakistan, the most modern sensitive radar as well as other military personnel carriers."<sup>6</sup> The reason for this was to enable Pakistan to handle cross-border threats from the Soviet or Soviet-backed Afghan forces and to prevent the Soviets from coercing Pakistan in any manner. The United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick expressed the view that the arming of Pakistan "was neither an actual or intended threat to India"<sup>7</sup>.

Since the partition of India in 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three wars. The United States has continuously armed Pakistan since 1954 and not India. Despite all assurances to India the only action after the

Bangladesh war (1971) was to institute an embargo against further arms shipments to Pakistan. New Delhi is unaware of the restrictions if any, which have been imposed on Pakistan as to the direction the arms can be fired. India's claim is that at present it does not have anything in its arsenal to match the F-16s given to Pakistan by the United States. The F-16s have the long-distance capacity and is therefore within range of every major industrial city, military installations and nuclear facility in India. India feels that this will only result in an arms race among nations that should be concentrating on economic development. In addition it will make the Third World countries dependent on the great powers for military aid in their regional struggle for security. The announcement of the sale of F-16 aircraft and other advanced military hardware to Pakistan was made on 15 June 1981 in Islamabad.

In an interview with Steve Patton of United States News and World Report, on 15 February, 1982, Indira Gandhi the then Prime Minister of India said that there is an American tilt against India. She said :

Pakistan has attacked us - I think it was four or five times - so we can't forget that. And in 1954 the Pakistanis had assured President Eisenhower that they would not use their U.S. supplied arms against India. But they did. Now, this time we are told that the guns can face any direction. ... Just because we exploded our entirely peaceful nuclear device, we were being blamed and there was a lot of propaganda against us and so on. But to give

these F-16 planes to Pakistan, the U.S. is willing to bypass the Symington amendment, even though Pakistan probably will not use those weapons for peaceful purposes.<sup>8</sup>

Whatever be the potential impact of arming Pakistan it was magnified considerably as Reagan continued to talk of the need to arm China as well. This means India being encircled by a hostile Sino-Pakistan alliance supported by the United States. Clearly, if the United States pursues security arrangements with Pakistan and China and ignores India it could only weaken India's role in the region and nudge it closer to the Soviet Union.

"Reagan had thus begun to comprehend the feasibility and desirability of friendship and co-operation with both India and Pakistan."<sup>9</sup> This attitude, as well as Indo-Pakistan talks of no-war might lead to goodwill and co-operation between the United States, India, and Pakistan much to the benefit of all. Prior to the Afghan crisis the United States administration had viewed Pakistan as an insignificant power in the region because they violated human rights, tried to acquire nuclear weapons capability. Carter's affinity toward India, Iran and Saudi Arabia had emerged as America's principal allies in the Persian Gulf region, and the administration's proclaimed policy of disengagement from the India Ocean. Therefore, one can conclude that the Afghan crisis, suddenly made Pakistan the most important country in the region to contain the

Soviet Union. This had led President Carter to offer Pakistan a \$ 400 million assistance package in February 1980, but this was considered peanuts by the Pakistanis for substantial security cooperation.

Unlike Carter, President Reagan went all out to challenge the Soviets anywhere in the world and hence the Afghan crisis provided an excellent opportunity. Reagan and his team therefore rejected Carter's pre-December 1979 arms restraint, non-proliferation and human rights policies. In the bargain Pakistan emerged as a strategically important state. This resulted in a manifold increase in the American arms and economic aid to Pakistan in the 1980's. This enormously bolstered Pakistan's defense capabilities despite the concerns expressed by India. "By 1985, Pakistan became the fourth largest recipient of American bilateral military assistance, after Israel, Egypt and Turkey. With the approval of the \$ 4.02 billion military and economic aid package in 1987, Pakistan emerged as the second largest recipient of American aid, after Israel."<sup>10</sup> Henceforth, in some respects the Afghan crisis facilitated the influence of the United States over Pakistan. This also vice-versa proves that Pakistan was successful in demonstrating the leverage a dependent nation could exert on America. They rejected Carter's initial aid offer so that they could influence Washington to provide them with greater economic and military assistance. This they got in the form of F-16 aircraft in place of the earlier proposed but less advanced F-5G aircraft.

Buoyed by developments in the Afghan resistance, the Reagan administration decided in 1986 to increase military and economic aid to Pakistan from \$ 3.2 billion for 1981-86 to \$ 4.02 billion for 1987-93. The important rationale for the new assistance was that it would help quicken the Soviet withdrawal and serve as a deterrent against further violations of Pakistan's sovereignty by Afghan air raids. The arms supplies also helped the U.S. maintain Islamabad's interest in assisting the rebel forces headquartered in Peshawar. Moreover, it enabled the rebels to receive weapons and supplies without succumbing to Soviet offers for a conditional pullout and substantial economic and military assistance.<sup>11</sup>

The leaders in Pakistan turned to America for political, economic and military support because they wanted security and stability. The United States also gained from its alliance with Pakistan as it strengthened the weakest and most unstable country in South Asia i.e. Pakistan. In return Pakistan was able to get an access to the American arms market. There is a misconception as to when the Pakistan - United States security relations were conceived. President Truman, in his message to the Quaid-I-Azam on Independence Day had affirmed, "I wish to assure you that the new Dominion embarks on its course with the firm friendship and goodwill of U.S."<sup>12</sup>

Regarding the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union Mrs. Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India responded neither in favour of the

Soviet Union nor against the United States. During President Leonid Brezhnev's (of the Soviet Union) visit to New Delhi via Islamabad Indira Gandhi met him very friendly and frankly. She said, "We are neither pro-Russian nor Pro-American. We are Pro-Indian."<sup>13</sup> Indira Gandhi outlined America's hot and cold foreign policy towards the Third World, especially India. She was very explicit about her disapproval of the American desire to arm Pakistan. India's stand on Afghanistan has oscillated between strong support and mild censure. It is clear to the world community that India has supported her time-tested and durable ally - the Soviet Union. In that context, any ambiguity on Indira Gandhi's part would have seriously de-stabilised the strategic relationship which has stood India in a good stead in the past, and is certain to pay dividends in the future. India's alignment with Pakistan, China and the United States against the Soviet Union was out of question. Any measured censure of the Soviet action in Afghanistan could only have cost India a valued and trusted friendship, without compensation from any other quarter. At least in this way India could influence Moscow's thinking and actions as a friend. India's only interest on the Afghanistan chess game is to safeguard her borders. At first, what seemed to be a betrayal of non-alignment was in effect a carefully calculated response intended to shock American policy makers into not taking India for granted and consulting more closely the one country the very same policy makers admit is the region's predominant power. India's stand was designed to embrace a long-term and more realistic view of the crisis.

Pakistan has been a perennial factor in Indo-American relations. It is clear that for years since the creation of Pakistan, she has developed an India fixation. Therefore, her one point program has been of considering India as the main adversary instead of developing co-operative relationship. In her plans of India- baiting Pakistan has utilized American cold war perception of the Soviet expansionism to the hilt. Domestically, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came at the right time for Zia, as it enabled him to continue in power.

Soon after the return of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to power in 1980, she sent the then foreign Secretary, Ram Sathe, to Islamabad to reassure Pakistan that India had no intention to exploit its security concerns. India also renewed its offer to sign a "No War" pact. However Zia rejected the offer.<sup>14</sup>

As it has been pointed out earlier the United States obsession with the Soviet power and the need to check it manifested itself again under the Reagan administration in the 1980s. According to Reagan the United States had become militarily inferior to the Soviet Union during the Carter administration. Personally he felt the Soviet Union had to be fought at all levels. Therefore Indo-American relations came to be dealt by the United States - Soviet rivalry. As stated earlier, the United States felt that India was leaning towards the Soviet Union in international affairs therefore they used Pakistan to check India. In fact the Reagan administration was



willing to go beyond the Carter Administration in assisting Pakistan. India's protests against the arming of Pakistan by the United States fell on deaf ears. The Reagan administration argued that the military aid to Pakistan was necessary in order to help Pakistan to face the threat from across the borders. Anyone familiar with the Indo-Pakistani relations will know that Pakistan used American weapons against India in 1965 and 1971. American policy makers are aware of the fact that their own perception of United States military aid to Pakistan does not square with Pakistan's perception of it.

One cannot deny the fact that Pakistan's security was threatened by the presence of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan. No country wishes to have a powerful nation as its neighbour especially when it has become a neighbour by the invasion of another neighbour. Pakistan's leaders have said more than once that they do not wish to commit suicide by directly confronting the Soviet Union. Therefore it would have been advantageous for Indo-Pakistan amity if instead of arming itself Pakistan had normalized its relationship with India. If we accept the fact (for a while) that the United States supplied F-16s to Pakistan because it was vulnerable to the Soviet threat, how is it going to justify the arming of the "Pakistani Navy with Harpoon missiles."<sup>15</sup> These could be used only against the Indian Navy, some Americans argue that this was done to keep the Pakistani Navy satisfied as much of the United States military aid would strengthen only Pakistan's Army and Air Force. This was the first time that the United

States - foreign policy has been determined under the compulsions of another nation's domestic problems. Therefore, the purpose of arming the Pakistani Navy goes beyond the extent of just taking note of the internal rivalries in the armed forces of Pakistan. The manner in which the United States - Pakistani relationship was consummated also exhibited needless insensitivity to India.

Thus we see, that the United States failed to assure India that the arms supplied to Pakistan were not to be used against India. They did not make any effort to provide military support to India nor did they dispatch a high ranking presidential representative to discuss emerging American Policy. Earlier the Carter administration had taken all these steps to placate Indian sensitivities. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, a United States Official did come to India but she is known for her pro-Pakistani inclinations and anti-Indian ones. Hence, it did not soothe the tensions in India. Moreover, she had not come to visit India especially but rather all the South Asian countries. In essence, the Reagan administration's evolving military relationship with Pakistan exhibited unnecessary insensitivity to Indian concerns. The reason for this insensitivity was that the key to the United States foreign policy was resistance to the Soviet Union. Any country that did not understand this was itself to be resisted. The Reagan administration officials no doubt must have recalled that one of the main reasons that Islamabad had dismissed the Carter administration's aid offer as peanuts was because it perceived excessive sensitivity to Indian

concerns in making the offer. Thus the Reagan administration counter-compensated for Pakistani suspicions by showing an exaggerated though for the Indian's very real, insensitivity to India. Finally, the Reagan administration felt that even if they assured India that arms supplied to Pakistan were not to be used against it, India would not find these assurances credible.

In 1987, the Reagan administration pressed ahead with another six-year allotment of military / economic assistance for Islamabad worth \$ 4.02 billion. Certain features of the new programme were noteworthy. First, unlike the 1981-1986 package, the military component was smaller than the economic one. Second, in real terms, the annual Foreign Military Sales (FMS) portion was less than the 1981-1986 amounts. Third, however, the higher concessionality of the package meant that the reduced military dimension was somewhat misleading. Still, it is true that the 1987-1993 security assistance package was smaller than the 1981-1986 one and considerably less than what Pakistan had been seeking.<sup>16</sup>

The Reagan administration's response to Indian criticism regarding Pakistan's Nuclear programme was not only insensitive but less credible than they had been compared to justifying arms for Pakistan. It was obvious that the United States was rewarding a nuclear proliferator by giving it arms aid. The Reagan administration justified its military relationship with Pakistan by saying that the Soviets continued to occupy

Afghanistan. Finally the Reagan administration felt that by giving military and economic aid to Pakistan it was diminishing the motivation of Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons.

Since India had exploded a nuclear device in 1974 and possessed unsafeguarded nuclear facilities the Reagan administration felt that Pakistan too was justified in pursuing a nuclear explosive capability. Most importantly, India's nuclear program was far less Pakistan-centered than the Reagan administration implied. The Chinese nuclear test of 1964, coming as it did in the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war gave an impetus to India's nuclear program. In order to contain the Soviet Union, the United States required the help of China and Pakistan. Therefore, the administration justified Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear capability because of India's, but on the other hand exerted pressures on India to refrain from its nuclear activities. The Reagan administration followed a discriminatory policy to nuclear non-proliferation.

This proves that the Reagan administration followed double standards. On the one hand it tried to rationalize Pakistan's nuclear activities and on the other hand it maintained an uncompromising attitude on India's right to receive fuel for the Tarapur nuclear reactors in accordance with an agreed schedule and contract. Hence, the Reagan administration's policy towards Pakistan's nuclear program was inimical to amicable United States -Indian relations.

The question now arises as to why the Reagan administration was insensitive towards India regarding Pakistan. The single most important reason was to contain the Soviet Union. Any country which helped the Reagan administration to do this was a friend otherwise not. Promoting human rights, nuclear non-proliferation and democratic governments were subordinated to this over-riding aim by the Reagan administration. India's tepid response to the Soviet Union's action in Afghanistan and close economic and military ties to the Soviet Union and India's opposition to some United States policies led the administration to believe that India was pro the Soviet Union.

The only time, "when Indian sensitivities on the weapons issue may have been accommodated involved the provision of E-3A airborne early warning aircraft to Pakistan. Islamabad had sought these from the U.S. since the mid-1980's, ultimately without success."<sup>17</sup> One should not be misled into believing that Indian concerns was the main reason. There were other reasons like cost, suitability, Pakistan's nuclear activities, the death of Zia and the United States congressional reluctance. Later on the United States decided to inform India about specific arms sales to Pakistan.

In the Rajiv - Reagan summit of June 1985 on the state of Indo-American relations, Rajiv Gandhi the Prime Minister of India was particularly keen on pressurizing the United States to cut down on arms

supply to Pakistan and curb her pell mell advance towards the nuclear threshold. In late 1984, the Reagan administration warned Pakistan of an arms cut - off if they developed a nuclear weapons capability. In August 1985 Washington refused to sell Islamabad a special camera because it feared that it might be used for nuclear purposes. The above American actions should not be viewed as accommodation of India because the United States congressional criticism of Pakistan's march towards acquiring nuclear weapons was responsible for the slightly changed American Policy towards Pakistan. India appreciated this as earlier the United States had justified Pakistan's nuclear activities.

America has tried to influence Pakistan to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but have met with very little success. On the contrary Pakistan has succeeded in securing more American arms and economic aid. The Reagan and Bush administration had attempted to convince critics in congress and in the nonproliferation lobby by asserting that conventional weapons transfer would work as a disincentive on Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons capability. The Reagan administration was convinced that the Carter administration's termination of military assistance to Pakistan had made Pakistan feel more insecure. It felt that improvement in Pakistan's conventional arms would prevent Pakistan from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. All the available evidence indicates that Pakistan relentlessly pursued a covert nuclear weapons program and the United States failed to prevent it from doing so.

Concerned by reports that Pakistan had been enriching weapons - grade uranium to a 90% level, Reagan wrote to Zia in 1984 asking that the enrichment at the Kahuta plant be restricted to a 5% level, the requirement for a non-weapons programme.<sup>18</sup>

It was confirmed by American intelligence reports that Pakistan ignored the United States request. In September 1991 Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto stated that Pakistan could build a nuclear weapon and in February 1992, Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan confirmed that Pakistan had the components to construct a minimum of one nuclear weapon. Hence, all attempts made by the Reagan and Bush administration to curb the Pakistani nuclear program proved futile. In October 1987 the U.S. administration suspended American aid to Pakistan for six weeks. Due to pressure in the United States Senate by those who supported aid to Pakistan, it was further approved to receive military and economic aid for another six years. When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, it was then that Pakistan was pressurized to give up its nuclear programme. The Bush administration in October 1990 reestablished the linkage between arms aid and nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia. Pakistan did not certify that it did not possess nuclear weapons and so the United States suspended arms and economic aid worth \$ 600 million for fiscal year 1991-92.

It was only after this that Pakistan accepted the fact that it had nuclear capability and renewed its offer to engage in negotiations with India for a nuclear weapons - free zone in South Asia. "On June 6, 1991, the Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif proposed a five nation conference – India, Pakistan, U.S., Russia and China — for the purpose of banning nuclear weapons from the South Asian subcontinent."<sup>19</sup> The objective of Pakistan was to gain American economic and military aid. According to Indian perceptions the United States influence on Pakistan's nuclear option has been limited. Pakistan has in fact been a detrimental factor in Indo-American relations. The United States should have been more influential in preventing Pakistan from pursuing a nuclear program. All these things made India more apprehensive and it could not come close to the United States. The United States needed Pakistan to challenge the Soviets in Afghanistan. Therefore, they simply ignored the Pakistani threat to India.

The American and Indian thinking have been quite different regards the arms aid to Pakistan. Besides military aid, the United States gave a lot of economic aid to Pakistan as they felt that the healthy development of Pakistan would ensure its peace and stability against any internal or external threats from communist countries. The United States felt that the arms aid to Pakistan would in no way endanger the peace and security of India. Their assessment was that India had nearly four times the area of



Pakistan, four times the population and probably ten times more strength in other areas. Therefore, they felt that how could Pakistan pose a threat to India. Moreover, the Government of Pakistan assured the United States authorities that the military aid would be used for self defense and against any Soviet attack on Pakistan. The United States felt that they could influence Pakistan in case of any threat to India. This assumption of the United States proved wrong when in August 1965 Pakistan attacked India and the United States could do nothing.

India is a non-aligned country and is ostensibly not aligned with either of the two blocs. It does not believe in extending the military pact system to Asia. The military aid to Pakistan by the United States has brought the cold war to the doorstep of the Indian sub-continent. India does not wish to be involved in the cold war rivalries. India felt that if a country joined one bloc it would become the enemy of the other bloc and this would increase rivalries. Pakistan's alignment with the West endangered India's security and brought the clashing interests of the major powers to the borders of India. Another point of difference between Indian and American thinking is that India's size is no guarantee against Pakistani aggression. For example in 1948, when Pakistan was very weak, it sent its troops into Kashmir to fight against the Indian army. As stated earlier in 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, Pakistan used American military equipment against India despite the fact that they had assured the United States Government that it would not do so. In 1971, there was another Indo-

Pakistan War over the question of Bangladesh. Quite often Pakistan has talked about a holy war against India to liberate Kashmir from India. Indo-American friendly relations have been hampered due to these objections. The United States gave military aid to Pakistan to contain communism but Pakistan did not use them against any communist country but against a neutral country like India. In fact, Pakistan had assured China that its military strength would not be used against China. The cordial relations Pakistan has with China has been a matter of grave concern for India. Pakistan's security is guaranteed through military pacts like SEATO and CENTO and it has also obtained the protection of China. If, Pakistan has really been afraid of India why has it refused the no-war pact offered by India. Selig Harrison has appropriately observed that :

Pakistan has been able to acquire a disproportionately strong power position relative to that of India through alignment with the United States. As an ally permitting the use of its territory, for strategic intelligence purposes, Pakistan has commanded from the United States an economic and military aid subsidy, much larger than her size would otherwise warrant. Rawalpindi has been emboldened by this to think big and press for Indian concessions from a position of artificially induced strength. The special nature of the Pakistani link (with U.S.A.) has been scarcely understood in the American refusal of Indian requests for supersonic aircraft, air-to-air missiles and heavy tanks, all of which have been given to Pakistan.<sup>20</sup>

It has been stated that only \$ 1.9 billion out of the announced \$ 4.2 billion aid would be used for the purchase of arms by Pakistan but past experience does not allow one to accept such an assumption. It is not the arms aid exactly which poses a threat for India but the fact that it has brought the cold war right to the borders of India. India's existing military and defence preparedness including her future potential can look after Pakistan's threat including the development of the nuclear bomb. The actual threat that India faces is not military but political and diplomatic. The possibility of a Washington-Peking-Islamabad axis is the real disturbing factor for India which she is trying to off-set by political and diplomatic means. Pakistan refuses the treaty of over all friendship because of its connections and India persists in order to off set such connections.

As stated earlier, Pakistan is serving as a buffer state for the United States to check communism, particularly after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan is apprehensive of the Indo-Soviet connections while India is apprehensive of the Pakistan-United States alliance. This is the main hurdle in the normalization of relations between these countries. Indian security is therefore not threatened as much by Pakistan's militarization but by the United States policy of encouraging militarization of developing countries. Apart from the open militarization of Pakistan, the clandestine military potentiality of Pakistan which cannot

be assessed that generates an uncertain situation. It is because of the American arming of Pakistan that the latter could pose a threat to India. India feels insecure because of the Super power politics using the weaker states as pawns in their game for power.

Probably, in the initial stages India had over reacted to the United States arms aid to Pakistan during the Afghanistan crisis. But of late, particularly since Rajiv Gandhi became the Prime Minister of India, official statements merely state that the United States arms aid to Pakistan is compelling India to divert more funds to defence which otherwise could have been used for developmental purposes. The arms race has led to the induction of the latest generation equipment into the arsenals of both Pakistan and India which they could have ignored. Pakistan has also profited from the American predicament by compelling it to overlook the clandestine nuclear weapons program. This is a cause of concern for India and it may compel India some day to review and change its nuclear policy.

It is one of the greatest ironies of history that the two largest democracies of the world have so far failed to establish a durable and trustworthy relationship. There is a basic difference between India and Pakistan regarding American assistance. Pakistan's demand for United States military equipment reveals Pakistan's desperation, short sightedness and perhaps helplessness to do any different. Whereas India's

efforts to import advanced technology shows her confidence to upgrade her own production base and to make her self-reliant. India and the Soviet Union are just good friends and India has not in any way compromised her independence of action. If India and Pakistan do not wake up to the realities, in the near future the super powers might start wars by proxy in this region, and India and Pakistan may become another Iran-Iraq affair. Hence, both the countries should try to come closer instead of becoming willing tools in the Super Power game. They should learn to co-exist. Any sort of apprehensions — real, or imaginary should be removed through mutual cooperation and an attitude of give and take.

There is a general feeling in India that Pakistan's success in an armed conflict in West Asia would enhance its image and would be detrimental to India. Others feel that the United States wants to disrupt the existing balance and alignment in the subcontinent. To prove this they have cited how India and the United States have differed on various global and third world policy issues. Yet some others feel that the United States - Pakistan tie up is there to put India in its place. It could be argued that the United States support for Pakistan was inevitable following the exit of the Shah of Iran, irrespective of the Afghan crisis. The latter only added fuel to fire.

The ratio of military expenditures between India and Pakistan at constant prices (1980 dollar exchange rates) over the 1973-82 period has

remained more or less constant around 3.2-to 1 with small variations. During the period 1977 to 1982, the defence expenditures of both countries as percentage of their G.N.P. also shows no great fluctuations (India 3.3 to 3.5; Pakistan 5.7 to 6) . The table below gives data on the strength of the army and the tank and aircraft inventories. The figures would appear to suggest that if at all there was an arms race between India and Pakistan it was during the Bhutto period. Then Pakistan's army strength went up from 278,000 to 400,000, its tank inventory shot up from 860 to 1050. There were similar increases in the Indian Army strength and inventories during that period.

	1972-73	1976-77	1977-78	1978-79	1979-80	1980-81	1981-82	1982-83
<b>INDIA</b>								
Army Strength	840000	913000	950000	950000	950000	944000	944000	944000
Tanks	1490	2030	1930	1850	1900	2170	2120	2268
Air craft	650	509*	670	661	620	630	614	635

<b>PAKISTAN</b>								
Army strength	278000	400000	400000	400000	400000	408000	420000	450000
Tanks	660	1050	1050	1065	1065	1065	1300	1300
Air craft	200	217	247	257	256	256	220	212

\* including those on order.

(All figures from the Military Balance of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London).<sup>21</sup>

It was only after 1980 that India and Pakistan started accusing each other of starting an arms race and the western media made a mountain out of it. Pakistan's ego is boosted when it is told that it is in an arms race with India. Therefore, one can conclude that both India and Pakistan feel compelled to modernise their armaments. It has already been pointed out that Pakistan has chosen the United States as the main supplier while India receives its new equipment from the Soviet Union and Western Europe. When compared the United States equipment is more sophisticated and therefore Pakistan arms acquisition tends to have a qualitative edge. India's defence program basically serves India's security needs while Pakistan's re-equipment takes into account the role it has to play in Southwest Asia. Indian defence program is Indocentric while Pakistan's Defence Program is politically influenced. There is very little

domestic bias underlying Indian defence effort whereas in Pakistan the military is the most important state institution.

In the past, the instability in Pakistan spilled over to India as in 1971. This can happen again. In Pakistan, there can be certain elements which would like to bring about a conflict with India for their own benefit. For example in 1971 Bhutto instigated the Pakistani military junta to confront India so as to achieve the secession of East Pakistan in order to achieve power. They might even get involved in an internal turbulence in India which may escalate into a major conflict. Under such circumstances the United States military aid to Pakistan can only spell disaster for India.

With the coming of the Bush administration in the United States there was a change in governance but the new government initially followed in the footsteps of its predecessor. It gave precedence to Pakistan over India. With the break-up of the Soviet Union very soon the United States secured a dominant position on the international scene. Though it may be too soon to term it a 'unipolar' world. Therefore, one can conclude that the United States no longer needs to build up small countries against Soviet expansionism. It does not require Pakistan with the urgency of the cold war era nor does it fear India's ties with the Russians.



The United States could now take a fresh look at South Asia with the collapse of the communist giant. Since 1945, the greatest determinant of American involvement has been its competition with the Soviet Union and its attempts to counter Soviets and communist expansionism. There were now hopes of a improved Indo-American relations. In the beginning of 1990 the United States attention was distracted by the developments in Eastern Europe, disintegration of the Soviet Union, re-unification of Germany, mounting tension in the Persian Gulf and complications the Uruguay General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) negotiations. Pakistan's importance showed a considerable decline though fighting continued in Afghanistan. By now, the United States congress and public appeared to be loosing interest in the issue. Earlier, the United States had ignored Pakistan's nuclear programme but now it was not willing to do so.

In October, 1990 President Bush did not provide the certification that Pakistan had not developed a nuclear device. Consequently, all military assistance to Pakistan was suspended and economic cooperation was limited to aid already in the "pipeline" under the Pressler Amendments. It also lead to a widening of differences between the U.S. and Pakistan over the payment of demurrage charges of the military weapons which were held by Washington due to the invocation of the Pressler Amendment.<sup>22</sup>

Indo-American relations became better as aid to Pakistan was stopped.

A reduction in Indo-American tensions was witnessed in their developing economic relations. There was now more scope for foreign trade and investment and the United States was convinced of India's serious commitment to a more open economic system.

Co-operation in the field of defence increased after the visit of General S.F. Rodrique to the U.S. in September 1991. The focus was on the transfer of sophisticated technology and equipment for the Right Combat Aircraft project. The U.S. also made provision for some aid under the international military education and training programme, to finance visits and exchanges between the Indian and U.S. armed forces personnel. In December 1991, The U.S. dropped its Super - 301 trade threat against India by formally extending the on-going investigation by another three months ..... This suspension removed an irritant which had disturbed Indo-U.S. relations since 1989.<sup>23</sup>

India and Pakistan have been at war with each other three times. Hence, there is a possibility that they may be at war again. America has warned both the countries with dire consequences in the event of a war.

The U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser, Robert Gates visited India and Pakistan in May 1990 and cautioned both the countries that no 'Sympathy' or 'help' would be available from the U.S. in the event of a war (Paul H. Kleisberg, 4). This warning appeared to have resulted in the 1992

ratification of the undertaking (of 1988) on avoiding attacks on one another's nuclear facilities, the establishment of 'no-fly' zones near their joint border and promise to provide advance notification of military exercises involving division-size levels of armed troops or exercises within about 50 miles of the border. An agreement to exchange 'military visitors' and the installation of a 'hot line' resulted from this cordiality (John J. Shulz, 6). In January 1993, the two neighbours also signed a new chemical weapons Treaty, prohibiting the development and deployment of chemical weapons.<sup>24</sup>

Besides India, Washington also wanted to improve its relations with Pakistan. After all, Pakistan is also quite a significant country. It has a large land mass and population when compared to most Third World states and it is strategically located near to Iran, Russia, China and India, all salient to the United States government. Pakistan also plays a significant role in the Islamic world. Pakistan's utility to the United States was proved with the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

Though there have been several factors of discord in Indo-United States relations, the issue of Kashmir has developed into a perpetual wound. At the time of partition of India, the state of Jammu and Kashmir had important international boundaries. It had common boundaries with both India and Pakistan. Besides this it also bordered the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the People's Republic of China, Tibet and Afghanistan.

At the time of the partition of India into India and Pakistan, the princely states had been given an option of joining either India or Pakistan. At that time the Maharaja of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh delayed his decision. This gave an opportunity to Pakistan to apply economic pressure, by obstructing the supply of essential goods and encouraging the tribesmen to invade Kashmir. The Pakistani army supported these tribesmen. The Maharaja tried to stop the aggression but he failed. The Maharaja appealed to India for help. The Indian Government asked for the acceptance of the letter of accession, before the troops could be sent.

Desirous of getting assistance, the state acceded to India on October, 26, 1947. This accession was confirmed by the popularly elected constituent Assembly on February 6, 1954 and on November 19, 1956 the Assembly of the State adopted a constitution by which the state was made an integral part of India. Thus, accession was formalised by India on 26th January, 1957 and it was also made irrevocable. In spite of the accession, the Indian Prime Minister Nehru, declared that popular opinion would decide the future status of Kashmir after peace was established.<sup>25</sup>

Pakistan has never recognised this accession of Kashmir to India. Hence, it has become a permanent thorn in the Indo-Pak relations.

India feels that Pakistan has no legal right over Kashmir as it is an integral part of India. First of all, Kashmir had never been recognized as a

sovereign state under the international law. Secondly, like other princely states its accession was in conformity with the Indian Independence Act. Thirdly, the accession had never been questioned by the United Nations Commission or the Security Council. Therefore, India upheld its right over the area. Though India expected the Security Council to declare Pakistan an aggressor it did not do so.

The Kashmir problem has effected the relationship between India and America as the United States has always supported the Pakistani stand on Kashmir. It did not declare Pakistan as an aggressor, and instead wanted that a plebiscite should be held. America felt that partition had taken place on religious grounds, dividing the Hindus and Muslims into two nations. It therefore, felt that Kashmir being a Muslim majority state should be given to Pakistan and not to Hindu India. India has never accepted the two nation theory. It has never been the homeland of a particular religious group and has been a secular country. The Kashmiri's continued to see themselves as one people. "Professing different faiths - Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism the three religious sub-communities of Kashmir historically have lived in peace with one another."<sup>26</sup> There are areas of Hindu and Buddhist numerical predominance in Indian Kashmir while Muslim Kashmiri's are a majority on both sides of the line of control. Most of Kashmir is in Indian hands including the famous vale of Kashmir. There have been two wars between India and Pakistan over Kashmir in 1948 and 1965 and was the scene of fighting in the 1971 war over East Pakistan.

On account of their differing perspectives India opposed the Anglo-American resolutions of 21 Feb, 1951 and 5 Nov., 1952 regarding Kashmir. After the U.S. Pak Pact of 1954, Indian suspicions were further escalated. It suspended the agreement with Pak to appoint a plebiscite administrator latest by the end of April 1954. It also asked for withdrawal of U.S. military observers in Kashmir for it was unable to believe in their neutrality.<sup>27</sup>

In return for the help the United States had given India during the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the Kennedy administration expected India to bow down to its pressure. Many rounds of talks were held between India, Pakistan and the United States of America but nothing came of it. India was also not willing to conduct the plebiscite as Pakistan was not willing to move out of that part of the state on which it had committed aggression. Thus, a rift occurred between the two democracies on the question of Kashmir. The United States wanted to enhance its sphere of influence along with wanting the support of Pakistan in its anti-Soviet strategy. This caused severe tensions in Indo-Pakistan as well as Indo-United States relations. As stated earlier in the Indo-Pak war in 1965, Pakistan used arms supplied by the United States against India. These arms had been supplied to meet the communist threat but the war proved that the target was India. The United States had always given the assurance that the arms would not be used against India. The United states suspended all military and economic aid to both India and Pakistan. This proved that in

Indo-Pak conflict, the United States was on the side of Pakistan. If such sophisticated arms had not been supplied to Pakistan, it would not have been in a position to challenge India.

After this initial phase, the Kashmir issue has been a subject of discussion on numerous occasions. At Tashkent in 1965 and at Simla in 1972 an attempt was made both by India and Pakistan to solve the Kashmir problem. On 10 January, 1966, the Prime Minister of India Lal Bahadur Shastri, and the President of Pakistan, General Ayub Khan, reached a dramatic agreement in which they decided under the United Nations Charter not to use force and to settle their problems through peaceful means.

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 25 February, 1966, to the positions they held prior to 5 August, 1965, and both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the Cease-Fire Line.<sup>28</sup>

The most positive and constructive document in trying to bring about peaceful and friendly relations between India and Pakistan was the Simla Agreement. Its Article 14 (ii) says:

In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December, 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognised position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it

unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations.

Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.<sup>29</sup>

The decision of not using force to solve the Kashmir problem was indeed a great gain for peaceful evolution of relations between the two countries. An important aspect of the Simla Agreement is a provision that in future all problems between India and Pakistan would be resolved only on a bilateral basis. This rules out the interference by an outside power in matters related to the two neighbours. This was agreed upon because in the past a third party initiative had not been very helpful. History is proof of the fact that such an agreement of far-reaching consequences had never been concluded earlier.

Since Pakistan is a member of the American led military alliances it raised the question of Kashmir dispute in the United Nations Security council and other international forums from time to time. Particularly in the United Nations, the issue began to get firm support from the United States and other members of western alliances like the United Kingdom and France. The support given by permanent members of the United Nations isolated India. Under such circumstances the Soviet Union began to exercise her veto power in favour of India. The Soviet Union supported India because its rival the United States was supporting Pakistan in regional conflicts. The Soviet factor was thus introduced in Indo-American



relations. This further embittered Indo-American relations. The policy makers of the United States were not ready to accept the fact that their own policies were driving India closer to the Soviet Union. Beyond her national interest and prestige, India is not going to accept the solution of the Kashmir problem. No country, not even the United States can force India to accept a settlement of the dispute. The prime concern for India is the freedom of Azad Kashmir (part of Kashmir-Indian territory) from the clutches of Pakistan. Times of India wrote :

America's friends are dismayed and distressed by the appearance of what can only be described as the cloven foot of imperialism. In the context of Kashmir the open arming of one of the parties by a foreign power can only be constructed as an unfriendly act to the other. Should that situation erupt into warfare the blame must rest squarely on Washington....India can legitimately and does regard such action as a projection of the policy of incitement and encirclement.<sup>30</sup>

As stated earlier India and Pakistan have gone to war over Kashmir in 1947 and 1965. "An armed insurgency in 1990 once again brought the two traditional foes very close to war, and most Indian, if not Pakistani, observers would argue that a low intensity-war has been underway since December 1989 in the Kashmir valley."<sup>31</sup>

It is indeed a cause for India's embarrassment that Kashmiri's are now fighting India's security forces, not Pakistan - backed invaders. In Kashmir a militant Islamic fundamentalism has acquired a foothold. The beauty of Kashmir has been charred by a savage destruction of life and property. If keeping Kashmir may have lead to a tragedy, letting go of Kashmir will definitely lead to a tragedy of a greater magnitude. There will be a Hindu- Muslim bloodbath and so India's secular politicians are afraid of a nationwide violence. Kashmir was saved from Pakistan's occupation in 1947-48 and 1965 by India's army. So, there is no justification for an independent Kashmir.

In the past the United States had sided up with Pakistan in its demand for a plebiscite. A change came about in the early part of 1990 and 1991. Now, the United States started agreeing with the Indian stand that the 1972 Shimla Agreement had superseded the United Nations resolutions calling for plebiscite.

The United States permanent representative to the United Nations Thomas Pickering, clearly stated that the United States belief in the Shimla Agreement remained strong and abiding (Pioneer 10.9.91) and that the United States was opposed to a United Nations role in settling the Kashmir issue.<sup>32</sup>

India feels that Pakistan is sponsoring terrorism in the valley and the United States agrees with the Indian view. In October 1991, Stephen Solarz, issued a statement saying that –

Credible reports suggested that Pakistan is providing arms, training and other support to the militants in Jammu and Kashmir, many of whom engage in assassination, kidnapping and similar terrorist tactics (Pioneer 17.10.91). It even threatened to place Pakistan on its list of nations abetting terrorism in view of its aid to Kashmiri separatists.<sup>33</sup>

After so many years of independence India has still not been able to solve the Kashmir problem. Most of the Indians feel very dejected about this. Major powers are trying to pressurize India to resolve the Kashmir problem with their help especially after India's nuclear tests. According to Satish Kumar, Pakistan focussed its attention to the development of nuclear weapons after its defeat in 1971 and soon after launched a proxy war in Kashmir in 1988. Its next attempt was to internationalise the Kashmir issue and thus involve third parties. This gained momentum after the nuclear test by Pakistan and India. Pakistan justified this move saying that if the Kashmir problem would not be resolved soon it could become a nuclear flashpoint.

Pakistan will keep trying to involve a third party to solve the Kashmir issue but it will not succeed. For Pakistan the only option will be

to continue to low intensity conflict in Kashmir under the cover of nuclear weapons, and thus to drain and debilitate India. India will have to bear the cost of this. It will have to effectively manage military in Kashmir and conscientiously attempt to meet the aspirations of Kashmiri people. A war between India and Pakistan is something which the United States does not want. Any government would oppose the prospect of heavy casualties and use of nuclear weapons moreover, Washington would not like to be called to intervene, most likely through the United Nations auspices, to end the conflict or police a cease fire line. The United States would prefer to concentrate more on the domestic side and reduce its military role.

Thus we see that Indo-American relations soured during the Reagan administration mainly due to the arms supplied by the United States to Pakistan. The reason given by the United States was the presence of the Soviets in Afghanistan. India was not convinced and felt it was to undermine Indian hegemony in the sub-continent. In short we can say that during the Reagan administration Indo-American relations definitely took a downward slide. The Reagan administration refused to even give any assurance, unlike the Eisenhower administration in the mid 1950s, that Pakistan would not be allowed to use the arms supplied by the United States against India. This brought Indo-American relations to its lowest ebb since 1971. According to Indian diplomat P.K. Kaul, "Pakistan will always remain a problem in Indo-U.S. relations but instead of making it the key determinant one should make it one of the 50 items."<sup>34</sup>

Indo-American relations soured as their respective policies towards Pakistan differed. They did not try to understand each other. For India, relations with Pakistan are an immediate and central aspect of its foreign policy whereas for the United States they are peripheral and sporadic. A more insightful view is that offered by Maya Chadda. She wrote in 1986:

An examination of Washington's South Asia policy over the past six years suggests that the administration had indeed settled on a two-track policy for the region: improving its nonstrategic ties in the framework of regional balance and maintaining intact its strategic ties with Pakistan : in the context of its larger military objectives.<sup>35</sup>

Due to international changes after 1989, the administration had to pursue a more creative foreign policy. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has had a profound impact on their foreign policies and relations with each other. India's non-alignment which earlier irked the United States, has become less irksome now. Pakistan's strategic importance for the United States has diminished due to the end of the Afghanistan War, at least in terms of Soviet involvement. In light of these events the United States has ceased its military relationship with Pakistan. This has eased a major Indian concern about United States - Pakistani ties. One should not expect that United States - Indian differences regarding Pakistan will disappear. They are too deep-rooted for that to happen. In future if the United States again helps Pakistan with weapons, it will also try to accommodate Indian concerns and India too would try to minimize its criticisms. It is an

imperfect and incomplete accommodation, but it lies in the realm of the possible and would benefit Indo-American relations as a whole.

In American foreign policy, Pakistan should be given importance but India should be given priority. In comparison to Pakistan, India is a more significant regional and global player than Pakistan. New Delhi is more in a position to affect United States interests than Pakistan, positively or negatively. Bureaucratic routines and struggles should not be allowed to affect this priority ranking. The United States being a world power should offer its services to help governments resolve their conflicts. Ultimately, governments have to settle their problems themselves. An example is the American support for the Shimla process. However, positive outside involvement can help solve conflicts. If a plebiscite were held in Kashmir, other Indian territories such as the Punjab and Assam would demand the same. This would begin to unravel the country and plunge it into civil war.

On a number of issues, India and the United States are divided but there is potential for most of them to be settled in a mutually satisfying way. Washington should not try to box India into a corner. On its part India should try to understand that as the World's leading power, the United States will play an active role in every region, including South Asia. The expectation of India could be that Washington should tilt to some degree towards India, but it cannot ignore Pakistan or antagonize it needlessly.

## NOTES

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<sup>2</sup>Norman D. Palmer, 28.

<sup>3</sup>S.L.Poplai and Phillips Talbot, *India and America* (New York : Praeger, 1988) 69.

<sup>4</sup>Devidas B. Lohalekar, *U.S. Arms to Pakistan : A Study in Alliance Relationship* (New Delhi : Ashish Publication House, 1991) 28.

<sup>5</sup>Verinder Grover, *U.S.A. and India's Foreign Policy : International Relations and Foreign Policy of India* (New Delhi : Deep and Deep Publishers, 1992) 251.

<sup>6</sup>Verinder Grover, 251.

<sup>7</sup>Verinder Grover, 251.

<sup>8</sup>R.K. Jain, ed., *U.S. – South Asia Relations 1947-1982* (New Delhi : Radiant Publishers, 1983) 556-557.

<sup>9</sup>Navin Sinha, "Indo-American Relations : Changing Perspectives," *India Quarterly* 39.1 (1983) : 67.

<sup>10</sup>T.V. Paul, "Influence through Arms Transfers. Lessons from the U.S.– Pakistan Relationship," *Asian Survey* 32.12 (1992) : 1084.

<sup>11</sup>T.V. Paul, 1087.

<sup>12</sup>Devidas B. Lohalekar, 29.

<sup>13</sup>Rajvir Singh, *U.S.– Pakistan and India Strategic Relations* (Allahabad : Chugh Publications, 1985) 155.

<sup>14</sup>P.M. Kamath, *Indo-U.S. Relations, Dynamics of Change* (New Delhi : South Asian Publishers, 1987) 47.

<sup>15</sup>P.M. Kamath, 47.

<sup>16</sup>Satu P. Limaye, *U.S. Indian Relations : The Pursuit of Accomodation* (Boulder : Westview Press, 1993) 68.

<sup>17</sup>Limaye, 69.

<sup>18</sup>T.V. Paul, 1088.

<sup>19</sup>T.V.Paul, 1090.

<sup>20</sup>Selig S. Harrison, "Troubled India and Her Neighbour," *Foreign Affairs* 43 (1965) 322-323.



<sup>21</sup>P.M. Pasricha, "Is there an Indo-Pak Arms Race?" *Strategic Analysis* VII. 19 (1983) : 673-674.

<sup>22</sup>Vinay Kumar Malhotra, *Indo-U.S. Relations in Nineties* (New Delhi : Anmol Publications, 1995) 55.

<sup>23</sup>Vinay Kumar Malhotra, 56.

<sup>24</sup>Vinay Kumar Malhotra, 56.

<sup>25</sup>Vinay Kumar Malhotra, 44.

<sup>26</sup>Sumit Ganguly and Kanti Bajpai, "India and the Crisis in Kashmir," *Asian Survey* 34.5 (1994) : 402.

<sup>27</sup>Vinay Kumar Malhotra, 45.

<sup>28</sup>K.C. Saxena, *Pakistan Her Relations with India 1947-1966* (New Delhi: Vir Publishing House, 1966) 205-6.

<sup>29</sup>K.P. Misra, "Regional Peace and Security : Coalescence and Clash in Indo-Pakistani Relations," *India Quarterly* 40.4 (1984) : 266.

<sup>30</sup>Editorial under the caption "The New Imperialism," *Times of India* 17 Dec. 1953.

<sup>31</sup>Ashutosh Varshney, "India, Pakistan, and Kashmir : Antinomies of Nationalism," *Asian Survey* 31.2 (1991) : 998.

<sup>32</sup>Vinay Kumar Malhotra, 55.

<sup>33</sup>Vinay Kumar Malhotra, 55.

<sup>34</sup>N. Gaan, "Hopes and Realities in Indo-U.S. Relations : From a Cold War to a Post-Cold War Perspective," *India Quarterly* 48.4 (1992) : 12.

<sup>35</sup>Satu P. Limaye, 74.

### **Chapter - 3**

## **The Great Power Triangle and Indo-American Foreign Relations**

Relations between any two countries cannot be conducted simply on a bilateral basis. They are inevitably and usually profoundly, shaped by the nature of the relations of these countries with many other nations, by the impact of major world trends and events and by the general international environment. Indo-American relations are significantly affected by these broader factors. Pakistan as a factor in Indo-American foreign relations has already been discussed. In this chapter the effect of the great power triangle i.e. the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and China on Indo-American foreign relations will be discussed. Indian and American tradition and practice have much in common which draws them close together. There is a broad similarity in their foreign policy goals that is close to people in both countries. For instance both the countries want to promote and protect the rights and interests of its people. Both have a humanitarian desire to do good in the world; to halt the massacre of racial and religious minorities and to help victims of earthquake, flood, fire, famine and civil war. And yet, these similarities, these common bonds, may be as misleading as they are enlightening.

Thus, to India, relations with Pakistan are of the utmost urgency while to the United States they are not. To the United States, military pacts are an essential part of defense while for India they only add to the evils which they are supposed to correct. India wants communist China to be drawn into the international scene, while the United States regards it as an aggressor and a continuing menace. There are other differences of acute importance which have hampered the smooth functioning of Indo-American relations.

In 1945, when World War II ended, India and the United States were virtual strangers to one another. Today, they cannot ignore each other even if they desire to do so. Both the countries wield an important influence in world affairs in their own way. Their foreign policies touch and sometimes clash with each other. By the time India attained independence on August 15, 1947, the Cold War had already begun; the polarization of the world into the Soviet bloc and the Western bloc had occurred. India had to evolve a foreign policy in the context of bloc politics. After decades of colonial rule, India wanted an honourable place in the world and contribute to world peace. Therefore India adopted the policy of non-alignment. The United States has always been suspicious of the policy of non-alignment. The major problem for the United States was to confine the Soviet Union's expansionism. "India disagrees with the United States view that the Soviet Union may undertake the spread of communism militarily."<sup>1</sup> India believed in peaceful coexistence with the

communist countries. The emergence of the People's Republic of China in 1949, further added to India-United States differences. Nehru attempted to cement Sino-Indian cooperation which he hoped would lead to an independent and influential Asia. While, to the United States the coming of the communists to power in China plus its alliance with the Soviet Union, added to the security threats facing the United States.

China was labelled as an aggressor in the Korean War by the United States. While the United States felt that aggressive powers should be tamed by threats of massive retaliation, India felt they could be dampened through patience, trust and friendship. For India the United States military alliances such as NATO, SEATO and CENTO were irrelevant or positively harmful while for the United States they were essential for security against communist aggression. Pakistan was a member of SEATO and CENTO so India was more suspicious of them. This introduced the Cold War into South Asia and estranged Indo-United States relations.

The United States policy in Asia has placed undue emphasis upon military power, military pacts and military alliance. This ..... tended to trade reliable democratic friends for doubtful military allies. Therefore, India was forced into closer ties with the Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup>

The United States took every step to check the expansionist policies of China while India hoped that the two Asian giants could live peacefully.

She appeased China when she allowed China to occupy Tibet, a buffer state. Even after the Chinese aggression against India in October 1962, India continued to advocate seating of China in the United Nations while the Soviet Union was not so enthusiastic about it. For India, the universality of the United Nations was more important than her own national interest. Indira Gandhi continued her father's policy. After her return to power in 1980 she began to follow more realistic policies which were further strengthened by Rajiv Gandhi's government since 1984.

When China attacked India in October 1962, Nehru's policy of nonalignment was for once in trouble. India had to ask the United States for military equipments to face the challenge from the People's Republic of China. Other western countries were also willing to aid India. This factor also affected Indo-American relations. It was now Pakistan's turn to question the objective of United States aid to India. After all Pakistan was a military ally of the United States. The President of Pakistan, Ayub Khan even hinted in July 1963 that, "if the military aid flow continued, Pakistan would positively drift towards China."<sup>3</sup> The result was that the United States offered limited military aid to India. It even tried to pressurize India to settle the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. Thus, the cooperative phase in Indo-American relations was short-lived. Pakistan become interested in having an alliance with China in 1963. India was considered to be the common enemy of both Pakistan and China. In the event of an Indo-Pakistan war, China declared its support for Pakistan. India was forced to

keep a large part of her army on the Chinese border due to increased activity of China on the Sino-Indian borders. The United States supported India when attacked by China in October, 1962, because China was a communist country. But she was not supported by it when attacked by Pakistan, a non-communist country in August 1965.

During the 1971 war, China came out firmly in support of Pakistan. She condemned the free Bangladesh movement, accused India of expansionist tendencies, and charged her with intentions of breaking up Pakistan. The United States wanted to normalize its relations with China. She informed India that if China intervened, no response to that move would come from the United States. Though India's military strength had increased, she was still no match for China which had been a nuclear weapons state since 1964.

Relations between the two Communist giants, China and the Soviet Union, had soured in 1959. But how deep the split was, and how intense the rivalry, did not become evident until 1968. After that, the bond of communist ideology was no bar to open hostility between the two.<sup>4</sup>

Therefore, while China was trying to befriend the United States, the Soviet Union was encouraging security alliances in Southeast Asia and South Asia. For their own benefit, containing China became a common goal for India and the Soviet Union. In August, 1971, a security pact was signed between India and the Soviet Union. In the Indo-Pakistan war of

1971, China refrained from taking any action on behalf of Pakistan. This may have been because of the Indo-Soviet treaty.

An attempt was made to improve relations between India and China in October 1978, when the Indian foreign minister was invited to Peking. Though both the sides welcomed the development they approached it with caution. China considered the Soviet Union as the biggest threat to her security. Nothing much came of this visit as Chinese armies marched into Vietnam on February 17, 1979. China was emboldened to do so even though Vietnam had a security treaty with the Soviet Union. China could now take greater risks because of its new relationship with the United States. Sino-Indian relations were at a standstill. China declared her support of Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Therefore, for India continued reliance on the Indo-Soviet treaty was part of the preparedness to meet such a challenge. This is not at all very comforting for China who sees the Soviet Union as her enemy number one.

The above account makes it very clear that the superpowers are very much involved in matters relating to subcontinental security and stability. Due to cold war tensions, the United States and Soviet Union entered the arena in search for allies.

The countries of South Asia unable to solve their disputes on a bilateral basis, sought outside support to strengthen their case against each other. The United States - China- Pakistan alliance led India to tilt



towards the Soviet Union. This has only multiplied the differences among the nations of the sub-continent. With the entry of China in South Asian politics, the picture has become more complex. Earlier regional politics was affected by the United States - Soviet friction, today they are influenced by Sino-Soviet friction. It seems, China has replaced the United States in South and Southeast Asia. May be this is because the United States wants regional partners to stem the tide of Russian influence. All these factors affected the relations between India and the United States.

The United States was against China and the Soviet Union during the first cold war. The People's Republic of China has been with the United States in checking the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union when the second cold war began. India has her border dispute with China still outstanding. Under such changed circumstances the policy of the United States towards the People's Republic of China is bound to have direct consequences on the Indo-United States relations. A number of officials in the past as well as in the present United States administration have suggested that the United States must develop closer relations with China. Such a policy can only be short-termed and short-sighted. The question is that in the event of a Sino-Soviet conflict, will the United States side up with the People's Republic of China. From time to time the policy-makers of America have advocated the sale of sophisticated weapons to China. These weapons given to China to maintain the balance of power could be used against India. There is nuclear cooperation between the United

States and China without any safeguards. China is not required to assure or adhere to nuclear safeguards. India and other Asian countries could be affected by such a policy of United States. There is no guarantee that China will not launch another military expedition against India in the near future to teach India may be, one more lesson. Will the United States remain neutral? In such an eventuality, it is but natural for India to feel that it is better to be a nuclear weapons state. She can then cooperate with any nuclear powers without safeguards and also take care of her own security. In the interest of national security India was driven further into the Soviet camp.

The Chinese want to prevent India from drifting into the Soviet orbit. The former foreign minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had been assured during his 1979 visit to Beijing that, "Chinese assistance to dissident tribals in northeast India was a thing of the past. They have toned down criticism of Indian policy."<sup>5</sup> The Chinese wanted to put the border issue aside, at least for sometime so that China and India could strengthen their relations. The Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua visited New Delhi in June 1981 which proves that they believe that India has not drifted towards Moscow. When the Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev visited New Delhi in December 1980, the Chinese media blasted the Soviet Union. They praised India for keeping their distance from the Soviet Union's various proposals. On April, 8, 1981, Deng Xiaoping, according to Indian press reports, told Subramaniam Swamy, an Indian member of parliament, that

"there should be an atmosphere of friendliness and spirit of mutual give and take ..... there is no conflict of fundamental interests between China and India."<sup>6</sup> China wants to maintain friendly relationship with India as long as New Delhi avoids a close strategic relationship with the Soviet Union.

Depending on the attitude of the superpowers, India is delicately balanced between East and West. For example, when New Delhi seemed to be moving closer to China, the Soviets were very concerned. They offered a number of inducements to India to retain their friendship. So, if the United States offers excessive military and economic aid to Pakistan, India can be expected to move closer to the Soviet Union. The United States contribution to the modernization of China's military forces is the result of a possible Sino-Soviet military confrontation. The officials in United States continued to talk of military aid program to China without even noticing the views expressed in India and other southern Asian states. "Rather typical is an article by Jonathan Pollack of the Rand Corporation that focussed on the international implications of an arms aid program to China but never mentioned India."<sup>7</sup>

The only country in Southern Asia that demonstrates any enthusiasm over China's military modernization program is Pakistan. For the other states, including India, the American military aid to China can only pose a serious threat to their security. China's military modernization program, focussing on the development of nuclear weapons

and delivery systems, especially if assisted by high grade United States technology can lead to advocacy of military modernization in India. This can lead to actual production of nuclear weapons in India. India will be further drawn towards the Soviet Union. This will further complicate matters between India and the United States.

In the 1980's India and China have tried to improve their relations. There have been several irritating setbacks in the past, but after each setback they have tried to improve their relations. Washington could help to improve their relations indirectly by defining its policies towards China with great care. If relations improve between India and China, it will be in the interest of the United States also. This of course will be distressing for the Soviet Union. The United States can help by informing New Delhi about their technological transfers to China. They should also assure India that its security will remain intact. The then Chinese government gave more priority on economic modernization and a low priority on military modernization. Therefore, it will benefit all the interested powers, including the Soviet Union if America encourages Beijing to retain the emphasis on economic modernization. In his article in the New York Times on July 15, 1981, entitled, "India, and Reagan's tilt toward Pakistan," Selig S. Harrison warned that,

the combined impact of the Administration's overtures to Islamabad and Peking has produced the most dangerous crisis in relations between New Delhi and Washington since India won its independence in 1947.<sup>8</sup>

He further asserted that,

The Administration seems largely oblivious to New Delhi's emergence as a regional power center, but in the eyes of 650 million Indians this indifference is viewed as hostility because it is linked with pro-Peking and pro-Islamabad policies.<sup>9</sup>

It is expected that China could support Pakistan quietly with a continuous flow of military resources. In comparison to the United States, China's support to Pakistan can be steadier. The reason is that China is a communist country and does not require to win public support from an elected congress. Therefore in a crisis, China would no doubt continue to stand by Pakistan at the United Nations and in other diplomatic arenas. In 1963 a strategic linkage had been forged between China and Pakistan. It is believed that China is involved in Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme:

.....this collaboration extended even to nuclear weapons became known in 1982, when a spate of U.S. intelligence reports leaked to the American press alleged that China had made available the designs of the fourth atomic test to Pakistan. Also, Chinese scientists are believed to have aided Pakistan with the development of the Ultra-centrifuge technology at Kahutta.<sup>10</sup>

Even today, the United States is not convinced that Chinese technicians have left Pakistan. Due to this the United States - China nuclear cooperation pact was held up until July 1985. This linkage will remain a major factor for Indian security planning. The Chinese could align with

Pakistan in the event of a war between India and Pakistan if the United States and Soviet Union do not intervene.

China with a lag of nineteen years behind U.S.A. and 15 years behind U.S.S.R. was able to move into a position of minimum and proportionate deterrence vis-a-vis the two superpowers; there is no reason why India cannot achieve in a few years a similar equation vis-a-vis China. The latter's lead over India is much less than the latter's lag behind U.S. and U.S.S.R.<sup>11</sup>

The level of cooperation between India and the United States will depend to a large extent on the United States policy towards the People's Republic of China. China is now a powerful country with nuclear weapons. China has been given a unique position in the foreign policy calculations of the United States. China could act as a counterweight to the Soviet power in the Far East. Therefore, in the 1970's and 1980's the United States attitude towards China was guided by this fact. All this did not go unnoticed by India. India will remain concerned if either or both the superpowers take actions that might increase China's strength. India has not exactly voiced the implications of Sino-American cooperation though the United States has clear reservations about Indo-Soviet relations. "India and China are two countries with a large population and a sizeable industrial infrastructure. However, it is China, rather than India, that has today attained the status of a great power."<sup>12</sup>

Since 1982, relations between China and Soviet Union are moving towards normalization. The speech given to China by Mikhail S. Gorbachev at Vladivostok on July 28, 1986 is clear proof of it. There are also signs of improvement in Sino-Indian relations though the objectives of Chinese foreign policy in the region remains somewhat the same. India is not considered in America's foreign policy towards China, but India's attitude towards America is bound to get affected by Sino-American relations. Recently the Soviet threat in the perception of the United States has reduced. Therefore, it may appear that Sino-American cooperation is irrelevant. However,

The eagerness and endeavour of the White House to patch up with the Chinese authorities after a brief strain in Sino-U.S. relations in the wake of the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Beijing, on the one hand, and the steady efforts by the Kremlin to give a positive direction to Sino-Soviet relations, on the other, indicate that the superpowers may continue to compete with each other to befriend Beijing.<sup>13</sup>

It is necessary for India to review its foreign policy objectives, strategies and priorities. The state of super-power relations can have and has had in the past, a direct bearing on regional developments. For instance, the politics of the Cold War invariably contributed to the heightening of tensions between India and Pakistan.

During Rajiv Gandhi administration, there was a steady development of India - China relations. One became optimistic because there was an increase in economic, scientific and cultural exchange programmes between the two countries. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi expressed his satisfaction on the eve of first session of the new Lok Sabha regarding the progress made in the talks with China. He was well aware of the fact that the road towards a full agreement was very long. The President's address to Parliament on 17 January 1985 also indicated the same situation. He said, "Our relations with China have shown improvement. We shall persevere in seeking a solution to the boundary question."<sup>14</sup> These feelings have been warmly reciprocated by the Chinese. Attending the Republic Day reception given by the Indian Ambassador A.P. Venkateswaran in Beijing, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian said that, "he saw no real conflict of fundamental interests between India and China and there were bright prospects for bilateral cooperation in the future."<sup>15</sup>

Many factors have contributed in improving the relations between India and China. The foremost being a strategic shift in China's South Asia policy, an independent foreign policy and a lot of exchanges between India and China. China takes great care in covering Indian developments in its press. Earlier the growing strategic relationship between China and the United States had caused concern in many quarters. Now China is



critical of America's policies on issues like Central America, West Asia, disarmament, star wars etc., though it continues to purchase arms from America. Sino-Soviet relationship has improved recently. The visit by Soviet Vice Premier Arkhipov to China along with a high powered team was not a total failure. There has been a steady expansion of cultural and economic exchanges between China and the Soviet Union. The initiatives taken by India at the Non-Aligned Movement and at the six-nation summit have been applauded by China.

There has been also a shift in China's South Asia policy. After realizing that India is the most powerful nation in South Asia, China no longer tries to capitalise over the tensions between India and its neighbours. Infact, China now encourages bilateral discussions between India and its neighbours for settling their problems. Regarding Kashmir, China's pronouncements are more cautious than before. Earlier, China had criticised India on the Sri Lankan issue but later gave factual reports on India's peace efforts. China is also now quite enthusiastic about the South Asian Regional Cooperation as it realizes that SAARC can emerge as a force to prevent super power interference in the sub-continent.

Both India and China have to reckon with the contemporary reality of world politics. These two populous societies are on the path of modernization and are trying to acquire economic and political strength. Therefore, they have to maintain maximum options vis-a-vis the Super Powers and others for strategic as well as economic reasons. There are

many problems in Asia which may develop dangerous external linkages. Hence, there has to be a pan-Asian balance based on a relationship of both cooperation and competition. They must remove the irritants in their relations so as to check super power domination in the Third World and create a new international order.

The visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in December 1988 brought about a thaw in their relations. In September 1993 Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited China and there was a further normalization of relations between the two countries. The credit for this goes to both their governments. An agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas was signed in Beijing on September 7, 1993.

The key difference is to be found in the respective equations between the U.S. and China on the one hand and the U.S. and India on the other. China's investment of effort, time, and money in cultivating goodwill and/or limiting opposition in the U.S. is enormous; India's is not. For historical reasons, American perceptions of China, despite distortions, reflect greater respect than equally muddled perceptions of India.<sup>16</sup>

China can afford to deal confidently on terms of political parity with the United States. After all, China is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Since 1964 it is a recognized nuclear weapons power, and an important trading power with an ostentatious dynamic

economy. India cannot do the same as it lacks the self-confidence. Since there was a lack of strategic planning or systematic coordination, along with a continuity in government India was deprived of initiative in the conduct of foreign affairs and was forced to react to agendas set by others.

The relationship between the United States and Soviet Union have directly or indirectly affected the other nations of the world. Indo-American relations have faced many ups and downs. Immediately after the Second World War, the United States India policy was targeted at preventing communist influence of any kind, especially closer relations between India and the Soviet Union. The then Prime Minister of India Jawahar Lal Nehru was well aware of the fact that unless colonialism and imperialism ended and the newly independent countries stood on their own feet, progress in any field would not be possible. In the first ever Asian political conference of the Post-War period known as the Asian Relations Conference, Pandit Nehru declared:

For too long have we of Asia been petitioners in Western courts and chancellories. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own legs and to cooperate with all others who are prepared to cooperate with us. We do not intend to be plaything of others.<sup>17</sup>

In the 1950's and 1960's the Cold War intensified while India persisted in following a non-aligned path. This soured the relationship between India and the United States. Though there was no meeting ground on political and security issues between the leaders of India and

America, there continued to be economic interaction between them, along with a cultural one throughout the Cold War period. Such assistance given to India was because of American obsession with the containment strategy. In the words of George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African affairs:

Were South Asia to pass to the communist orbit, either by subversion or conquest, there would then be in the Soviet Orbit some 1,300,000,000 and we would be reduced to some 900,000,000.....<sup>18</sup>

Especially after the communist victory in the Chinese civil war, such was the thinking of American policy makers. They could not afford to ignore India whom they wanted to have a pro-Western political orientation, if not an anti-communist one. Therefore, a certain amount of economic aid was given to India, as to many other countries so as to make the governments and the people of these countries pro-Western.

The friendship between India and the Soviet Union is not new. It existed right from the times the Russian scholars studied our ancient facets. In the same way, Russian literature left an impact on us. Infact between Leo Tolstoy and Mahatma Gandhi there existed a sharing of philosophical experience. At the time of the Russia revolution of 1905 Mahatma Gandhi, then leading a fight against racialism in South Africa, wrote in his journal :

In the caption to this article we have put Russia and India together. We have , therefore, to justify it by showing how India is concerned with events in Russia..... We also can show the same things that the Russian people have shown.<sup>19</sup>

The advent of Gandhi on our national scene coincided with the Great October Revolution of Russia. The great Russian socialist Lenin evinced keen interest in our fight for freedom and pointed out the importance of India to the world struggle against colonialism. India in turn recognized the Soviet Union as an ally. The Soviet Union has always befriended the countries of Asia and Africa and has supported them in their struggle for freedom, racial equality and technological development.

India and the Soviet Union share a common desire for peace and peaceful construction. Every country has the right to choose as to how they want to live. The acceptance of this fact leads to peace. In order to preserve its identity, India followed the policy of non-alignment. The Soviet Union showed great foresight in accepting India's non-alignment. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India continued her father's policies, and used the friendship with the Soviet Union to guarantee India's security, military power, and hegemony. In February 1966 she signed a communique in Moscow refering to the imperialist in South East Asia. In an interview in Forbes magazine in later years she said, "The global strategy of the United States administration does not find a place for

India, whereas we think that the Soviet Union is not fighting for Communism, it is fighting for nationalism.... after World War II their system and survival go together."<sup>20</sup>

On August 9, 1971, the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and India signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and cooperation in New Delhi. Swaran Singh, the then Minister of External Affairs, announced the signing of this treaty in the Indian Parliament where it was welcomed with a stormy applause. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was of the opinion that the treaty would strengthen peace and make the nation strong. The Soviet Union too felt that the treaty would serve as an important factor for peace and international security. Worldwide the treaty between the Soviet Union and India had many repercussions. It was highly valued by leaders of socialist and non aligned countries and by progressive public organisations.

The preamble of the treaty confirms the two states, adherence to the principles of peaceful coexistence, their conviction that in today's world, international problems can be solved only through cooperation. In an interview to the New Wave, an Indian weekly, Indira Gandhi said, the Treaty showed how countries could strengthen their friendship for the purpose of ensuring peace and containing aggression.<sup>21</sup>

The Western press which started campaigning against India had just one objective to compromise the Treaty and India's policy of peace and

non-alignment. According to the press India had given up its policy of non-alignment and joined the Soviet bloc by signing the treaty. Some of the member countries of military blocs felt that the Treaty was a kind of military alliance directed against Pakistan, and even the United States, which is thousands of kilometres away from the sub-continent. Some foreign political leaders felt that the Soviet Union and India had signed this treaty because of United States - Chinese accord. They felt this would lead to tensions in Asia. But such opposition was drowned by the approval of India and other peace loving countries. They have called this treaty as historic and epoch - making. The Indian government pointed out to other countries that this treaty was not inspired by any hostility towards any third country. The treaty has been concluded on equal terms, which is a positive aspect for India. Moderate American statesmen felt that India had not withdrawn from the policy of non-alignment. The United States Senator Edward Kennedy, who was in India when the treaty was signed, said at a press conference, "that he saw no discrepancy between India's policy of non-alignment and the signing of the Soviet - Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation."<sup>22</sup>

Since the signing of the treaty India and the Soviet Union have maintained a close contact with each other through mutual exchange of visits and discussions. Their views on international issues is the same. The Soviet Union's call to end the nuclear arms race has been welcomed by India while the Soviet Union has backed India during the Kashmir and

Bangladesh crisis. India's policy of non-alignment has also been respected by the Soviet Union. Regarding the treaty the then Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi said:

Jawaharlal Nehru laid the foundation of Indo-Soviet friendship on which Indira Gandhi built a fine edifice. The relations between our countries have long been a model of international cooperation between societies with different traditions and political structures. Mutual regard has led to mutual benefit.<sup>23</sup>

From the perspective of national security, the Indian sub-continent has been a peripheral and relatively insignificant area for the United States. The global impact of the Cold War touched just the exterior of the region. This was the result of American objectives as also the decision of India's leaders to chart a sphere free of superpower involvement for itself. All the United States was interested in was to prevent the loss of the region to an external adversary power. It did not seriously involve itself in the intra-state conflicts in the region. Only occasionally, the sub-continent of India has been important in the security perceptions and policies of the United States. This has been so when India has been a theatre of involvement in larger confrontations, especially those embracing the Soviet Union and sometimes the people's Republic of China. Therefore :

U.S. security relationships with and concerns regarding the nations of the Indian sub-continent should be viewed in the light of U.S. global security policies and interests.<sup>24</sup>



Few Americans regard India a threat to the United States while India perceives the United States as a complicating factor in their security efforts.

Indo-American relations which had reached a low point in 1971, improved during the period 1972-75. Unfortunately, it deteriorated during the Indian Emergency of 1975-77. In 1976, the American democratic party had emphasized the fact that the United States should only involve itself in South Asia as a mediator and that to only when all parties had agreed on the usefulness of her presence. The fact that India had become important in the sub-continent was to be accepted. Jimmy Carter's victory in the United States Presidential elections of November 1976 was greeted in India with expectations. In the March 1977 elections in India the Janata Government came to power. Therefore Indo-American relations improved and contacts became more frequent. In spite of all this there were differences of policy, and approach on many issues. The economic policies of Morarji Desai favoured the private sector more and gave more opportunities for foreign investment and operations. Indira Gandhi had followed a more socialist policy. The Americans felt that Morarji's foreign policy was more pro-American and less pro-Russian. During, the emergency in India the United States - India Joint Commission and its sub-commissions had been quite inactive but with a change of government in India they were given a new impetus.

During a visit to New Delhi in July 1977 Warren M. Christopher, under secretary of State, said that the United States had decided to look to India as the leader of South Asia, a statement that pleased the Indians and drew an official protest from the government of Pakistan.<sup>25</sup>

In January 1978 President Carter visited India. He was given a warm welcome in India. All his speeches here stressed the fact that India and the United States were linked by common moral and democratic values. But in their private conversations many factors remained unsolved. Morarji Desai's visit to Washington was also warmly welcomed there.

The improvement in India's relations with the United States and the deterioration in the United States - Pakistan relations that began in 1977 were abruptly reversed as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979. This was also the time when Indira Gandhi returned to power in India's seventh general elections.

A coup d'etat in Afghanistan in April 1978 brought to power a revolutionary socialist regime which developed close relations with the Soviet Union, leading to the signing of an Afghan - Soviet treaty of friendship and co-operation in December 1978. The Soviet Union sent military aid and advisors to Afghanistan to help the regime combat Moslem resistance groups, which challenged government authority through much of the country. In addition, the Soviet Union supplied extensive economic assistance.<sup>26</sup>

Soviet influence in Afghanistan increased which caused concern in China and the United States. China feared that the security of its western border was endangered. The Afghan and Soviet authorities accused China of giving aid to the Moslem rebels, during 1978 and 1979. On the other hand the Chinese Government accused the Soviet Union of trying to make the Afghan - Pakistani region its sphere of influence. The Soviet union sent its troops to Afghanistan. Gradually the number of troops increased. These troops were sent there to provide military support for the Afghan armed forces against the Moslem resistance fighters.

A formal note of protest was delivered to the Soviet Union by China on December 31, 1979.

The People's Daily on Jan. 1 accused the Soviet Union not only of gaining an "iron grip" on Afghanistan but also of seeking a "stepping stone for a south ward thrust towards Pakistan and the whole subcontinent," adding that there would be "No peace from South Asia to the Horn of Africa with 45,000 Soviet soldiers in strategic Afghanistan."<sup>27</sup>

Huang Hua, the Chinese foreign minister who was in Pakistan from January 18 to 23, 1980 told the press that he talked mainly of Afghanistan with the Pakistani Government. He infact called upon the world especially the United States, Western Europe and Japan to support Afghanistan's neighbours in order to counter the Soviet power.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 was looked upon by the United States as having very serious entanglements for the security of the Indian Ocean. It also feared serious results for the countries that relied heavily on the region for their vital oil supplies. Hence, the United States was ready to counter any attempt by the Soviet Union to dominate the Gulf and the Indian Ocean region. This was made explicit by President Carter soon after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan when he said,

Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by the use of any means necessary, including military force.<sup>28</sup>

Later, the same view was upheld by the Reagan administration. They considered the presence of a United States Navy in the Indian Ocean region as important to the western security so long as the Soviet threat persisted in the region. This would deter the Soviets from further aggression. India on the other hand had continued to express the view that the Indian Ocean should be a zone of peace. India does realize her strategic location in the Indian Ocean and therefore the need to create it into a zone of peace.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was perceived by Pakistan also as a serious event. The Carter administration which had earlier suspended the economic and military aid to Pakistan because of the apprehensions

regarding Pakistan's nuclear programme now decided to lift the freeze. An agreement between both the countries could only be reached in September 1981, several months after the formation of the Reagan administration. They announced a six year \$ 3.2 billion economic and military aid package to Pakistan. Pakistan now became a front-line state. Thousands of refugees from Afghanistan sought shelter in Pakistan. Therefore, the United States felt that this had increased the burden on Pakistan. To counteract the Soviets they needed a strong Pakistan not a weak and disintegrating Pakistan. Therefore, they gave sophisticated arms and equipment to Pakistan. Though America tried to assure India that the arms sale to Pakistan was not for use against India, New Delhi did not feel comfortable about it. These apprehensions were largely due to the fact that earlier Pakistan had used arms given by the United States in her conflicts with India. As a matter of fact, the American decision to arm Pakistan with some of the latest sophisticated weapons such as the "F-16 supersonic jet fighters, AIM-9L air-to-air missiles, Horpoon air-to-surface missiles, armed helicopters and Gearing class destroyers, were looked upon as threatening Indian interests."<sup>29</sup>

The Reagan administration did not believe that the United States military aid to Pakistan was any threat to India's security. As the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, said : "India has undertaken such a very large military build-up and expansion since the last Indo-Pakistan war that she is today

invincible from threats from Pakistan."<sup>30</sup> Moreover, America felt that since India was much bigger in size and strength, it negated the possibility of a Pakistani attack on India.

India's reaction to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan was of a very different nature. At first Indira Gandhi seemed to be supportive of the Russian action; but she was opposed to any form of foreign intervention including that of the United States and China. She did try to coax Russian leaders at personal meetings and through diplomatic channels to withdraw the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. She was more concerned about the United States military aid to Pakistan. She was also worried about the presence of the Great Powers in the Indian Ocean.

In order to prepare itself in case of Pakistani aggression against herself, India had to turn once again to the Soviet Union for sophisticated military equipment. Therefore, in the 1980's India had to double her military expenditures from 1980 to 1988.

.....expanding the size of her ground forces, procuring virtually every new Soviet fighter or attack aircraft including the state-of-the-art MIG-29, and acquiring a wide variety of other ground and naval weapons, including a nuclear attack submarine rented from the Soviets in 1988.<sup>31</sup>

As a consequence, India relied heavily on the Soviet Union for her military security.

Therefore, one can safely conclude that during most of the eighties, New Delhi and Washington were suspicious of each other. In spite of this, both were prepared to test the water. India was interested in increasing its foreign policy options. India was concerned about the presence of the United States Diego Garcia and the increase in base facilities at the disposal of the United States in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The United States could now operate more effectively in the Indian Ocean which was an area highly significant for India's national security. Therefore India made attempts to remove superpower rivalry from the Indian Ocean and backed efforts to create a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. India felt that the United States should respect the demands of the bordering states of the Indian Ocean. India felt that military rivalry of the two superpowers should not be brought to this area and that economic commitment should precede all other kinds of activities. Historically it has been seen that those powers which were able to deploy their navies in this ocean were in a position to acquire political and economic control over most of the bordering states. This possibility is still there because most of the littoral states are still developing countries and therefore are more liable to succumb to pressure from powerful countries.

Pakistan felt that India did not share its apprehensions regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Indeed, during the January 1980 debate at the U.N., the new Indira Gandhi government went so far as to justify Russia's move as a defensive response to the activities of "certain foreign powers", implying American and Pakistani responsibility for the Soviet venture.<sup>32</sup>

But by the end of February, India was publicly criticizing the Soviet Government for its presence in Afghanistan. Hence, it seems India's initial response to the Soviet invasion was not the result of a reasoned analysis.

Towards the end of the eighties the Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan and its naval presence in the Indian Ocean region was reduced. However, from August 1990, the situation in the Indian Ocean region, particularly in the Persian Gulf region became very tense because of the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. Economic sanctions were enforced against Iraq by the United Nations. There was also a naval blockade by the United States and other members of the United Nations. These developments had an adverse impact on a large number of countries, including India, because of the increase in the price of oil.

New Delhi failed to reassure Islamabad regarding the security situation. Experienced Pakistani officials understood India's reluctance. More than seventy per cent of India's armaments still came from Russia. In various international forums, Moscow supported New Delhi's position. India's trade relations with the Soviet Union was important as well.



Pakistan has always been India's regional opponent and therefore India would not have spoilt its relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, India preferred a secular Afghanistan under Soviet Control to a religiously zealous Afghanistan which might excite Muslims throughout South Asia.

With regard to Afghanistan, the Soviet Union learnt that countries are easier to invade than to leave. This did not mean that the Soviets wanted to stay in Afghanistan. On the contrary, Mikhail Gorbachev wanted to bring his troops out. The war was proving very expensive for the Soviet Union. Moreover the war was unpopular at home and abroad. The Soviets wanted to withdraw from Afghanistan slowly so that they could manipulate the political developments out there. Whereas Pakistan and the Afghan resistance wanted a rapid pullout. The Soviet Union wanted the assurance that after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, the Communist Party would play a leading role in any future government. The resistance refused to accept this. Meanwhile, the Soviets have other troubles.

Efforts to Afghanize the war are going badly, as government troops show poor discipline and capabilities. At the same time, the Afghan regime remains isolated abroad and unpopular with the bulk of its own people.<sup>33</sup>

The Soviet troops could not return home soon because a pro-Soviet regime could only survive in the presence of a Red Army. Therefore, the war and negotiations dragged on for quite some time.

The Indo-Soviet friendship was important to both the powers. This alliance posed less of a problem for both the countries prior to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. But the strains were kept below the surface.

In defining its policies and role in South Asia since 1955, Moscow has generally played the role of a compliant if occasionally dissatisfied - client state, adopting its policies, in the region to Indian directions in most crises.<sup>34</sup>

Therefore, Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was a major break with the past. It ran counter to India's self proclaimed status as a dominant power in the region. Hence, America should not have viewed Indo-Soviet relations to be very close.

Both the United States and India wanted the Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan. For this India adopted diplomatic channels whereas the United States imposed military and economic sanctions on the Soviet Union. For once, New Delhi and Islamabad were in agreement that the United States was punishing the Soviet Union not exactly over Afghanistan but to extract concessions from Moscow on other subjects vital to the United States government. They feel that the United States does not have an Afghanistan policy. Moreover, there is a suspicion that the Soviet intervention has served as an excuse for America to expand its military capabilities in South West Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Washington should have bargained with the Soviet Union for its withdrawal from Afghanistan. They could have used India to play a mediatory role. Such a step would have been appreciated in New Delhi.

American military aid to Pakistan has always been a concern for India.

Pakistan has been emboldened by \$ 1.5 billion in renewed aid provided since 1981 and by another \$ 1.4 billion which was scheduled for delivery by 1991 including 60F-16 higher aircraft in addition to 40 already in Pakistan arsenal. <sup>35</sup>

The United States kept on arming Pakistan even after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. But India had to accept this reluctantly so as not to strain its own technology flow from the United States. This posed a security threat for India because the arms supplied to Pakistan could be used against India. The Reagan administration had justified this flow on grounds of restraining Pakistan's growing nuclear power.

After the pull-out of Russian troops from Afghanistan, India figured high on the United States agenda. The United States policy makers were inclined to look beyond Pakistan and forge better links with India. India's image has been boosted because of its scientific and technological progress. It is viewed as a land with great potential for growth according to modern standards. The late 1980s witnessed an improvement of the political climate between India and the United States.

They perceived the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to be liberal in his economic policies and felt that India was a force for stability in a troubled region.

In a memorable speech ushering in India's independence, Jawahar Lal Nehru said: "A moment comes, which comes but, rarely in history when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends." The age of Cold War has ended. Will India remain a prisoner of the past?<sup>36</sup>

India will now have to change its domestic and foreign policy and bring about a freshness in its relationships.

With the collapse of communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Soviet factor has been transformed from an impediment into a spur to improving Sino-Indian relations. With the end of Cold War, Moscow's relations with Beijing and Washington improved. This brought an end to the suspicions which were created earlier due to Indo-Soviet relationship. There were various agreements between India and China.

On the other hand the Soviet breakup destroyed India's most important source of defense supplies, and took away a major export market. India was also left more vulnerable to hostile resolutions at the United Nations. India had to look towards the West for foreign aid. For example:

a high level U.S. military delegation held talks with Indian counterparts in Delhi in January 1992 and agreed to programs of reciprocal training and participation in regional conferences and seminars.<sup>37</sup>

Therefore, the Soviet experiment begun in 1917, had ended in failure. The high moral goals that it had set for itself were never realized. Economic failure was the key reason for the Soviet Union's collapse. The socialist alternative to the market economy turned out to be an illusion.

India has been able to mobilize both China and the United States in impressing upon Pakistan that help to anti-Indian insurgencies in Punjab and in Jammu and Kashmir is not being regarded any longer with favour. Both the great powers feel that the Kashmir question should be tackled on the basis of the Simla Agreement of 1972 between India and Pakistan.

It is not clear if the meaning of Simla agreement is to let India and Pakistan sit down and evolve a negotiated solution or to get India and Pakistan to evolve a mechanism for turning the present line of control into a permanent international boundary between the two neighbours.<sup>38</sup>

The United States now stands out as the sole global power, possessing an overwhelming military and technical capability. There are discussions among Indians and Chinese on whether the world is becoming unipolar or multipolar. They are in favour of the latter.

Indo-United States relations in the fields of trade, investment and technology transfer also improved with the relaxation of the Cold War. Scientists from both the countries are today working together in a thousand scientific fields including weather prediction, control of diseases, dryland agriculture and malaria research. Indeed, there is hardly a significant field of scientific activity in which at least one team of Indian and American scientists is not working together. The efforts by the Indian and American Governments in recent years to improve cooperation in co-production of certain defense related items is a noteworthy development.

In fact, joint collaboration in the manufacture of a Light Combat Aircraft has already started. The prototype of this aircraft is likely to be ready by the year 1992 and the aircraft may be available for use by the Indian Air Force by 1994-95.<sup>39</sup>

Thus we see that prior to the break up of the Soviet Union, it provided economic assistance to India, was a vital source of military equipment and absorbed a significant share of Indian manufactured exports. After the mid 1960s both India and the Soviet Union shared their hostility towards China. This was very beneficial for India especially after Washington and Beijing patched up their differences in the 1970s. The Soviet relationship became the sheet anchor of Indian policy. However, nonalignment provided a means of avoiding too close an identification with Moscow.

During the 1980s Gorbachev sought accommodations with the United States and China and therefore problems began to arise in Indo-Soviet relationship. There were less chances of India getting the automatic support from the Soviet Union when India would face difficulties with Pakistan and China. Yet, India continued to hope though not so confidently that the Soviet Union would remain its most dependable foreign relationship. In the course of 1990-91 there was economic chaos in the Soviet Union. They became more concerned with domestic problems, it was no longer a useful prop against China. The Soviets no longer showed inclination to support India in its difficulties with Pakistan over Kashmir. Even when the Indo-Soviet Friendship treaty was renewed in August, 1991 it was virtually meaningless. As a Russian commentator noted "Officially the treaty is seemingly in effect. But in practice there is no one on our side to implement it."<sup>40</sup>

Though India is trying to negotiate new agreements with Russia and several other successor states but they don't expect much from them.

With the decline of the Soviet Union, Indians have come to believe the slogan of American primacy in a unipolar world. During the cold war era, Indians believed that the United States was determined to keep India from playing its rightful international role. During the 1980s the American Government began to take notice of India's growing military might and regional primacy. Thus we see that during the mid 1980s the two countries

embarked on cooperative programs that would have been unthinkable a few years earlier. The prospects for closer United States-India ties have been enhanced by the shift in American policy towards Pakistan. Washington has expressed its displeasure over Pakistani assistance to Kashmiri insurgents and has said that the Kashmir question should be solved bilaterally without any external involvement.

The two long-time enemies China and India find themselves in similar predicaments. During the Cold War era both found a stage to play their international roles and to balance one superpower against the other. Both are concerned with stability in Central Asia and fearful of the spread of militant Islam. Therefore, both are showing a keen regard for each others interests. India has kept a careful distance from the cause of Tibetan freedom and Civil rights, China, like the United States, has been reluctant to give Pakistan support over the Kashmir issue. In December, 1991, the Chinese Premier Li Peng visited India followed by a return visit of Indian President Venkatraman in the following spring. Though it did not produce any break through in Sino-Indian ties, yet both sides have a strong incentive to cooperate in ensuring that whatever new world order emerges, it will not be incompatible with the interests of these two Asian giants.

Therefore, one can conclude that India must assert its autonomy as an international player and its sovereign right to control its own future. For its economic development it should develop a foreign policy which should not divide the world into trading blocs. It should establish a firm



regional base in South Asia that will enhance, not detract from its international image. It should try to escape marginalization and find a new way to become relevant on the broader international scene.

Aside from security considerations, both the United States and India have much in common, Liberty, national independence and respect for the individuals are ends to which both the countries are dedicated. They are the world's two largest democracies. Both, therefore, have a mutual concern and interest in seeing that each other's institutions prosper, prevail and endure. The United States recognizes India's special position in South Asia. India on her part, wants closer understanding with the United States, not only because she cannot ignore the American colossus but also because the United States can be an enormous help in bringing about India's transition to the technetronic era for which she is well poised.

There are, however, significant divergences in the policies of the two countries even when they seek similar ends. But while the two countries might have differences from time to time, there is no reason why they cannot have friendly and constructive bilateral relations especially since the countries have reached a point where they can be expected to pursue a mature and constructive relationship, based on the values and interests that they share rather than on points of differences.

## NOTES

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## **Chapter - 4**

# **Indian Response to American Non-Proliferation Treaty**

The nuclear issue remains a key source of friction between India and America. People from all over the world have felt the need to halt the spread of nuclear weapons since the early days of the nuclear age. In January 1946, the United Nations General Assembly resolution envisaged the elimination of such weapons from the national arsenals. The United States had been the first country to apply nuclear energy to the production of weapons. It was also the first country to propose in the United Nations the establishment of an international authority to control all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.

This proposal known as the Barruch plan, met with no success. Shortly thereafter the USSR (in 1949), and the U.K. (in 1952), also became nuclear weapon powers and they were followed by France (in 1960) and China (in 1964).<sup>1</sup>

At the time when scientists in the West were working solely on the military application of nuclear energy, Homi Bhabha, the architect of India's nuclear program visualized the possibility of nuclear energy being used for civilian industrial use. More than a year before Hiroshima was flattened by the destructive force of atomic energy, Bhabha declared that, "when nuclear energy has been successfully applied for power production in, say, a couple of decades from now, India will not have to look abroad for its experts, but will find them ready at home."<sup>2</sup> After gaining independence India stressed on the creation of a broad based science and technology infrastructure because it believed that technological backwardness made a country politically and economically vulnerable. Therefore India made the nuclear program a major area of scientific research and development.

India wants two things from its nuclear program electricity and the option to make atomic bombs. India started its first important reactor called CIRUS in 1964. This opened the way for nuclear cooperation with the United States and Canada. The reactor was supplied by Canada and the heavy water to run it by the United States.

Heavy water (deuterium oxide) is needed to achieve a chain reaction with the natural uranium fuel that CIRUS uses. India promised Canada and the United States to restrict CIRUS to peaceful use, but CIRUS was not covered

by international inspection; consequently, in 1974 India could test a bomb made with plutonium from CIRUS's spent fuel and call it a peaceful nuclear device.<sup>3</sup>

The peaceful nuclear explosion was carried out by Indian scientists and engineers at 8 O'clock on the morning of 18th May 1974, at Pokharan in Rajasthan desert. This explosion marked a watershed in Indo-American nuclear relations and in the non-proliferation policy of the United States.

The United States reacted strongly. She voted against loans to India at the International Development Association while Japan and Britain cut bilateral aid.

The shock waves also led to a virtual nuclear trade embargo against India and provided a major impetus to the United States to review its contractual fuel supply obligations under the 1963 Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement. Fuel shipments to the U.S. supplied Tarapur were temporarily halted until India had reassured the United States that no American - sold nuclear material or equipment would be used to make explosives.<sup>4</sup>

However, no evidence was produced that the blast involved a breach of contract with any foreign country with which India had nuclear collaboration. India was isolated in the Western nuclear community. This



caused serious setbacks to India's nuclear program. No one contended that any material or equipment supplied to India by America had been used in manufacturing the nuclear device. It was more to do with India emerging as a nuclear capable Third World country. It was felt that the Indian explosion would have a deep impact in South Asia and elsewhere.

American policy makers were quite disturbed by India's abrupt entry into the nuclear club. India had achieved nuclear status. In fact, since independence, India's nuclear program can be said to have passed through several phases:

the preliminary stage of 1946-56 apart, the first stage of India's nuclear programme was 1956-66, the second phase was from the death of Dr. Bhabha to the death of Dr. Sarabhai ; the third phase was from 1970 to the PNE of 1974 ; the fourth phase was 1974-1984; and the fifth phase saw the birth of Agni in 1989.<sup>5</sup>

In 1948, the Atomic Energy Act was passed to provide for the development and control of atomic energy and purposes connected therewith. This Act allowed for the control of atomic energy by the Central Government. Later, it was replaced by another Act of 1962. This Act provided for the development and control of atomic energy, for the welfare of the country. This Act sought to keep in view India's security concerns. By this time Britain and France too had become nuclear powers. India, felt that a ban

on proliferation was both essential and urgent but it clearly asserted that the heavier responsibilities lay with the nuclear powers.

India had hoped that the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 would encourage steps towards a complete and comprehensive disarmament. In 1964, China became a nuclear power. Therefore the Indian Government was pressurized to go ahead with the development of nuclear weapons. This was partly due to a perceived nuclear threat or blackmail from China. Despite pressures, Nehru was firm in his stand for peaceful uses of atomic energy, even against a Chinese nuclear threat or blackmail. Nehru had hoped that the United States would provide a "nuclear umbrella"<sup>6</sup> to India. Thus ended the first phase of India's nuclear program.

Lal Bahadur Shastri who succeeded Nehru considered developing nuclear weapons. This idea faced several setbacks in the beginning. But by 1965, the Indian government was not prepared to hinder the development of nuclear technology. Apparently this decision was taken to deter China or any other hostile nuclear power. By the end of 1966, there was unanimous support for a nuclear weapons program. Due to the discriminatory aspects of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, India rejected it. India decided to sustain its independence on international security by allowing for the development of the peaceful nuclear explosion technology.

The mastering of the technology by the Indian Scientists and engineers was reflected in the explosion at Pokharan on May 18, 1974. Hence, India came under severe pressure from both the United States and Canada to accept international controls and safe guards on its nuclear installations and plants, especially on the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre.

Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980 and her government asserted that it would be vigilant in protecting the national interests. It was necessary for India to be in touch with the latest technology. India would be committed to the peaceful use of atomic energy but would keep its nuclear option open. Despite India's problems with the United States over fuel and spare parts supplies to Tarapur, India did not accept the international safeguards. During this period the development of missile technology in India grew.

The nuclear policy of India was only marginally affected by changes in the Indian government. Rajiv Gandhi too adhered to the peaceful uses of atomic energy for the development of the country. But India would rethink its stand if Pakistan continued in its drive to acquire a nuclear weapon. India's first medium-range missile Agni was developed during this time. This demonstrated India's firm resolve to acquire an independent nuclear capability and arms modernisation. These achievements do not indicate India's move towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons. India wants to

be self-sufficient in such areas so as to develop its backward economy. India would be forced to go nuclear if Pakistan went nuclear.

Nuclear fission was discovered in 1938 and the first atomic weapon was exploded in 1945. This caused great anxiety all over the world as the chances of terrorists and additional nations going nuclear increased. In 1968, after 30 years of effort, the best hope seemed to lie in a treaty that would require:

- that the nuclear weapon states not assist others to acquire weapons;
- that the non-nuclear weapon states agree not to acquire them; and
- that facilities in the latter states capable of producing fissionable materials that might be used in weapons be subject to surveillance by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to assure that they were not being so used.<sup>7</sup>

The result was that a treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was concluded on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970. It became the most widely subscribed arms control agreement in history as the nuclear weapons states along with many other countries signed it.

The international community realized that a wider proliferation of nuclear weapons would pose a threat to world security. This led to the development of many rules and institutions both national and

international. Among them, the most important is the non-proliferation treaty.

At the same time, the treaty establishes a framework within which nations can cooperate to obtain the benefits of the peaceful atom under strict controls to prevent its misuse for nuclear explosive purposes. Finally, the NPT calls upon all states, particularly the nuclear weapons states, to pursue good faith negotiations to end the nuclear arms race.<sup>8</sup>

Since the end of the second world war, countless smaller wars have been fought. Hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost. If nuclear weapons had been used in such wars the consequences would have been disastrous. Hence an assessment of nuclear proliferation continues to be very important.

Every country is interested in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. If many countries acquire nuclear weapons the threat to their neighbours would increase and sooner or later threaten the security of the new owners themselves. This would lessen the security for all. Therefore, the nuclear powers feel that there should be cooperation among all the nations to maintain and strengthen the non proliferation treaty and other defenses against the spread of the bomb. Mere pledges of commitment to the treaty are not enough. Words should match the actions. The nuclear powers feel that the world is safer place now due to the treaty of non-proliferation.

The essential non-proliferation undertakings are contained in the first two articles of the NPT.

Article 1 places the nuclear weapon state under the obligation not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over them, and not in any way to assist encourage or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or acquire such weapons or devices. Article II pledges the non-nuclear weapon states not to receive nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as well as not to manufacture them or receive assistance in their manufacture.<sup>9</sup>

The first part of the article has not as yet given rise to formal complaints. But the second part of Article I has led to controversy. Nuclear material and technology destined for power programmes have been exported by non-proliferation treaty parties to non parties. There have been certain forms of nuclear cooperation which has led to the development of nuclear weapon capability in several countries. For instance the willingness of China to sell nuclear commodities without strict control to Pakistan has contributed to its nuclear weapons capability. Under Article II of the non-proliferation treaty, every non-nuclear weapon party to the treaty have to conclude a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, whether or not it is actually engaged in nuclear activities. This promotes nuclear safety.

The United States is of the opinion that all the NPT countries, especially developing countries have the right to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Infact it has helped countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy like meeting their needs in power, medicine, health care, science, industry and agriculture. Among NPT parties nuclear cooperation has increased as they are confident that peaceful nuclear exports and assistance will not be misused. The following activities of the United States since 1980 has proved how it has helped the NPT countries.

- Virtually all U.S. nuclear export financing totaling more than \$ 1 billion - has been given to NPT parties.
- Special training arrangements have been set up to foster technology transfer only with parties to the NPT or the treaty of Tlatelolco.
- We have granted hundreds of fellowships for technical training under the IAEA nearly exclusively to NPT parties.
- All U.S. extra budgetary funding of technical assistance projects not funded by the IAEA has gone to NPT parties.
- We have modified our regulations to make it easier to license exports to NPT parties.

- We have pledged nearly \$ 22 million to the IAEA's technical assistance program.<sup>10</sup>

The United States feels that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has helped immensely in halting the arms race. President Reagan believed that a nuclear war can never be won and therefore must never be fought. It has been Reagan's top priority to eliminate nuclear weapons. Even then, there has been little progress in eliminating nuclear weapons.

Indira Gandhi had made her intentions obvious to carry out underground nuclear explosion for economic advancement in August 1972. Hence, India's emergence on the world nuclear scene was not a new phenomenon. Infact it had been Jawahar Lal Nehru's aim to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes. It was his initiative that led to the establishment of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission on August 10, 1948. After exploding her first nuclear device in 1974, India became the sixth nation to conduct such a test. But India made it very clear that it would use nuclear energy for the welfare of its people.

The non-proliferation treaty of 1968 was not signed by India as she thought that it would be a major hurdle for peaceful experiments. Most of the members of the Indian parliament were in favour of India not signing the non-proliferation treaty. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who was present in the House during the discussion pointedly remarked:



Mankind today is at the cross - roads of nuclear peace and nuclear war. There can be no doubt that we should take the road to nuclear peace. But the first step in this direction is yet in sight. It is vitally important, therefore, for the nuclear weapon powers to undertake as soon as possible meaningful negotiations on a series of measures leading to nuclear disarmament..... This is a situation which cannot be viewed with equanimity by non-nuclear countries, especially as they are called upon to undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons for their own defense.<sup>11</sup>

The Indian reaction to the Pokharan explosion was therefore favourable. It was hypocrisy on the part of the United States to criticize India when she herself had built up a huge stockpile of nuclear armaments. It was ridiculous to think that a ten kilo explosion could be a menace to world peace and security . The nuclear explosion was actually an extension of the research work being done to see that the uncontrollable nuclear energy is utilised for peaceful purposes. India may have been the sixth nuclear power but the first to renounce its use for military purposes.

America was not convinced by the explanations put forward by India. They felt that India now had nuclear weapons and this would lead to a race for nuclear weapons. Hence, the non-proliferation treaty would not be successful. Inevitably this led to a set back in Indo-American

relations for sometime, and India had to dispense with, for the time being, the aid from the United States.

For its first venture into nuclear power production, India turned to the United States.

The result in 1963 was a thirty-year nuclear cooperation agreement providing for the construction, continued supply, and safeguarding of two General Electric Light water power reactors at Tarapur in western India. Included was a U.S. commitment to meet the fuel needs of the Tarapur reactors for the thirty years of the agreement - i.e., into 1993. The aid extended a \$ 78 million low interest loan to help finance the purchase.<sup>12</sup>

The controversy that generated in America over the issue of the obligation of the United States to supply enriched uranium for India's Tarapur Atomic Plant at Trombay in Bombay has soured Indo-American relations. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 1978, the United States applied fresh safeguards and inspection requirements for India's nuclear reactors. Naturally, this roused the anxiety and indignation of the Indian Government. In the discussions held in April 1981 between India's top officials and their counterparts in Washington, it was argued that the United States domestic legislation on nuclear non-proliferation was both legally undefendable and morally untenable. India would not abandon her right over the nuclear spent fuel.

The Indian Government felt that America was trying to prevent India from becoming an autonomous nuclear power. Opposition members in India felt that America was trying to blackmail India. The double standard of America was proved when it tried to lift the Symington Amendment restrictions on aid to Pakistan. They could do a similar thing by modifying the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, 1978. Such a policy behaviour reflects that the United States is mainly guided by political and extraneous considerations rather than by dictates of legal and moral obligations.

It is significant to observe here that the General Accounting Office (GAO), known as the watchdog of the United States Congress, is critical of the United States nuclear policy vis-a-vis India. It commented. "India's national pride has become heavily involved in the issue of discrimination with respect to international nuclear non-proliferation."<sup>13</sup> But at the same time it has justified the export criteria applied to the shipment of nuclear fuel to India. Further the United States is of the opinion that India cannot extract Tarapur's plutonium. They feel that the extraction would give India about 1,300 kilograms of plutonium, enough for 160 bombs. India cannot extract plutonium unless the United States finds that safeguards can be effectively applied to the extraction plant.

The air was slightly cleared when the Reagan administration discovered an alternative to rearrange the supply of enriched uranium to

India in collaboration with the French Government. France has agreed to supply nuclear fuel for the Tarapur plant. Indira Gandhi made it clear before Americans :

India was not opposed to the safeguards evolved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) but she asserted, having accepted them once, India has the right to reprocess. Mrs. Gandhi further explained that once IAEA safeguards were met there was no need for India to take concurrence of any country for reprocessing.<sup>14</sup>

The government of the United States did not agree with India's point of view. Therefore in the bilateral relations of India and the United States, the nuclear fuel has left a bad taste. The tripartite agreement has given rise to complexities between India and France and heightened the degree of misunderstanding and bitterness between India and the United States.

As stated earlier India refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and then in 1974, proceeded with an underground nuclear explosion. It regarded the Non-Proliferation Treaty as discriminatory and therefore an unacceptable invasion of its sovereignty. The shipment of uranium to Tarapur plant was stopped for sometime. It was only after much debate that the United States authorized shipments for Tarapur. Infact the United States wanted to maintain as far as possible, good relations with India as the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan and also out of a sense of contractual obligation.

Senator Javits (Rep., New York) argued;

We would be foolish to alienate India at a time when two countries to the west of India are engaged in a war in which both sides are accusing the United States of causing the bloodshed.<sup>15</sup>

Further Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who was an ambassador in India, almost tore into pieces the opposition to the fuel shipment. He was of the opinion that the arm twisting on the part of the United States to force India to accept the full-scale safeguards would appear to the Indian people as an infringement on their sovereignty.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty has been criticized by a number of non-nuclear weapon countries of the Third World, including India. The reasons why India has refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty are as follows. Firstly, so far, the nuclear-weapons powers have not ceased the arms race and there are no signs that they are going to do so in the future. Secondly, the United States and Britain have not submitted their non-military nuclear facilities for verification. Thirdly, the non-proliferation treaty says that the non-nuclear countries who will become members of the treaty will be favoured with regard to the supply of nuclear technology and material, but they have not yet been the exclusive beneficiaries of such aid and trade. In its press comments after the Indian nuclear explosion SIPRI year book said on this point:

There has been no inducement to join the NPT : States can remain outside the Treaty, and outside the new safeguards systems set up by the IAEA, without risking difficulties in their peaceful nuclear endeavours or even in preparing for a nuclear explosion. Indeed, the insouciance of supplier countries may have facilitated the Indian nuclear explosion.<sup>16</sup>

Fourthly, article I and II of the treaty concerning transfers and safeguards are extremely unfair to non-nuclear weapons powers. The nuclear powers are free to transfer nuclear weapons and explosive devices and even to encourage each other to acquire and manufacture nuclear weapons. While this is not applicable to the non-nuclear weapons countries. They can only receive nuclear material and equipment under rules.

According to another provision of the treaty, the benefit from nuclear explosion would be made available to treaty partners at a low cost. Needless to say, no benefits have been made available to non-nuclear countries. The promise of protection for non-nuclear countries is also valueless. Therefore in its early phase the non-proliferation treaty fell short of all reasonable expectations as a disarmament measure.

During the cold war period the division of the world into two great blocs resulted in the guarantee of security to the aligned countries. The guarantee was given by the Soviet Union and the United States. Had it not

been for this guarantee, the aligned countries would have also acquired nuclear weapons. Moreover during this period the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was so intense that nuclear weapons proliferation received low priority. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the United States did not try to dissuade Pakistan from going ahead with its nuclear weapons program. It gave more priority to Pakistani support in putting off Soviet advances in Afghanistan. To prevent Soviet influence in India, America backed off from trying to induce India to accept the International Atomic Energy Agency inspection safeguards on all its nuclear facilities.

Since 1975, there have been many non-proliferation treaty review conferences after an interval of every five years.

At the review conferences of 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990, the most noteworthy common feature was the dissatisfaction expressed by most of the non-nuclear parties with what they considered the failure of the three major nuclear powers - the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. - to live up to their treaty obligations, particularly, their obligation to implement the nuclear disarmament pledges contained in Article VI and the Preamble, which deal mainly with preventing vertical proliferation.<sup>17</sup>

The nuclear powers were more interested in the implementation of the provisions for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the

question of safeguards. It was the non-aligned states which took the lead in presenting proposals in an effort to obtain full compliance by the nuclear powers with their commitments to nuclear disarmament.

After the fourth review conference in 1990, the United States realized that it could not continue to oppose a comprehensive test ban. Therefore, the United States Congress enacted a legislation in 1992 for a phased approach to an internationally agreed end of testing during this decade, with the primary objective of safety.

America may be right in saying that nuclear weapons must not be allowed to proliferate endlessly. On the other hand India is not wrong either in stressing that the principle of non proliferation must be non-discriminatory as well. The notion that nuclear weapons are safer in some hands than in others is preposterous if one looks at the record of those that have them.

The United States was the first and only country to use the nuclear bomb. It hardly makes any sense that a million Japanese had to be killed or maimed in order to shorten the war just to prevent a few thousand American casualties. The idea of establishing American supremacy in the post-war world, also did not last long because other countries were able to produce the bomb. The Soviet Union followed suit, followed by France and China. The international waters of the South



Pacific was turned into a private nuclear testing ground, causing immense damage to the environment.

When the Soviet Union became a nuclear country the United States threatened it with serious consequences but gave up the threat as the Soviet Union left it with no option. Since Britain and France belonged to the United States club, it did not raise its voice against them. China did not belong to either of the clubs so both the Soviet Union and the United States were horrified at its nuclear status. But all the members are more worried about India becoming a nuclear power.

India has always believed in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Indira Gandhi as chairperson of the non-aligned movement addressed the Thirty Eighth Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on September 28, 1983. In her memorable speech she exposed the dangers of Nuclear war and reiterated the need of peace in the following words: "Scientists, scholars and some notable soldiers have vividly described the outcome of a future nuclear war. Imagine a hundred or thousand Hiroshimas at one time..... We can all live only if we all combine in the struggle for peace."<sup>18</sup>

The next Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, of India also felt that the Non Proliferation Treaty was very unfair. While addressing a press conference in New York on June 12, 1985, he said,

Our policy on the NPT is very clear and we have no intention of changing it. We feel that the NPT is very unfair. It has two different levels of control. It treats non-nuclear weapon states differently. And we think anything which is so blatantly unfair should not be in existence and we will not sign it.<sup>19</sup>

He felt that the military blocs should understand that stability cannot be achieved through superiority or even balance of weapons. It could only come through co-existence and disarmament. It was everyone's duty to avert this danger.

India and Soviet Union jointly made a clarion call for an international convention banning the use or threat to use of nuclear weapons. They signed a ten point Indo-Soviet Delhi declaration on November 27, 1986 which called for a nuclear weapon free and non-violent world. The said declaration proved a milestone towards the journey of disarmament and peace. Some of the principles adopted in the declaration are peaceful co-existence must become the universal norm of international relations and human life must be reorganized as supreme. The resources being spent on armaments must be channelled towards social and economic development.

Another significant reason why India has been compelled not to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty is because relations between India and

Pakistan since August 1947, have alternated between uneasy calm, open hostility or warfare. Matters had been further complicated with the development of the Soviet and American blocs. The creation of Bangladesh in 1971, with the assistance of India, further embittered feelings between them. India had hoped that the 1972 Simla Agreement would neutralize or eliminate external involvement in the subcontinent.

To India's great disappointment it has not worked that way. Indeed, Indo-Pak hostility is threatening to assume a nuclear dimension. Therefore in case of a nuclear threat from Pakistan, India needs to keep herself prepared for it. This is also one of the reasons why India has refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In a March 1987 interview with a British newspaper (The Observer), Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, doyen of The Pakistani nuclear establishment, who heads the nuclear enrichment facility at Kahuta near Islamabad, admitted that his country already has an atomic bomb and would be prepared to use it if its existence was threatened.<sup>20</sup>

A short while later in a time magazine interview, President Zia-ul-Haq confirmed, more or less, what Dr. Khan had already revealed: "You can virtually write today that Pakistan can build a (nuclear) bomb whenever it wishes ..... Once you have acquired the technology, which Pakistan has, you can do whatever you like."<sup>21</sup> Infact in respect of uranium enrichment technology, Dr Khan pointed out that Pakistan had overtaken India. He

was justifiably proud that Pakistan had achieved in about seven years what took the European consortium twenty years to achieve.

Shortly after the defence minister K.C. Pant made a statement in the Parliament that Pakistan was forcing India to review its options. India felt that the United States had ignored Pakistan's search for nuclear capability and had continued to supply it with a whole range of highly sophisticated conventional weaponry. Infact Pakistan had aligned itself with the United States and China. There was a plan to update F-7 fighters which had been supplied by China to Pakistan, utilizing the technology of the United States, Chinese air frames and Pakistani defence facilities. Therefore the security environment for India had become very vulnerable. Long before these statements of Pakistani authorities, the Pakistani nuclear programme was launched, by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1972. As foreign minister, Bhutto had declared in 1966 that, "If India built a nuclear bomb, Pakistan would follow suit even if Pakistanis had to eat grass to succeed in that venture."<sup>22</sup> Pakistan had refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 simply because its arch-rival, India had pledged not to accede to it.

The Pakistani nuclear programme was based on two main pillars, firstly nuclear espionage and smuggling and secondly nuclear collaboration with its strategic ally, China. Apparently, Pakistan ran the

world's most successful nuclear smuggling ring. In the development of Pakistan's nuclear programme, China has played the central role. Probably China feels that a nuclear-armed Pakistan would be a crucial counter weight to India.

China's clandestine assistance to Pakistan predates the nuclear cooperation agreement signed by the two countries in 1986 and has included the transfer of nuclear bomb designs, collaboration in the development of gas centrifuges and possibly a joint nuclear test. U.S. intelligence reports suggest that a seismic event in Xinjiang in May 1983 was a secret nuclear test and that a senior Pakistani government leader attended the event.<sup>23</sup>

Later, the senior Pakistani official was identified as the then- foreign minister Yaqub Khan. There was speculation that China may have exploded a nuclear device for Pakistan.

Time and again the donor countries have said that the arms supplied to Pakistan are not meant for use against India. It was basically to counter the potential Soviet threat to Pakistan from the Afghan border. History has proved that these weapons have been used against India only. America feels that a strong Pakistan is necessary in view of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan can go to any lengths to weaken India so as to avenge the defeat of 1971.

The United States is pampering Pakistan with military economic aid package. India is not basically against Pakistan acquiring weapons but is concerned about the intervention of external powers which can have far reaching consequences. Pakistan is on the verge of making the Islamic Bomb. Pakistan's keen desire for a nuclear bomb was there much before India in 1974 tested her nuclear device, with the acquiescence of United States and some other powers. We can have a real feel of Pakistan's ambitions in Bhutto's calculations: "(1) Pak bomb will be a status symbol not only for Pakistan but for the entire Islamic world (2) that it would fetch aid and oil supply from the sympathetic muslim states and (3) it would give Pakistan enough leverage to put India into the defensive."<sup>24</sup> Bhutto wanted Pakistan to seek a new identity in the Islamic world. India was not only worried about America keeping quiet over Pakistan's nuclear quest but it was more worried about China helping Pakistan to develop the trigger mechanism that would enable Pakistan to build a reliable and usable bomb without necessarily having to test it.

Both the super powers did not want a nuclear proliferation in South Asia. But at the same time the United States had been conniving at Pakistan's bomb-making by waiving the Symington Amendment. When the Soviet Union warned General Zia not to go in for nuclear weapons program, the United States issued a stern warning to Moscow to keep its hands off Pakistan. The danger of a nuclear war exists more amongst the

smaller nations than amongst the super powers. The smaller nations can be provoked into using the nuclear weapons as the last alternative to national demise. In a war between India and Pakistan it is more likely that Pakistan would be the first user of nuclear weapons. The Indian armed forces feel that when Pakistanis are outnumbered they may use nuclear weapons to prevent the defeat of Pakistan. So, the probability of the use of nuclear weapons is more in the context of Indo-Pakistan than United States and the Soviet Union.

India's decision to develop nuclear energy or to go nuclear in the future is therefore caused by its protest against the discriminatory non-proliferation treaty or it may be a response to Pakistani and Chinese nuclear power development. It may even have been a deliberate attempt to join the nuclear club. The United States was perturbed about Pakistan's nuclear activities and India's unsafeguarded sensitive nuclear facilities and its detonation of a nuclear device in 1974. Richard T. Kennedy, Ambassador at Large and adviser to the Secretary of state on non-proliferation policy and nuclear energy affairs said that :

Acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan would serve only to exacerbate tensions, increase the level of mutual distrust, and undermine rather than enhance security - the very opposite of the goal intended.<sup>25</sup>

Renowned defence analyst K. Subrahmanyam stated in the Times of India (29 February, and 17 March, 1984) that :

At the outset, let us disabuse our minds of the racist view that while the nuclear weapons are safe in the hands of the white and yellow races they cannot be trusted with black and brown leaders. The historical record shows that city - busting was essentially a military tradition of the European and American nations.<sup>26</sup>

City destruction through nuclear weapons is wholly traceable to the Western values and philosophies of war, while Indo-Pakistani wars so far have been fought with due deference to laws of war and the Hague convention.

But this does not mean that India can rest assured with Pakistan going nuclear. The strategic, political and military implications of Pakistani nuclear capability suggests that India should also formulate a response to safeguard its security and national interests. India will have to follow such a policy that would serve it best without being sentimental or pseudo moralistic in approach. India has to be more concerned about the explicit and ominous United States - Pakistan strategic consensus than the mere fact of United States arms supply to that country. The Reagan administration merely accommodated India with great reluctance. The real threat to India was the probability of a United States - Pakistan or United States - Pakistan - China axis.



The Reagan administrations insistence that nations receiving American fuel shipments must conform to the provisions of the United States Non-Proliferation Act is in complete accord with Reagan's Declaration of 17 July 1981, "that efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons will remain a fundamental foreign policy objective."<sup>27</sup>

America feels that if India acquires nuclear weapons then Pakistan would both need and require the same. This would lead to Nuclear Proliferation all round the world. But it could also be that if America rearms Pakistan it might precipitate this very chain reaction. Therefore the United States needed to be very careful while designing its security arrangements with Pakistan. India might be led to reactivate its nuclear weapons programme if the United States pours sophisticated weapons into Pakistan. This may further lead to Pakistan pursuing a nuclear weapons programme with more vigour.

India felt that the United States had turned a blind eye towards Pakistan's efforts at acquiring a nuclear capability. Infact it had continued to provide aid to Pakistan though it had violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.

The waiver of the Symington Amendment expired in the summer of 1987, and Pakistan's nuclear programme came under close Congressional scrutiny in the context of negotiations for a new economic-cum military aid

package to Pakistan. Military aid had been temporarily suspended till January 1988, after a Pakistani national had been arrested in the U.S. for alleged involvement in smuggling vital atomic bomb components from that country.<sup>28</sup>

In spite of all this the United States had granted a new \$ 4.02 billion aid package to Pakistan beginning from 1987. The Reagan administration informed the Congress that it had no proof of Islamabad's plans for manufacturing nuclear weapons. Though, successive governments in India have proclaimed that they will not opt for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons programme but Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons may lead it to review its policy. As the former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said at a press conference on 5 June 1988:

We do not intend making nuclear weapons and we will hold ourselves back from developing a nuclear weapon. But the fact is, if Pakistan does have a nuclear weapon, it is going to cause very serious problems for us.<sup>29</sup>

Therefore, the policy of the United States towards Pakistan's nuclear programme could give rise to nuclear proliferation problems on the Indian sub-continent.

The Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, signalled his intentions to withdraw the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1988, the final year of Reagan administration. This greatly affected the United States stance

towards South Asia. "Although the United states continued to funnel arms aid through Pakistan to the Mujaheedin to parallel continuing Soviet aid to Afghan government forces, Pakistan ceased to be a frontline state."<sup>30</sup> George Bush, the next President had already had previous exposure to India and the subcontinent when he was the Vice President under the Reagan Administration. While in Pakistan there was a shift from a military dictatorship to a democratically elected government under Benazir Bhutto. Under the changed circumstances the Bush administration justified the military aid to Pakistan as boosting its self-confidence in the transition to democracy. America, moreover did not want to loose out on French competition.

There was continuing concern in India about Pakistan's persistent efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability. In October 1989. Bush provided the waiver required by the Pressler amendment to permit economic and military aid to continue. But with more information about Pakistan's nuclear activities, the Bush administration decided it could no longer defer taking action. Therefore, the president decided that he would not certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon. So, in keeping with the Pressler amendment the United States military and economic assistance to Pakistan was stopped. India was much satisfied and pleased that at least for the time being the United States arms aid to Pakistan had ended.

China exploded a nuclear weapon in October 1964, and became the world's fifth nuclear power. Washington was worried in case New Delhi followed suit to become the sixth nuclear power. It was a significant threat to India's territorial integrity and sovereignty. America felt that the possibility of India becoming a nuclear power was not theoretical. Since its independence, India had developed a substantial civil nuclear energy program, headed by Dr. Homi Bhabha until his death in an airplane crash in 1965. From the point of view of the United States, India had already proved difficult in nonproliferation negotiations.

Relations between India and China had already been strained after the Chinese aggression against India in 1962. With China becoming a nuclear power, it sparked off a debate in the Indian Parliament as to whether India should become a nuclear weapon country or not. While speaking on the capital outlay of the Department of Atomic Energy in the Lok Sabha on March 23, 1963 Bade, a member of the Jan Sangh Party strongly pleaded:

India should manufacture atomic weapons in view of the threats posed by the Chinese on the borders. He contended that China possessed atomic weapons and it would be impossible for India to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity without the nuclear weapons.<sup>31</sup>

There were other members in the Parliament who were of the opinion that India should not manufacture atomic or nuclear weapons. Nehru was also of the opinion that India should not develop nuclear weapons.

The people of India, on the contrary felt that India needed to manufacture nuclear weapons as it would not violate the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 as underground explosions were allowed nor would it be going against the spirit of non alignment. Members of Parliament also pleaded with Lal Bahadur Shastri, the then Prime Minister of India, for nuclear weapons. India's security could no longer be left to the mercy or whims of so-called friendly countries. But, India went in for a peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974.

When the nuclear non-proliferation treaty came up, India refused to sign it due to its discriminatory nature. But the Indian experts held different views on India's attitude towards the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. "Major General Som Dutt, Director of the institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, was against India's signing the treaty because of the security consideration, particularly in view of the development of nuclear weapons by China."<sup>32</sup> But other Indian experts felt that India should sign the treaty as it appeared contradictory to declare on the one hand that India would utilize nuclear power for peaceful purposes and on the other hand refuse to sign the treaty.

The threat to India had increased with the maturing of Sino-American relationship in the eighties. Pakistan's connections with China was already well established. It was further renewing its connections with America. All this was a grave threat to South Asia. "Islamabad's willingness to recognize China but not India as the predominant power in South Asia, aggravates India's fears of China as a hegemonistic power that is in occupation of its territory."<sup>33</sup> Therefore, if Pakistan continues to involve China in the affairs of South Asia, Indo-Pakistan relations can never improve.

Therefore, another crucial dimension of Indo-American nuclear non-proliferation policy was the linkage of the United States with China.

A Sino-US accord was initiated in Beijing on April 30, 1984, at the time of President Reagan's visit to China and signed on July 23, 1985, when the Chinese President Li Xianman visited the United States. The delay of more than a year in finalising the agreement was due to some suspicious activity indulged in by the Chinese. These included reports of China having given to Pakistan detailed nuclear weapons, design information and help in building a centrifuge uranium enrichment plant to produce highly enriched uranium for atomic blasts.<sup>34</sup>

This was a threat to India's security as well as had implications for nuclear proliferation.

India was more concerned with the United States - China nuclear deal since the agreement had waived all the conditions that had killed the Tarapur Agreement. Infact, China had refused to commit that it would not process the spent fuel nor did it allow for any international inspection of its nuclear facilities. America overlooked all this as it would be economically beneficial to the United States and it would improve the relationship between the United States and China. This definitely points out to the selective implementation of the United States non-proliferation policy.

China faced international criticism of its proliferation activities. It therefore decided to publicly acknowledge its missile and nuclear transfers and meet the demands of the United States. During, secretary of State, James Baker's trip to Beijing in November, 1991, China agreed to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) by April 1992 and to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime if the June 1991 United States sanctions were lifted. China formally acceded to the NPT on March 9, 1992, and the administration effectively lifted the June 1991 sanctions on March 23, 1992.

In the nineties the Chinese continued to provide technical assistance to Pakistan. The foreign secretary of Pakistan said on February 6, 1992 that his country now had the components and know-how to build at least one nuclear explosive device. The Reagan administration had

convincing evidence that China was helping Pakistan to operate its Kahuta uranium- enrichment plant and had given Pakistan a nuclear bomb design. China had given Pakistan enough weapons - grade uranium to fuel two nuclear weapons. On December, 31, 1991, China had signed a contract to build a 300 - MW nuclear power reactor for Pakistan. Li Peng, the Chinese Premier had said that the deal was totally for peaceful purposes and that the project would have the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards.

Due to all these activities, India was unwilling to enter into any comprehensive non-proliferation treaty. Though India has not addressed nuclear issues on the bilateral level with Pakistan, it has been a leading advocate for total nuclear disarmament on the multilateral level. Through the so-called Five continent peace initiative, India has tried to focus global attention on nuclear issues. There have been periodic heads-of-government summits, experts meetings, and publicity efforts by the six nations - India, Argentina, Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden and Greece. All this is not considered very significant by the Western arms control community but the Third World countries view it as important. The Soviet Union has taken the initiative seriously.

Some have criticized the five continent initiative because it had failed to come up with a workable proposal. Others felt that the Initiative could not be taken seriously because India and Argentina steadfastly



refused to address their own nuclear programmes. On his 1987 visit to Washington, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi came up with his three tier approach. The three tier approach divided the nuclear world into three categories of nations: the superpowers - the United States and Soviet Union, the second rank nuclear nations - China, France and the United Kingdom and the near nuclear Nations - India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Israel and South Africa. Each tier would have different obligations.

First of all the superpowers would be obliged to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Secondly the second - rank nuclear powers would be obliged to freeze their arsenals at current levels. Finally, the near-nuclear countries would have to agree to remain non-nuclear. All this would require the assent of the five official nuclear states as well as of the near-nuclear states. But this global nuclear agreement is unequal as it allows some states to retain their weapons while others have to go for a nuclear weapons freeze.

India also rejected Pakistan's proposal for a South Asia nuclear weapons-free zone comprising just the subcontinent. So, any comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation limited just to the Indian subcontinent is not acceptable to India. But a Greater South Asia nuclear weapons-free zone that would address many of India's strategic and political conditions would be acceptable to India. This agreement would

prohibit the deployment of nuclear weapons in India, Pakistan, Tibet and adjacent areas of China, and in parts of the Indian ocean. The greater South Asia Nuclear weapons-free zone would be beneficial to India if it reduced the risk of a Chinese nuclear attack on India and also reduced the likelihood that South Asia would be a battle field in a United States - Soviet Union nuclear clash. Such an arrangement could pose difficulties for China and the United States.

In spite of various predictions of imminent tests, neither country has undertaken the testing programme critical to the development of a reliable nuclear arsenal. Therefore, there was optimism that the nuclearization of the region had not yet occurred. Since India had detonated its device, neither India nor Pakistan are known to have manufactured nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are not going to serve the interest of either of the countries.

India has retained the nuclear option to deter China but an option by itself has little deterrent effect. On the other hand India's retention of the option has encouraged Pakistan to continue its nuclear weapons programme. Even if India has its own nuclear weapons, Pakistan armed with nuclear weapons could do much damage to India. It is most unlikely that India would use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear Pakistan. This would be because of India's conventional superiority. So, even if India has nuclear weapons there is no need for Pakistan to go nuclear. If

Pakistan acquires nuclear weapons then India might be tempted to take advantage of its nuclear superiority to launch a preemptive first strike.

The only region in the world in which three rival nations, sharing disputed frontiers, deeply hostile to each other and facing each other with nuclear capability is South Asia. There is hostility between India and Pakistan on the one hand and between India and China on the other. The situation has reached the post proliferation stage with India and Pakistan both possessing weapons-grade fissile material and the means of delivering nuclear arms. "This region, according to U.S. Director of Central Intelligence Agency, James Woolsey is the part of the world where weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, are most likely to be used."<sup>35</sup> Therefore it is a challenge for the international community to manage this situation.

Though both India and Pakistan claimed to have a nuclear weapon capabilities, neither admitted to building any nuclear bomb. Since both feel that the other has a nuclear bomb, the very thought acted as a deterrent. Pakistan seemed to have the capability of striking New Delhi and Bombay. India's main goal was to develop a deterrent against China which has already developed nuclear weapons. Just like the established nuclear powers, Pakistan has developed its nuclear weapons capabilities through a dedicated weapons programme. While India's weapons potential comes from its large and growing civilian nuclear power programme.

Besides the security reasons India and Pakistan's nuclear programme is guided by the powerful force of nationalism. For Pakistan it is a reason to feel proud as it regards itself the leader of the Islamic world. While India has employed science as a tool of national autonomy and sovereignty. At the international level also they seek respect and prestige. In Pakistan, the nuclear programme has been controlled by the military. Whereas in India, it is under the control of the Indian cabinet and top civil servants of the cabinet secretariat and is answerable to the national parliament. Therefore, it seems that a nuclear rollback for these two countries is not possible. Even outside pressure is not going to succeed in stopping them.

Therefore, the outside powers should instead try to deter the overt deployment of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and try to prevent a subcontinent arms race. India and Pakistan should be encouraged to embrace confidence - building measures. This would result in the stability of the region. Robert Mc Namara stated, "..... nuclear weapons serve no military purpose whatsoever. They are totally useless – except only to deter one's opponent from using them."<sup>36</sup> In the 1980s, this assumption was used to buttress what the United States had been advocating. In the 1990s it formed the basis for advocating a move towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

Since the beginning of the atomic age both the Super Powers have been concerned about nuclear weapons. Recently, they have been more concerned about the spread of a civilian nuclear technology in other parts of the world, particularly the Third World. The Soviet Union was the first to consider a complete ban on nuclear weapons. On 19 June 1946, its representative in The United Nations, Andrei Gromyko, proposed a draft in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission demanding that an international convention be held for:

the prohibition of production, storing and use of atomic weapons and for the destruction of such weapons within three months of the entry into force of the Convention.<sup>37</sup>

The Soviet Union wanted disarmament first and nuclear control after that. Whereas, America wanted to control all nuclear energy and then to disarm. Therefore, both the Soviet Union and the Third World Countries were of the same opinion on the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union had supported all those measures by which proliferation of nuclear weapons can be stopped in the Third World countries. Therefore it had supported the non-proliferation treaty. It believed the treaty to be a part of the international law and therefore felt that all the countries should sign it. The Soviet Union felt that the International

Atomic Energy Agency safeguards should be extended to the nuclear non-weapons states even if they had not signed the non-proliferation treaty.

In the 1970s and 1980s a number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed by the Soviet Union and the United States grew significantly. Therefore, the non-proliferation treaty was considered discriminatory by the non-nuclear weapons states. Even at the review conferences there was a lot of argument that the nuclear weapons countries were not trying to currently stop the testing of nuclear weapons or the nuclear arms race. Hence, it was not possible to achieve nuclear disarmament.

In July 1991, a strategic arms control treaty was signed by the Soviet Union and the United States. However, this did not satisfy the non-nuclear weapons states. In the 1990s the success of the non-proliferation treaty depended on the partnership between the developed and the developing world, rather than unilateral actions undertaken by the developed world through export controls and the United Nations Security Council.

The failed coup of August 1991; the subsequent independence of the Baltic republics; and the declarations of independence issued by other republics of the Soviet Union have raised troubling questions about the future of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons. The relationship between the Union forces and the military capabilities of the republics is now uncertain.<sup>38</sup>

There was speculation as to what would happen to the nuclear weapons currently in the custody of the Union forces. If they would be taken to the Russian Federation, there were chances that the republican forces would try to prevent it. There was also the possibility that the smaller republics would try to build nuclear weapons so as to balance Russia's overwhelming military and economic power. These changes were expected to alter international non-proliferation policy making.

With the breakdown of the East-West bloc system, a major war in Europe is less likely to take place. Those countries which were under the protection of the Soviet Union or were members of the Warsaw pact have been left militarily isolated. Hence, there is need to reassure them about their security prospects because most of them have significant nuclear programmes. In the absence of a security guarantee they might seek nuclear weapons, unless creative policies in the West makes this unnecessary. The probability of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union has also declined after the end of the Cold War. But the danger has shifted to Asia, the middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Korean peninsula and especially to the South Asian subcontinent.

The old animosities between India and Pakistan are increasing day by day. Both the countries have the knowledge and nuclear materials required to construct nuclear weapons quickly. In Kashmir, the Siachen

Glacier and in the Punjab conventional forces or insurgents backed by their respective countries shoot at each other daily. "In Kashmir, as the New Yorker reported, the conflict flared so hot in 1990 that Pakistan apparently threatened to go nuclear, deploying an armored caravan from a nuclear facility to an air base where F-16S with modified bomb rocks stood waiting."<sup>39</sup> Though the nuclear conflict was averted, the relationship between both the countries remained uncertain as since late 1992, Hindu-Muslim flare - ups have increased.

United States gradually realized that India can neither be persuaded nor pressurized to sign the non-proliferation treaty. Therefore, it has been suggesting other ways to entrap India into its nuclear non-proliferation objectives. In the 90s, the United States had made Latin America, the Pacific and South Africa as nuclear-free zones. In 1991, Pakistan had proposed a five nation conference for the denuclearisation of South Asia but India had dismissed the proposal.

After the end of the Cold War the United States was in great urgency to bring India and Pakistan into non-proliferation net. This is because it wanted to dominate the unipolar world by preventing the emerging regional powers from developing nuclear weapons. It was also concerned in case India and Pakistan export nuclear and missile capability to Iran, other Gulf and South-West Asian countries. This would have enhanced the prestige of India and Pakistan. India's development in the nuclear and



missile field has also alarmed the United States. Moreover, it feels that there could be a nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

Therefore, American initiative on non-proliferation in South Asia was to try and make India and Pakistan accept a verifiable cap on their future nuclear programme. This would bind them to place all their nuclear facilities under international safeguards. Its plan was also to ask India and Pakistan not to deploy or test their missiles. It was also willing to offer incentives to both the countries so that they would be willing to join a multilateral conference on regional security. But, both India and Pakistan refused to sign the non-proliferation treaty.

There can be no regional non-proliferation accord unless and until China is involved in it. This is because of the perceived Chinese threat to India and also because of the intimate China - Pakistan nuclear relationship. Instead of trying to persuade India to give up its nuclear programme, the United States and other international powers should try to create a base in South Asia, which would make India believe and go for nuclear restraint with Pakistan. Infact all the nuclear powers should accept restraint on their own nuclear weapons programme. Since the nuclear position of Pakistan and China are a direct threat to India, the United States should consider the security interest of India equally.

It seems that the future world is bound to be nuclear, because it has been difficult to convince the non-nuclear weapon states, that their

with China, it has refused to enter into confidence building discussions on nuclear issues with India.

The United States is convinced that the non-proliferation treaty had been successful in making the world less dangerous. Nuclear weapons states have negotiated on additional measures to reduce and eventually eliminate the threat of nuclear war. It has also made available the benefits of the peaceful atom . But globally, far more needs to be done to stop vertical and horizontal proliferation and to address the underlying motivations that drive nuclear proliferation. Universal non-discriminatory arms control measures will be needed to achieve this goal. The United States will have to try and achieve all this otherwise India's response to American non-proliferation will continue to be an irritant in Indo-American Foreign relations.

## NOTES

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<sup>38</sup>John Simpson and Darryl Howlett, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation : The Way Forward," *Survival* XXXIII. 6 (1991) : 488.

<sup>39</sup>George Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way In South Asia," *Foreign Policy* 9.1 (1993) : 85.

<sup>40</sup>Brahma Chellaney, 130.

## **Chapter - 5**

# **End of the Cold War and Its Implications for Indo-American Foreign Relations**

The world after the Second World War is totally different from the world before it. The political landscape of the world underwent a great change. The colonial hegemony of Europe along with its imperialist domination came to an end. Many countries of Asia, Africa and America became independent. Britain and France became the second rate powers of the world while America and the Soviet Union became the two super powers. The world was divided into two powerful blocs headed by America and the Soviet Union. The capitalist bloc consisted of the countries of Western Europe, North America and Pacific and it was headed by America. The communist bloc was headed by the Soviet Union and comprised the countries of Eastern Europe, China and North Korea.

The foreign policies of major capitalist states took a fundamental turn after the end of the second world war. The influential classes of Britain France and America could not accept the fact that many countries in Europe and Asia had fallen away from the capitalist system and the

colonies were gaining their independence. The rising prestige of the Soviet Union in the international arena was a cause of concern for them. Their dream of dictating terms to the Soviet Union after the Second World War as they had hoped the Soviet Union would emerge weakened was dashed.

The U.S.A. created a ramified network of military bases throughout the world, surrounding the USSR and attempting to use the NATO in its designs to achieve world domination. That policy was based on the US monopoly in the atomic bomb in the first years after the war.<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately for the American imperialists and their followers in August 1949, the first experimental atomic device test was made in the Soviet Union. In August 1953, the Soviet Union successfully tested a hydrogen bomb. Plans of attacking the Soviet Union by the American imperialists and their followers did not materialize.

Therefore one of the repercussions that the Second World War left on world politics was the beginning of the Cold War, a new form for balance of power tactics. Since then it has been the most important factor as far as the issues in international politics are concerned. Relations between the Soviet Union and the West became difficult and they stood forth as rivals though no actual armed conflict took place directly between two opposing camps. Instead of allowing their mutual hostility to express itself in open fighting the rival powers confined themselves to attacking each other with



propaganda and economic measures and with a general policy of non-cooperation. The post war fear, tension, suspicion and hostility between the Soviet Union and the West has been termed as the Cold War.

The rivalry between the big powers is not only the rivalry of powerful nations but also that of two powerful systems. On October 23, 1962, the United States representative in the Security Council, Adlai E. Stevenson said :

Cold War..... is not a private struggle; it is a world civil war, a contest between the pluralistic world and the monolithic world, a contest between the world of Charter and the world of communist conformity. Every nation that is now independent is involved in this grim, costly, distasteful division in the World, no matter how remote and how uninterested.<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet bloc stands for a Communist world and the United States stands for the capitalist system and is the leader of the Western bloc. The most significant development of the twentieth century was not the end of colonialism or the march of democracy but the growth of totalitarian communism which led to the Cold War.

There were various causes which led to the emergence of the Cold War. The co-operation and understanding that existed between Russia and Western powers during the Second World War began to evaporate after

the War and mutual distrust and suspicion began to appear which led to bitter feelings and tension between the two sides. This led to the formation of military pacts. America organised North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) with the help of the European countries and to counteract it Russia laid the foundation of the Warsaw Pact with the help of East European countries under her influence. The ideological differences created tension and bitter feelings between the two blocs. The political and social systems of the Soviet Union was considered dangerous by American leaders as there is no place for parliamentary democracy and individual liberty in it. On the other hand, the Communists regarded the American democracy, as shameful instrument of the wealthy and an aggression on peoples' liberty.

All this culminated in the historic statement of March 12, 1947 by President Harry Truman. The Truman administration, in the spring of 1947, undertook to contain the communist threat.<sup>3</sup>

John Foster Dulles the United States Secretary of State advocated a more aggressive policy to contain communism and liberate people from the communist tyranny. It is known as the policy of rolling back communism. He also preached the doctrine of brinkmanship. Its aim was to push Russia on the brink of war to force her to grant concession. His policy further aggravated the tension between Russia and the United

States. In spite of all this there was a spread of Communist regimes in various countries. All this led to the race for armaments.

The whole of Europe fell into the grip of economic depression after the Second World War. The United States rushed to the rescue of Europe because she thought that the economic crisis would help the spread of communism in the free world. Marshal, the Secretary of the United States formulated a law known as the Marshal Plan in order to prevent economic, social and political deterioration in the European countries and to improve the political and social life of Europe by fighting out poverty and economic crisis. The Soviet Union rejected this plan. Her rejection of it heightened East-West tension. About the United States economic assistance, Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, said on November 29, 1950 :

Our technical assistance is not philanthropy, for here our principles and self-interest coincide. As the people of undeveloped areas rise from poverty, not only will our own economy benefit, but also and even more important the real promise of freedom, will expose the false promises of Bolshevik imperialism.<sup>4</sup>

The United States felt that lack of economic stability in India and other neutralist countries might well strengthen the hands of local communist movements so the aid was intended for them also.

After the Second World War America, England and various other western countries began to interfere for nothing in the internal affairs of other countries to check communism. The United Nations Organisation miserably failed to remove the feelings of fear, suspicion and mistrust between the communists and capitalist countries. So war-like situation prevailed in the world. The division of Germany into East and West Germany further increased the tension between the two power blocs.

The purpose of bipolarizing the world soon demonstrated its limitations. Most nations rejected the concept of a divided world. They refused to join any of the power blocs. They regarded the post war structure of world politics as neither stable nor permanent. Therefore the doctrine of non-alignment took shape in the complex conditions of the cold war. Chronologically India was the first non-aligned country, and the essence of the doctrine of non-alignment was first formulated by her outstanding leader Jawaharlal Nehru the then Prime Minister of India. Expounding the foreign policy of independent India at the constituent assembly in December 1947, Prime Minister Nehru said :

The main subject in foreign policy today is vaguely talked of in terms of - 'Do you belong to this group or that group?' That is an utter simplification of issues..... We have sought to avoid foreign entanglements by not joining one bloc or the other.... We were trying to act according to our own

lights and according to the merits of the dispute as they seemed to us..... to remain friends with every body and yet to advance your cause.<sup>5</sup>

The main objectives of the non-aligned movement are :

- (a) The stabilisation of world peace. The non-aligned countries always keep themselves away from the power blocs so that they may diffuse the tense atmosphere and if there is any war they may act as mediator to bring about peace among the warring states.
- (b) Liquidation of colonialism and imperialism in all their forms as they encourage the spirit of exploitation.
- (c) Condemnation of racial discrimination as they have firm faith in the principle of equality and discard racial discrimination as negation of humanity.
- (d) Opposition to military alliances as they have already brought about two world wars.
- (e) They believe in disarmament as the manufacture of dangerous weapons poisons the whole atmosphere.
- (f) They have respect for human rights because if this is denied then all other achievements will be of no use.

- (g) Preservation of Independence is important for them because they are militarily weak.
- (h) Establishment of economic relations between nations based on equality is a must for no country should exploit another on any grounds whatsoever.

A foreign policy of non-alignment was designed to achieve two basic objectives: full independence and respected international status. As Nehru said in March 1949,

What does independence consist of ? It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. Once foreign relations go out of your hand into the charge of somebody else, to that extent and in that measure you are not independent.<sup>6</sup>

Therefore to Nehru, and his daughter Indira Gandhi, full independence meant international recognition of India's freedom to define its own interests and pursue its own policies.

The United States regarded India's policy of non-alignment as immoral. This led to the divergence of views of both Washington and New Delhi. After gaining independence from Britain the United States had followed a policy of neutrality which is similar to India's strategy of non-alignment. In spite of this, the United States felt that the unwillingness on

the part of the neutrals to openly join the American bloc in the defence of the free world point out to the fact that such countries are against the United States. India objected to this conclusion because it feels that the United States exceeds its bounds when it demands that friends of the United States should consider the enemies of the United States as their own. Though India's non-alignment was officially announced in 1946, it was in the pipeline since the 1920's and hence was not a covertly pro-Soviet stand against the United States. The United States felt that it is necessary to confine the Soviet Union's expansionism. Therefore, their foreign policy was based on this basic need. On the other hand, India does not fear the Soviet Union. Developing countries should strengthen their economies, hence reducing the chances of internal subversion.

For the United States the coming to power of communists in China in 1949 added to the security threat facing the United States. The China policy of India and America differed initially though both India and the United States aim at maintaining international peace and security, they diverged on the approach suitable for achieving this objective. To tame the aggressive countries the United States felt it was necessary to threaten them with massive retaliation. On the other hand India felt that they could be tamed through patience, trust and friendship. To prevent the spread of communism, India had to be brought into the United States regional alliance system along with other countries. If India refused she was to be prevented from joining the Soviets. Ironically, the more the

United States attempted to bring about a balance, the more it pushed India towards the Soviet Union. Washington's willingness to arm Pakistan supposedly against communism but in Indian eyes it was against non-aligned India. The United States insisted that the arms would not be used against India but in either case the United States behaved in a most irresponsible manner.

The very notion that the world could be divided into two parts encompassing all the nations, categorizing them as friends and enemies was unrealistic. National interests were too varied and fluid for such a thing to happen. This forced the American officials to adopt an ambivalent view towards neutralism. Frederick W. Jandrey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, expressed the newer American attitude with some precision in May 1958:

We fully respect the right of any state to choose neutrality. We would never try to compel a nation to join a collective security system against its will. But this does not mean that we are obliged to agree with its reasoning. It would have been comparatively easy for the United States itself to have retreated to a policy of neutrality and isolation after World War II .... no free nation can successfully go it alone .... The Soviet Union and its Communist handymen have never respected either neutrality or nationality. To them, a neutral is simply a potential victim.<sup>7</sup>



Obviously, Cold War is the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union for the friendship, good will, diplomatic support, allegiance, and alliance of other countries. It could as well be termed as the struggle for the domination of the world. Therefore the United States has been an inevitable major participant in the Cold War World strategy. It was difficult for India to identify herself with either of the blocs. Though it had adopted the Parliamentary democracy of the West, it could not trust the Western powers due to the legacy of imperialism. The evils of imperialism were much more real and obvious to the Indians than those of the distant bugbear of communist totalitarianism. A total alignment with the Soviet bloc was also not easy because the nationalist movement in India was led by middle class intellectuals who were in no way communists or socialists, except in a partial way.

Therefore, one can safely conclude that India has been against the Cold War. Unlike the United States India has wanted to free herself from the Big Power diplomacy ever since her independence. Indian leaders were convinced that if India got embroiled in this bipolar struggle she would lose all that she had gained during her long struggle for independence. Militarily, India was weak. Moreover, she is strategically close to the two most powerful communist states - the Soviet Union and China. This could lead to tensions on the Asian continent. India rejected the belief of the United States that the Soviet Union, China and other small

communist countries, had hostile and aggressive intentions towards the non-communist world. It did not perceive any threat towards itself from the communist world. Therefore India did not support the defense arrangements and actions of the Western bloc and avoided external pressures. India felt that the occurrence of the Cold War was due to the competition between America and the Soviet Union for world power and that Asia and Africa were not in the picture except as play things of the Big Powers. India felt that a third World War may occur if either sides tried to impose their own ideology on the rest of the world.

India opposed the United States military pact with Pakistan in May 1954 as it brought the Cold War to the door of the Indian subcontinent. This was a direct threat to India's peace and security while on the other hand it strengthened Pakistan on her borders and made the solution of Kashmir problem more complicated. For India war was not inevitable and therefore it has been very active in conducting the role of peace-maker. She has been trying to save the world from an approaching disaster.

Although Nehru did not approve, of military alliances between great powers he understood them. But, he did not understand the necessity of attaching small countries. For him, in a nuclear age, only those countries counted which were in a position to use the bombs. Nehru warned while addressing the Rajya Sabha on December 12, 1957. "This constant wrestling, this cold war, this piling up of armaments, this frantic

search for a more powerful weapon, the ultimate weapon where does it all lead to ? Nowhere except destruction.<sup>8</sup>

All this made disarmament in the World more and more difficult.

World peace can only be achieved by safeguarding of peace between America and the Soviet Union. In the 1970s many realistically minded statesmen in the capitalist countries and in the Soviet Union realized that there was no alternative to detente. Each side had sufficient stocks of nuclear weapons to destroy humanity many times. Use of nuclear weapons meant committing suicide as there would be no survivors on either side. There was no third way.

The first Cold War came to an end when President Nixon introduced detente in the America - Soviet relations after the signing of SALT - 1 with Brezhnev in May 1972. Actually the long drawn Vietnam war in which the United States was involved was an economic drain on America. During the same period the Soviet Union had caught up with them in the nuclear race. Therefore the American President had realized that militarily, economically and politically the United States had become a weak power, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

America felt that the Soviet Union was taking advantage of the spirit of detente and was trying to carve out spheres of influence in the Third

World. They were doing this by promoting or assisting Marxist regimes as evident in Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia or Cuba. This was finally confirmed when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. Thus, began the Second Cold War which was raised to its high pitch under the first Reagan administration - 1981-85. Americans made Afghanistan, the Soviet Union's Vietnam.

In the late 1970s the leaders of the United States rejected detente and revived the Cold War against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. There was an arms race to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union.

They began to exacerbate the international situation in all ways and sought to provoke the U.S.S.R. to undertake actions enabling the imperialist states to justify their aggressive policy by referring to the Soviet threat.<sup>9</sup>

Once again the United States began a defence build up to make itself the supreme power and to face the Soviet Union every where in Asia, Africa and Europe.

However, the Soviet Union did not succumb to these provocations. On the other hand it tried to solve the problems through talks between itself and America. It also kept a vigilant watch that the strategic balance be maintained as a serious guarantee of peace and international security. The first half of the 1980s was devoted by the Soviet Union to putting forward proposals to reduce arms so as to maintain world peace.

In 1982, the Soviet Union pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This is an exceptionally important step, and, if other powers possessing such weapons were to follow suit, this would practically be equivalent to banning nuclear weapons altogether.<sup>10</sup>

Neither America nor the other nuclear powers made such a pledge.

The United States was forced to begin talks with the Soviet Union in 1982-1983 due to pressure from public opinion expressed throughout the world including America. But the talks reached a deadlock. The Soviet Union offered new proposals but the American delegation rejected it. Meanwhile the Soviet Union realized that the United States was using the talks with it as a means for deceiving the nations and concealing the arms race they unleashed. In March 1985, the Soviet Union once again initiated talks between itself and the United States to avert an arms race but it was rejected by the United States administration.

A meeting was held on November 19-21, 1985, in Geneva between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan where basic questions in Soviet American relations and the current international situation underwent all-round discussion.<sup>11</sup>

It was finally decided that both the United States and the Soviet Union would not seek military superiority, a nuclear or conventional war would

not be unleashed between the two as there could be no victors in such a war. Hence, the talks in Geneva had a positive impact on international relations and reduced the danger of a nuclear war.

All this was the result of the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev as the leader of the Soviet Union and the domestic changes introduced by him. As Joseph Nye, Jr. rightly says;

Reagan's military budgets, his rhetoric about the strategic Defence Initiative and the INF development in Europe all played a role, but the primary answer (to what changed American attitude) is Mikhail Gorbachev.<sup>12</sup>

This led the two leaders to sign the Intermediate - Range Nuclear (INF) Force treaty in December, 1987, which brought in another period of detente in the United States - Soviet relations. It was by then seen that cold war detente were like two ends in the swings of a pendulum in their bilateral relations. One of the agreements reached at the Geneva summit concerned the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The last soldier left in February 1989. Gorbachev was a hit everywhere he went in Europe. He promoted glasnost and perestroika. His policy earned for him the most coveted Nobel peace prize.

Relations between Gorbachov and Reagan's successor, George Bush, were good, and there were several summits. These produced two historic

agreements : the conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty signed in November, 1990 and the Strategic Arms Reduction treaty (START) signed in July 1991. But opposition by the Soviet General Staff undermined the CFE treaty and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in August 1991 halted progress on the START treaty. One of the objects of Soviet foreign policy had been to strengthen socialism around the world. By 1990 it was clear that this mission had failed. The Soviet Union's only allies were underdeveloped Third World States such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Cuba and they were all liabilities requiring more and more aid to stay afloat.

Rumours of a coup against Gorbachev were rife in Moscow throughout the spring and summer of 1991. On August 18, 1991 a delegation visited Gorbachev and asked for his resignation. When Gorbachev refused he was held prisoner. As they tried to take over the country, Boris Yeltsin arrived at the Russian Parliament building, from where, beginning on August 19, he declared the putsch an attempt to crush Russia, called for the return of Gorbachev, and appealed for popular support. The coup collapsed on August 21. The attempted coup destroyed Gorbachev politically. The republics rushed to be free of Moscow's control before another coup succeeded. Gorbachev resigned as Soviet President on December 25, and all Soviet institutions ceased to function at the end of 1991. The Soviet experiment, begun in 1917, had ended in failure. The high moral goals that it had set for itself were never realised. Economic failure

was the key reason for the Soviet Union's collapse. The socialist alternative to the market economy turned out to be an illusion.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian leader Boris Yeltsin said at his first meeting with President Bush in January 1992 that they were no longer "potential enemies"<sup>13</sup> and that their nuclear weapons would no longer aim at each other. With the end of the cold war, there was now possibilities of constructive partnership between the United States and Russia. For the Russians, economic development was the most important priority and for this they needed Western assistance. They set themselves a common agenda in the Camp David declaration of February, 1992. Besides other things it included a further reduction of their respective nuclear warheads.

The above changes stresses the enormity of an event which altered the course of contemporary international relations, namely, the detente between the former Soviet Union and the United States, the collapse of Communist systems in the East European states, and the chain of events that pronounced the death of ideology as political formula in all the communist states with the exception of China, Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea. In the light of the above changes it is essential to study its impact on Indo-American foreign relations.

First of all let us examine the fact whether the Cold War is a thing of the past and whether one can sigh with relief. If Cold War as a



terminology confines itself to only one set of bilateral relations i.e. between the former Soviet Union and the United States then one can safely conclude that it is over. But international relations is not confined to only one set of bilateral relations. The attitude of the United States towards other countries including India could be described as Cold War behaviour. Relations between India and Pakistan can also be termed as Cold War. Therefore, ideology is not a requirement of Cold War. In that sense the end of hostilities between the super powers does not mean the end of the Cold War.

If U.S. policy towards India was largely an extension of her anti-Soviet postures, the years ahead should be free of this strain in view of the decline of communism and disintegration of the Soviet Union.<sup>14</sup>

Even before it was clear that the Cold War would end, India had set on the path to repair her relations with the United States in the early 1980s. The Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi visited the United States in July 1982 while the cold war was at its peak. She had been invited by Ronald Reagan the President of the United States. Indira Gandhi described her visit as an adventure in search of understanding and friendship. During her visit the two leaders agreed on many issues instead of harping on the divergences.

Later in May 1984 President Reagan who was to remark in an interview with Derek Davis and Nayan Chanda, said that "India is not pro or anti any other country but instead is pro-India. We accept that position."<sup>15</sup> In June 1985, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited Washington. Since Gorbachev himself was moving closer to the United States and other Western countries it was essential for India not to consider Soviet support as the only guarantee for India's security. This became clear when Rajiv Gandhi visited Moscow in May 1985 but refused to give a clear indication as to whether India would extend the peace and friendship treaty of 1971 when it was due to be renewed in 1991. Since then Indo-American relations have been more positive. Now that the Cold War has ended it is essential for India's policy makers to realize that the United States has emerged as the sole super power, possessing much more power than it formerly did. Secondly, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union there are too many internal problems in that country. Hence, it cannot assume the role of a superpower. The future of the former Soviet Union is quite bleak.

Keeping in mind the above facts India cannot expect the same priority from the former Soviet Union as it did during the years of the Cold War.

The Indo-Soviet friendship was based on need and self-interest, and it may have served the purposes admirably in a given context. The changing world situation today, however, calls for a degree of realism on the part of Indian Policy makers.<sup>16</sup>

Therefore, India needed to develop a new foreign policy towards the United States. Keeping in mind the national interest of the country the policy should be practical. Now that the Cold War is over the United States and India can talk to each other honestly, without the stereotypes and suspicions of the past. It is now time to move beyond talk to action and start working to fulfill the potential of this new relationship. This could lead to a more stable and enduring friendship.

Following the end of the Cold War the strategic relations of India and its neighbours with the extra regional Great Powers, particularly the erstwhile super powers, are no longer what they were. In both form and content they are different.<sup>17</sup>

These relations can be seen to have both comforting and disturbing aspects for the countries of the region. It is therefore both challenging and frustrating to write about Indo-American relations for the 1990s. It is a challenge because it is difficult to comprehend the impact of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War on Indo-

American relations. It is frustrating to a certain extent because there appears to be a definite limit to Indo-American detente. Indo-American relations have always been conditioned both by the East-West divide and by the North-South divide.

From Indian perspective main security threat emanates from Pakistan. The policy of the United States towards Pakistan has always affected Indian- American relations. It is time for India to overcome the obsession that the United States is pro-Pakistan and therefore anti-India. Various events have pointed out to the fact that the United States is virtually disenchanted with Pakistan now. With the Soviet withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan is no longer a frontline State for the United States. The importance of Pakistan has lessened after the Cold War. Moreover, Pakistan is adamant about not submitting its nuclear program to inspection. The military of Pakistan is involved in the drugs and arms business. In Kashmir and Punjab it is also sponsoring terrorism. Moreover, the nationalistic Government in Pakistan thrives on Islamic fervour.

Annual U.S. economic and military aid totalling roughly \$580 million was halted on 1 October 1990 under the Pressler Amendment when President Bush declined to certify that Pakistan has no nuclear weapon device.<sup>18</sup>

The United States Congress has required such a certification since 1985 as a condition of foreign assistance to Islamabad.

Further the American Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley, has said publicly for the first time that, "Pakistan's new leaders must prove they have neither an assembled nuclear weapon nor its components if they want a resumption of U.S. aid."<sup>19</sup> This is definitely a stiffer requirement than the United States has publicly demanded in previous bargaining over Islamabad's nuclear weapons program. Pakistan's response was as expected. They decided not to relent over the nuclear weapons program, despite a cut-off of aid by Washington.

In the past, Pakistan had been loyal to the United States military alliances, not because it was against communism like the United States but because the association with the United States helped it to confront India. With the end of the Cold War therefore Pakistan has become less attractive for the United States. All this could be utilized by India to improve its relations with the United States. "Thus, by 1990, it was clear that U.S assistance to Pakistan would be phased out - and again, in Pakistan's eyes, the United States would prove to be an unreliable ally."<sup>20</sup> In the absence of cold war, there is warmth in Indian American relations.

In a report to Congress on National Security Strategy, President Bush in March 1990 outlined his administrations approach towards South

Asia. He said that both India and Pakistan were friends of the United States. With Pakistan they would try to maintain a special relationship and at the same time try to improve relations with India. They would also try to, "encourage India-Pakistan rapprochement and a halt to nuclear proliferation."<sup>21</sup>

Earlier the United States had supported Pakistan in its demand for a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. But due to improved relations between the United States and India in March 1990 they did not support Pakistan on this issue. The United States now stated that the Kashmir dispute should now be resolved in accordance with the Shimla agreement. Similar statements were made in the context of demand for so called Khalistan in Punjab. Both the executive branch of the United States and the Congress have supported India's integrity.

In February 1992, the Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif gave the call to support the cause of the Kashmiri people and to free Kashmir from India. Pakistan wanted to bring up the Kashmir issue in the United Nations Security Council, thereby calling for the United Nation's preventive diplomacy. The United States does not want to alienate India in the United Nations Security Council as now the United States is the only super power. "Thomas Pickering U.S. permanent Representative in the UN said that the U.S. is opposed to a UN role in settling the Kashmir

issue and would prefer both the countries to settle in bilaterally."<sup>22</sup> This is very important for India. After the break up of the Soviet Union, Russia had publicly stated that its stand on Kashmir had not changed.

John R. Malott, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asian Affairs, visited India and Pakistan for ten days in May 1993. There he discussed American policy towards South Asia. He said:

As for the question of Kashmir's Status, the United States will advocate no particular solution. Our concern is with process. There are three basic principles that govern our position:

- 1) We consider all of Kashmir to be disputed territory, on both sides of the line of control.
- 2) This is an issue to be settled peacefully by India and Pakistan, taking the views of the Kashmiri's, both Muslim and non-muslim into account; and
- 3) The United States is prepared to be helpful in this process, if that is desired by both sides."<sup>23</sup>

Therefore the United States wants that India and Pakistan should put an end to their cold war. The break-up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has had a favourable impact on the Third World.

Although it does not mean that peace and stability will necessarily follow, but, what it does mean, is that these countries may no longer be willing or unwilling objects of the Cold War rivalry, as many of these have lost their strategic significance to the two Super Powers.<sup>24</sup>

The recently introduced economic liberalization in India should meet one of the major requirements of a more positive, friendlier United States. Attempts to liberalize the Indian economy go back to 1985, but the scope was too limited then to make them perceptible. The Government of Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao took up economic reform in right earnest in 1991. Controlling planned economies were failing elsewhere in the world. India was also in the midst of a balance-of-payment crisis. If India had not decided to liberalize its economy the international financial institutions would not have agreed to bail out the economy. Though the United States does welcome India's liberalization it wants India to liberalize much more. The gap between what the United States wants India to do and what India is willing to do remains.

India is favouring export in favour of import. This is a part of the liberalization process. Foreign investments are welcomed now. This has not resulted in massive foreign investments but prior to 1991, the recent increases in investment proposals have been substantial.



Shankar Dayal Sharma recently told a joint session of Parliament that since August 1991 foreign equity proposals worth \$ 2.3 billion had been cleared. These involve projects with investments totalling Rs. 350,000 million. Out of the forty two projects in the power sector, the Americans have shown interest in nineteen.<sup>25</sup>

In spite of all this, economic relations still remain a much neglected area of Indo-American relations. The unpredictable social behaviour patterns of India is responsible for this. In a democratic country like India, public opinion can turn against the western investments. They can call it neocolonialism or economic imperialism.

"The joint exercises by the Indian and the US navy are an indication of the beginning of a healthy trend in Indo-US relations, where sector-wise collaboration becomes possible."<sup>26</sup> This does not mean that the United States approves India's nuclear postures or its strong military build up. The United States realizes that India is the largest littoral state of the Indian Ocean, with an expanding navy. So, despite controversies the joint exercises continued.

Now that the Cold War has come to an end the United States does not need dictators to stop communist expansion. So, it has become possible for it to tolerate social democratic regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America. As the only super power the United States can control the destinies of

these countries very easily and without much expenditure. The economies of most of these countries is always in a mess.

An important and positive factor in Indo-American bilateral relations today is the presence of Asian Indians in the United States. Since the immigration law was amended in 1965, a large number of Indians have migrated to the United States. By 1990 their number had crossed the 800,000 mark. This group is highly educated. Their participation in the political process has increased.

There are still some issues in Indian-American relations where divergence in their perceptions remain to act as irritants. But it is hoped that divergences are not likely to affect confluence of interests between them. One of the areas of divergence between India and the United States is the Indian Ocean. The end of Cold War does not seem to have changed the policy of the United States towards the Indian Ocean. India is interested that the big powers should agree to the convening of the much postponed United Nations conference on the Indian Ocean. The presence of the big powers in and around the Indian Ocean is perceived by India as a security threat.

But as the Gulf War has shown, the US was able not only to launch several of its B-52 bombers from the Diego Garcia base, but the highly sophisticated electronic facilities located there were used for coordinating satellite surveillance of Iraqi movements in order to pinpoint targets.<sup>27</sup>

As the only super power the objective of the United States is to control events in the Gulf. Therefore it is not likely that the United States will change its India Ocean Policy. This in turn will lead to Indo-American friction.

The Gulf war is an example of the limits to Indo-American cooperation and detente. India had backed the United States in demanding Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. India had also decided to provide refueling facility to American crafts. She was criticized by the opposition as being pro-American. She was accused of departing from the policy of non-alignment. Therefore India had to stop the refueling facility to the United States military aircrafts. Nevertheless she was rewarded by the United States. An International Monetary Fund Oil facility to the tune of \$ 1.2 billion was sanctioned to India, and an additional loan of \$ 777 million by the World Bank. Under domestic pressure, India argued that the sanctions on Iraq should be removed immediately on humanitarian grounds. Therefore one can conclude that India's policy of non-alignment prevents it from getting close to the United States.

Another low key irritant in Indo-American relations after the Cold War is the possible United States support on the Khalistan and Kashmir issues. The Khalistan lobby has become active in the United States Congress. Though the United States supports India's unity and integrity , it has also expressed serious concern about the violation of human rights

in Punjab. While on their part, the Indian authorities have not appreciated the United states position in this regard.

Earlier, we have seen that Pakistan has come increasingly under the pressure of the United States to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Though India has escaped from being brought under the Pressler Amendment, it cannot hope to be left alone. Pakistan is willing to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty if India does so. Infact, Pakistan has proposed regional Non-Proliferation Treaty to make South Asia a nuclear weapons free zone.

India has refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty because she feels that the problem should be tackled on a global rather than at the level of South Asia. India faces nuclear threat mainly from China and Pakistan, Since China is already a nuclear weapons state, her signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not lessen the nuclear threat from her.

Hence Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif with the U.S. approval proposed on June 6, 1990 a five nation - US., Soviet Union, China, India and Pakistan - conference on regional nuclear issues.<sup>28</sup>

The proposals have been rejected by India. After the break up of the Soviet Union, the Islamic Republic of Khazakhstan possess nuclear weapons. Till Russia possess nuclear weapons they are going to keep theirs too.

However China and Pakistan pose more of a threat to India. Though China is stated to be willing to remove its nuclear weapons from areas adjacent to its neighbours, India is unlikely to accede to the United States suggestion to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pakistan has used nuclear ambiguity to its fullest advantage. Since it is in a position to assemble a nuclear device, India has no alternative but at least retain its nuclear option by maintaining its present stand if not immediately go nuclear.

India's rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty called into question India's nuclear intentions. The nuclear countries felt that if India intended a peaceful nuclear program, it would have accepted the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The treaty will not be accepted in its present form because it is seen as a political tool used by the nuclear weapons power to segregate the world into nuclear have and the have-nots. Not surprisingly, India uptill date has rejected the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. This has also soured the relations between India and the United States. The nuclear powers have not given a satisfactory security guarantee to the have nots.

"In a speech made at the United Nations in January 1992 Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao set fourth India's well known position on the nuclear issue, and declared that India would not sign the NPT."<sup>29</sup> After meeting George Bush, he suggested bilateral talks on the issue. The foreign secretary of India J.N. Dixit then visited Washington D.C. in

March 1992 for discussions with State Department officials. There he told the Indian correspondents that India would neither sign the Non-Proliferation nor participate in the proposed 5- Power conference. Since then officials of both the countries have held two more rounds of talks. A statement made by Bartholomew in March 1992 indicates a narrowing of the gap between the two countries. Bartholomew said: "We have begun a more productive nuclear dialogue with India than we have had in (sic) some time."<sup>30</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been much talk about the Nonaligned Movement and the foreign policy associated with it. The validity of the nonaligned movement is now in question because of certain events like the end of the Cold War, nonaligned movements inefficiency in the Gulf war and the breaking down of the Soviet Union, causing the emergence of unipolar world order. Earlier we have seen that the nonaligned movement had roused the suspicions of the United States. Therefore it tilted towards Pakistan while India tilted towards the Soviet Union. Hence, we cannot say that India was nonaligned in the true sense of the word even during the Cold War era. According to some critics the nonaligned movement is relevant even after the end of the Cold War while others feel it is not.

Those who feel that the non-aligned movement is no more relevant fail to realise that in the sovereign state system there has always been a

continuous struggle between the dominating powers and the other smaller or middle states who are opposed to the emergence of unipolar world order.

For instance, in the Accra Conference of the NAM members, it was asserted that the present change in inter state relations have not (and will not be able to) render the NAM objectives irrelevant. On the contrary, the movement is being supported, since not being criticised by the West, following the emergence of a unipolar world order.<sup>31</sup>

Infact United Germany and Netherland were guest members of the movement in Accra. The Accra Conference demanded the democratisation of the United Nations, especially the Security Council. Non-aligned Movement was continued by the Indian Government under P.V. Narasimha Rao. This must have been on the basis of the fact that the traditional national consensus on India's consistency with the nonaligned policy, is still in existence.

After the end of the Cold War the question then arises non-alignment with whom or what. If we look at it logically then the nonaligned movement will continue to be a force against any global domination- multipolar, bipolar or unipolar. Therefore, nonalignment is a movement against the domination of great powers over the weak powers. May be with time the texture of the struggle might change but not the nature, that is the

demand for the functioning of the system as independent, sovereign and equal states, irrespective of size and strength.

With the emergence of the United States as the only super power the members of the non-aligned movement will oppose the domination of the United States over the world. This is not an anti-United States posture, earlier, during the period of the Cold War the non-aligned countries had opposed the domination of the world by the two superpowers. Therefore, any country or group of countries that turn dominating will be opposed by the members of the non-aligned movement. At present, India is the most developed among the developing countries of the South. Hence, it should guide if not lead them in the struggle for a new international economic order based on equality, equity and mutual benefits.

Since, to India the recent global changes only affected the context and not the essence of the nonaligned movement, it then seems necessary for India to continue with the policy. If India does become a permanent member of the Security Council, it will further enhance India's foreign policy strategy. Hence, the continuous relevance of the non-aligned movement and what it stands for.

With the end of the Cold War the priorities of the nonaligned movement should change so as to match it with the new unipolar world order. One should not interpret this as a weakness or reduction in the influence of the Movement.



India is playing now from weakness and if it is to reassert autonomy and avoid marginalization it can no longer rest on withered Nehruvian laurels. It must develop a foreign policy concept to shape its international relationships.<sup>32</sup>

There is no sign of this being done due to the priority that domestic politics demands and the absence of effective leadership in the External Affairs Ministry. "With the demise of the Cold War, India has in effect lost her foreign policy strategy. Of course, Indians may still be loathe to admit this, confusing foreign policy, objectives with foreign policy strategy."<sup>33</sup>

India's foreign policy objectives will remain the same but nonalignment as a foreign policy strategy has lapsed into history, together with the Cold War.

For its national security India has become greatly dependent on the United States in particular, and the West in general as Russia has withdrawn its active support. The Indian officials may not accept this readily though there is a continuous threat from Pakistan to India's security. Moreover, the Chinese threat, though not imminent has not disappeared, nor was it likely to do so through the nineties. With the end of Sino-Soviet hostility, India cannot hope to get any sort of help from the successor states of the Soviet Union. There has been rapid growth of Chinese power under its modernization program and American and

Western concerns and commitments to China has increased. Therefore, in relation to China, India is isolated. There is also the possibility of a reactivated Sino-Pakistani axis. The security concerns of India is in a susceptible and unenviable position.

Moreover, none of the South Asian states are going to be disturbed if India's strength on the sub-continent lessens. None of them are likely to come to India's help. Infact, many of the non-aligned countries are prepared to knuckle down to United States pressure tactics.

Nothing better illustrated the bankruptcy of Indian foreign policy than its confused responses to the gulf crisis. It could hardly have been in the country's interest to find itself bracketed with Cuba and Yemen in the Security Council.<sup>34</sup>

India acted blindly when it allowed sympathy for Saddam Hussein and antagonism towards America. Had Iraq succeeded, it would have been more of a calamity for India and the Third World countries than for America and the industrialized world. India risked being shunned as an outcast.

Having no choice, India has forged military and security links with the United States. The Government of Narasimha Rao found the Indian economy in deep financial straits. The Indian policy makers realized that the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other international

financial institutions are under the authority of the United States. The sordid economy of the Soviet Union and other east European communist states shaped by Marxian philosophy made the Indian policy makers to doubt the very rationale of conforming to the Nehruvian economy. "Impelled by these forces Rao's Government ushered in drastic economic reforms with liberalization and market economy orientation."<sup>35</sup> The details of this has already been discussed. The United States has expressed its satisfaction over India's economic reforms.

Healthy bilateral relations depends to a large extent on mutual understanding, cooperation and give and take. The stronger state is always in a position to dictate terms to the weaker country. This has been proved time and again and therefore aroused fear and suspicion in the minds of the weaker states. This is more or less true of the United States. Hence, the scope and prospects for a better Indo-United States ties depends on how and to what extent the United States erases such fears and suspicions from the Indian mind.

With the break-up of the Soviet Union the Third World and their needs, as also issues affecting them the most, will be low priority areas for the United States and the other great powers. They will become indifferent to issues like the New International Economic Order. From this point of view the disappearance of the Soviet Union from the global scene will hurt the Third World more than anything else. Of the two super powers, the Soviet Union was more positively inclined to the needs of the Third World.

The republics of the former Soviet Union are themselves trying to woo the Western bloc in quest of aid and new trading partner. Therefore their interest in the Third World countries is bound to recede.

Rao's governments main focus was more on economic than political matters. Narasimha Rao, clearly stated in his press conference in September, 1991:

I have a feeling that foreign policy from now on will have a larger component of economics and culture. The Ministry of External Affairs has to prepare itself for this reorientation. Our people have already been trained, but they have to concentrate, more on international economic equations.<sup>86</sup>

India's poor international economic standing is going to be a major stumbling block in the post Cold War order that is emerging. India's economic difficulties and problems have been aggravated with the end of the socialist bloc. It had been expanding trade and economic relations with the socialist countries particularly the Soviet Union. But the new global system without the socialist bloc, has become more rigid and the forces of the market system of economy more stringent. Moreover, the

imposition of United States sanctions against Indian Space Research Organisation in May 1992 on the question of the purchase of rocket engines from Russia and the imposition of Super 301 reveals that strategic

divide between Washington and New Delhi is still very wide and sharp to permit any meaningful cooperation.<sup>37</sup>

With the end of the Cold War people think that for American interests the Third World has become irrelevant. But this is not so.

Because war will not become obsolete in the Third World, and because many Third World states are becoming increasingly powerful, the threat that third World states pose to themselves and non-Third World countries will persist. Preparing to address these threats must be a central component of American foreign policy in the post-Cold War world.<sup>38</sup>

It is true that the collapse of the Soviet Union has eliminated concerns that Soviet control of Third World states posed a threat to American Security. Leaders of Third World states may act in ways inimical to American interests. The persisting instability often leading to war and the increasing capability of many Third World States to threaten American interests, particularly in the areas of nuclear proliferation and supply of oil, makes the Third World of continuing concern to the United States in the post Cold War era.

The development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons mounted on ballistic missiles by the Third World states pose more of a threat to America. Moreover, Third World countries are busy acquiring huge amounts of arms, some of which are equal to the best in the arsenals

of the great powers. With both the United States and the former Soviet Union reducing their own arsenals, pressures to sell in the Third World are likely to increase. Many Third World countries including India manufacture the four major types of arms - aircraft, armor, missiles and naval vessels. All this has decreased America's ability to control Third World conflicts. The days when the United States or the former Soviet Union could end a conflict simply by withholding arms are clearly at an end. President Richard Nixon wrote in his book:

If the next century is to be a century of peace, the causes of misery and war in the Third World must be addressed. Its security needs must be met, its economic potential fulfilled, and its political aspirations satisfied if the suffering that has plagued so much of the globe in the twentieth century is to be eradicated in the twenty-first.<sup>39</sup>

He further said that the Third World has enormous natural and human resources. It produces most of the world's oil and other raw materials. Therefore, the industrial economies would collapse without them. He felt that America must continue to assume the burden of leadership not just for the sake of others but also for their own sake. One can only be true to themselves if they take part in the great enterprise of shaping the future of human civilization.

American foreign policy should give increased priority to India as the world's largest democracy and as a potential partner in multilateral action to resolve global problems and maintain regional stability. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States undoubtedly has emerged as the number one power, at least in a military sense. India needs the support of America to neutralize Pakistan's efforts to keep Kashmir in a turmoil through state sponsored terrorist interventions. As long as America perceives India to be on its side there is no threat to India's territorial integrity and security. It is beneficial for India that the United States maintains its leverage with Pakistan otherwise Pakistan would turn to the Saudis, Iranians and Central Asian countries.

Further, India needs to think seriously about more economic cooperation between itself and the United States, before rejecting any proposal on the simple ground that it comes from America. Two irritants in Indo-American relationship which are likely to continue are America's goal of nuclear Non-Proliferation and in the area of protection of human rights and development assistance. These differences have provoked a range of actions by the United States. But now these differences are being handled in a mature manner, earlier this was not so. Specific disputes are not being allowed to inhibit progress in other areas of the relationship.

There is always a possibility that they could develop into a major crisis especially in India. The public opinion in India is that New Delhi has already given away too much to cultivate Washington. Ramesh Thakur writes:

India has generally seen itself as a world power in the making, and conducted its regional and international relations on this basis. The result has been insignificance abroad, suspicion in the region and turbulence at home.<sup>40</sup>

It would therefore be beneficial for India to bring about stability and prosperity in the country and in the region which would enhance its status at the international level and give credibility to its claims to global leadership. For too long India and America have allowed the irritants to undermine the underlying harmony between them. The world's most powerful and most populous democracies should be allies, not antagonists.

To conclude, the new global order that has emerged after the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union requires a reordering of the old ties and relationships. Undoubtedly, for India, it poses fresh challenges. But it also offers new opportunities which, if handled with diplomatic skill and single mindedness, can be exploited to India's advantage. The common interests and values shared by the two countries should help in reshaping their mutual relations. India and the United States stand to gain from looking at the world with a unified point of view.



## NOTES

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<sup>3</sup>Emeka Ohajunwa, *India - US Security Relations 1947-1990* (Delhi : Chanakya Publications, 1992) 10.

<sup>4</sup>Ved Vati Chaturshreni, 63.

<sup>5</sup>Ivan Kovalenko, Rais Tuzmukhamedov, *The Non-Aligned Movement. The Soviet View* (New Delhi : Sterling Publishers, 1987) 12.

<sup>6</sup>Surjit Mansingh, *Indias' Search for Power - Indira Gandhi's Foreign Policy, 1966-1982* (New Delhi : Sage Publications, 1984) 14.

<sup>7</sup>Norman A. Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy. American Foreign Policy 1945 - 1975* (New York : D. Van Nostrand Company, INC., 1977) 91-92.

<sup>8</sup>Ved Vati Chaturshreni, 83.

<sup>9</sup>S. Schmidt, K. Tarnovsky, I. Berkhin, 300.

<sup>10</sup>S. Schmidt et al., 302.

<sup>11</sup>S. Schmidt et al., 308.

<sup>12</sup>P.M. Kamath, "The End of the Cold War : Implications for 'Indian-American Relations,'" *India Quarterly* XLIX. 1-2 (1993) : 56.

<sup>13</sup>P.M. Kamath, 56.

<sup>14</sup>Kousar J. Azam, "Indo-US Relations After the Cold War," *Indian Journal of American Studies* 21.1 (1991) : 10.

<sup>15</sup>P.M. Kamath, 60.

<sup>16</sup>D. Jeevan Kumar, "Indo-US Relations in the Nineties : New Possibilities and Opportunities," *Indian Journal of American Studies* 21.1 (1991) : 62.

<sup>17</sup>S.D. Muni, "India and Its Neighbours : Persisting Dilemmas and New Opportunities," *International Studies* 30.2 (1993): 191.

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<sup>19</sup>D. Jeevan Kumar, 64.

<sup>20</sup>Leo E. Rose and Eric Gonsalves,ed., *Towards a New World Order : Adjusting India - US Relations* (Berkeley : Institute of East Asian Studies, 1992) 66-67.

<sup>21</sup>P.M. Kamath, 63.

<sup>22</sup>P.M. Kamath, 64.

<sup>23</sup>John R. Malott, "Indo-US Relations - Agenda for Progress," *Span* 34.6 (1993) : 43.

<sup>24</sup>Manorama Kohli, "Disintegration of the Soviet Union : Implications for India," *India Quarterly* XLIX . 3 (1993) : 89.

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<sup>26</sup>Kousar J. Azam,11.

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<sup>28</sup>P.M. Kamath, 66.

<sup>29</sup>B.K. Shrivastava, 220.

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<sup>\*32</sup>Thomas P. Thornton, *India Adrift* : Search for IMoorings in New World Order," *Asian Survey* 32, 12 (1992): 1063-1077.

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<sup>35</sup>N. Gaan, "Hopes and Realities in Indo-US Relations : From a Cold War to a Post Cold-War Perspective," *India Quarterly* XLVIII . 4 (1992) : 14.

<sup>36</sup>Manorama Kohli, "Disintegration of the Soviet Union : Implications for India," *India Quarterly* XLIX . 3 (1993) : 93.

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<sup>38</sup>Steven R. David, "Why the Third World Still Matters," *International Security* 17.3 (1992-1993): 127.

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## **Chapter – 6**

### **Conclusion**

To assess the relationship between the two largest democratic countries of the world, India and America, it is essential not only to assess the relationship in the context of only the present or the recent past, but in the larger perspective of past history and future prospects. It is imperative to bear in mind both the similarities and the dissimilarities in outlooks and in attitudes. One should not be unduly swayed by the passing phases. Sometimes the differences are exaggerated.

In spite of the moving ups and downs in Indo-American relations the fundamental feeling of friendship and sympathy between the people of the two countries has remained more or less unchanged. Since in a democratic country the people cannot be ignored, their feelings and aspirations are bound to have an effect on the thinking, the attitudes and policies of their Governments. Both India and America are secular democratic countries, who believe in the freedom of the press and individual liberty. The rule of law prevails in both these two countries. People of different cultures, races and religions reside in both the countries.

India and America have different historical and cultural backgrounds and different geographical and geo-political factors. So, it is but natural that there are bound to be differences between the two countries. But what is important is that they should be able to respect each others point of view. There should be mutual understanding between the two countries. Differences have arisen when there has been a lack of understanding and respect and when ulterior motives have been attributed to such differences. So, from time to time Indo-American relations got strained. America achieved her independence much before India achieved hers. Since independence, however, India has made rapid progress in the fields of industrialisation and technological advancement.

In the relatively short span of time since independence, India has emerged as a major actor in world politics with a deep involvement in international affairs. India's foreign policy formulations and attitudes have had an impact far beyond its own borders, not least because of the country's geostrategic importance.<sup>1</sup>

Likewise in working out her foreign policy objectives, India has always sought to promote India's security and further its developments.

After gaining her independence, India adopted the policy of nonalignment. Similarly, in the initial phase of its history, America too had adopted the policy of nonalignment. But after the Second World War,

America had to assume leadership of the world. Because of her military and security concerns, she could not remain nonaligned. From the very beginning, this very policy embittered Indo-American relations, as America perceived it suspiciously.

In the early 1950s, America did not like India's friendly relations with China. This was because of the fact that by then China had become a communist country. On his return from the Geneva Conference in 1954, the Chinese prime minister Chou-En-Lai, paid a three day visit to India. After a few months Nehru paid a return visit to Peking which lasted for twelve days. Both countries signed the Panchsheel agreement. Consequently India and China came closer after the bilateral visits:

In the United Nations, India worked relentlessly for recognition of the mainland regime as the legitimate government of China, even though the United States opposed this vehemently. This was the period when the popular slogan in Peking and New Delhi was : Hindi Chini, Bhai Bhai.<sup>2</sup>

Another irritant in Indo-American relations in the 1950s was the signing of a military pact between America and Pakistan. This was to enable Pakistan to fight communist expansion. India was alarmed at this alliance because after the partition of India, Pakistan had become an enemy of India. Therefore this alliance was a threat to India's security.



But, all along the differences between India and America have been mainly in relation to a third country rather than in the bilateral field.

In the late 1950's and 1960's the United States perhaps did not like India's growing relations with the Soviet Union. Kennedy's desire to develop closer and more cooperative relations with India conflicted with the Congress who were reluctant to renounce the Cold War legacy. Therefore India was forced to seek assistance from the Soviet Union. The Kennedy administration was helpful during the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 but the relationship got strained when India annexed Goa. The United States criticized India's use of force. They failed to understand the nonaligned status of India. In spite of the opposition of the Congress, Indo-American relations improved during the Kennedy administration.

In September 1965, Pakistan attacked India. The United States imposed an arms embargo on both the countries.

From the Indian standpoint, nothing could be less fair. As far as New Delhi was concerned, Pakistan had initiated the conflict, used American arms, and now- to add insult to proverbial injury- the United States had equated the nations through the imposition of the arms embargo.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, it also raised doubts in the minds of the Pakistanis about American reliability. The Rupee Devaluation and the United States

reluctance to alleviate the food problem in India further estranged Indo-American relations. America did not approve of India's criticism on the role of America in the Vietnam war. In the early Nixon years, America's interest in South Asia declined for sometime.

The Bangladesh war of 1971, brought India into the forefront of attention in Washington. The active American role was overwhelmingly the result of global concerns. They supported Pakistan so as to convince China that America was a reliable ally. At the same time they wanted to convince Moscow that America was against the Soviets and their allies. Moreover, Nixon was inclined towards Pakistan and critical of India. America wanted to bring the crisis to an end on equal terms.

The events of 1971 had a deep impact on Indo-American relations. India realized that no help would be forthcoming from America in the event of a war with China as America was trying to develop close relations with China. Infact, now there was an alliance between China, America and Pakistan. This naturally raised Indian fears. As a result, India signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union which raised questions in the United States about the international role of India.

Two other events in the 1970's further deteriorated Indo-American relations. One was the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 and the other was the suspension of democratic rule in India in June 1975. The nuclear test

marked a severe setback to the global nonproliferation regime. The United States felt itself to be particularly affected as it was the prime mover of nonproliferation. Many Americans demanded an end to nuclear cooperation with India. But Kissinger and Ford were not very much affected by the explosion as it did not violate any agreement with India. The imposition of Emergency in India also did not have a direct effect on Indo-American relations. The comments by America were mild but it was perceived by India as an interference in India's domestic affairs. If these events had seriously affected the interests of either the United States or India, it would have been very difficult to restore even a low level of relations between the two countries.

India may have been of secondary importance to the United States but it was not unimportant. Moreover, after 1971, India's prestige was enhanced. While on the other hand America was important to India from the economic and strategic point of view. Hence, there were positive incentives on both sides to improve their relations and to see to it that their relations did not deteriorate still further. Since India had much more at stake in the relationship, it was for India to set the pace for normalization.

In the late 1970s during the Carter administration, Indo-American relations in the initial years were good but towards the end there was considerable tension. When the Janta government came to power in

India,relations further improved. The Janta government believed in maintaining a balance between America and the Soviet Union and did not follow Indira Gandhi's tilt towards the Soviet Union.Infact, in the first three years of the Carter administration, India had a favoured position when compared to Pakistan. But with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,the Cold War was once again rekindled.Therefore America's interest in South Asia again became subservient to the United States - Soviet Union global rivalry.

India did not criticize the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in very strong words while in Pakistan there was public opposition to Soviet intervention. Moreover,Pakistan has been a loyal member of the Western bloc.Pakistan facilitated negotiations that produced the Sino - American detente.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has reinforced United States view of Pakistan as a key geo-strategic asset and "front line" state,which has made the backing of Pakistan strategic and imperative.Pakistan has adroitly played upon the US antipathy to Russia to boost the level of American aid.<sup>4</sup>

Therefore, though the United States was not happy about a possible Pakistani nuclear program, they did not want to jeopardize their ties with Pakistan under the present circumstances.

It is in this background that Indo-American relations during the Reagan and Bush administration (1980-1992) should be examined. With the coming of the Republican Party to power under the leadership of Ronald Reagan, Indo-American relations entered a new phase. In India, this change was being identified and interpreted as "reactionary", "rightist", "centrist". India felt that Indo-American relations might suffer a serious set back. Moreover, New Delhi felt that the Reagan administration viewed the world in East West terms with India being on the Soviet side. India found this deeply disturbing. These assumptions were based on past anti-Indian biases as well as the present divergent belief system and policy styles of Reagan and Indira Gandhi.

Indira Gandhi returned to power in early 1980. In America it was felt that her strong pro-Soviet tilt, might deepen differences between the two countries. Such doubts were set at rest by the pronouncements of both the governments that change of leadership in Washington and New Delhi would not reverse the friendly ties evolved during the Carter administration. The United States spokesman, Robert F. Goheen, the then United States Ambassador to India declared that: "With Mr. Reagan's election I see no change in the desire of the United States to continue a policy of friendly cooperation based on mutual respect."<sup>5</sup>

Things were not so simple as they appeared. In his inaugural address, Reagan had said that he would support his allies who remained faithful to America. The question was that could India declare herself to be loyal to America in order to win its friendship. India would never compromise on the independence of its foreign policy nor would it barter away its political autonomy. In keeping with the policies of the United States, Reagan would be bound to extend military and economic aid to its allies.

Eventually, the Reagan administration did realize that India could not be ignored as it was the most important state in the area of the Indian Ocean. In the same way, Indira Gandhi realized that India's policy of non-alignment was coming to be viewed by the world community as tilting more and more towards the Soviet Union. This could lessen India's credibility among the Third World nations. To protect the entire world from the Soviet threat, the United States realized that this could not be done single handedly. It did need India, the only stable power in the area. While on its part Indira Gandhi stated that India was not a satellite of the Soviet Union. In fact on her very first visit to Washington. Indira Gandhi stated her willingness to accept a limited amount of weapons from America.

In spite of all these declarations, Reagan's policy of "containment of Communism" came in the way of the smooth functioning of Indo-

American relations. The significant aspects of Reagan's foreign policy guidelines were to promote American interests, halt Soviet expansion and to regain military superiority over the Soviet Union. Former Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, in his 19 March 1981 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated, "that the Reagan Administration's Middle Eastern policy would centre around the development of the "strategic consensus" to oppose the Soviet Union in an area extending from Pakistan to Egypt, and including Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia."<sup>6</sup>

The second cold war which had already started assumed serious dimensions after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. It left a serious impact on Indo-American relations. Pakistan, which had receded to the background where America was concerned, once again became a frontline state. Pakistan was assigned a significant role in the strategy of the United States against Soviet expansionism. This alarmed India as Pakistan has always been an enemy of India. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in March 1981 Jane Coon, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asia, said :

We are deeply concerned over Pakistan's security.... Pakistan's strategic location, at the eastern flank of the Persian Gulf, makes it very important that we and our allies undertake a major effort to help Pakistan resist Soviet pressures and to become stronger and more self-confident.<sup>7</sup>

Indo-American relations were strained considerably over this issue as both countries perceived the problem differently. For India, the Soviet intervention was secondary while the rearming of Pakistan more of importance. Whereas the United States formulated its policies with a global view of the security relationships in the region. India perceived the problem from a regional and national security angle. At the same time the United States wanted to seek increased cooperation with India. "Such policies would appear contradictory because of the deep animosity between India and Pakistan. This had the effect of turning United States relations with South Asia's two largest entities into a zero sum game; if Washington improved relations with Pakistan, relations with India worsened, and vice-versa."<sup>8</sup>

India was concerned about the Afghanistan crisis and about the presence of Soviet troops so close to the sub-continent. Yet, India did not condemn the presence of Soviet troops. She abstained from voting against the Soviet Union in the United Nations General Assembly. This naturally did not please America. But the new strategic arrangement between America and Pakistan was bound to make India look to Moscow for arms supplies. This in turn led to an arms race in the sub-continent.

The Indo-Soviet military ties were discussed during two visits to India of Marshal Dmitri Ustinov, the then Soviet Defence minister — in March, 1982 and again in March, 1984. India got from the Soviet Union a pledge of



unrestricted access to the next generation of Soviet armament including those on Moscow's drawing board.<sup>9</sup>

These were some of the consequences of the Afghan crisis on the sub-continent.

According to the Reagan administration it was necessary to give military aid to Pakistan so that it could feel secure. But this made India insecure on the other side. After all, weapons supplied by America to Pakistan had earlier been used against India in 1965 and 1971, and America had done nothing about it. Therefore America was hardly justified in providing arms to Pakistan.

To meet the Soviet threat, Pakistan should have normalized its relations with India further. India's offer of a "no war" pact was rejected by General Zia-ul Haque who was more interested in cashing in on the global security concerns of the United States. It helped him to prolong his military regime and to arm Pakistan with highly sophisticated weapons. The re-arming of Pakistan caused tension in Indo-American relations due to the insensitivity shown to New Delhi by America. An experienced South Asia observer Selig Harrison noted in early 1981:

....They frankly acknowledge that Pakistan wants help mainly to build up its military posture vis-a-vis India, and they have pointedly refused to give public or private assurances to New Delhi that Washington would not

permit American arms to be used in an Indian- Pakistani conflict. At bottom, the Administration's policy reflects a belief that India has become a virtual Soviet ally.<sup>10</sup>

During the 1979-89 period the arms supplied by the United States to Pakistan was induced by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. However, at the end of the Cold War, the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. Eventually, the Soviet Union broke up and this changed the global politics and the strategic environment in the region. The significance of Pakistan as a strategic partner of America declined considerably. "There was no longer a need for a pipeline of weapon supplies to the Afghan resistance groups; in fact, the U.S. has been increasingly concerned about regaining weapons, such as Stinger missiles, that it had supplied to the resistance."<sup>11</sup>

Due to the American military aid to Pakistan, it appeared that Indo-American relations would worsen. Surprisingly, efforts were made by both India and America to prevent relations from souring further. A personal effort to patch up India's ties with America was made by Indira Gandhi when she met Reagan at the North South Economic Summit in Cancun, Mexico. She agreed to visit Washington. Moreover, India did try not to emphasize on its global and regional differences with the United States. India also tried to strengthen the existing bilateral relations as well as develop new areas of cooperation.

The most significant irritant in Indo-American relations was the belief in America that India was a close ally of the Soviet Union. Indira Gandhi took pains to remove this notion. First of all she refused to hold celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Then she visited Washington before Moscow and was cool towards Soviet offers of military assistance. Upon arriving in Washington Indira Gandhi attempted to directly placate the United States on the Soviet score. She said:

We are friends with the Soviet Union, although people have tended to read much more in our treaty of friendship and cooperation. We do not agree with everything the Soviets do. We do not approve of the communist system. We are having difficulties with our communists and Marxists within India but this does not affect our overall policy of coexistence with as many countries as possible.<sup>12</sup>

Shortly after this, India expressed stronger opposition publicly, to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. This was certainly a marked departure from the earlier statement of India in 1980 when she had tried to excuse the Soviet intervention on account of outside interference. By outside interference India had meant the United States.

Where United States - Pakistani relations were concerned, India exhibited increasing flexibility. She also toned down her criticism of

America's military presence in the Indian Ocean. Infact, Indira Gandhi said that no two countries could have the "same angle of vision," but they could try to appreciate each other's point of view. One should try to find the common areas on which to build and to increase cooperation. India did try to rebuild its relations with Washington because by late 1981 their relations had deteriorated very much. Differences between both the countries were being highlighted by the media. In order to acquire a pre-eminent place in South Asia it was essential for India to achieve the backing of both the superpowers. There had to be flexibility in India's foreign policy.

India had to maintain its nonaligned credentials not only with the superpowers but also with the South Block. They all condemned Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Indira Gandhi rejected the notion that America was the natural enemy of the nonaligned movement. Moreover, India was trying to nudge closer to the United States because it was becoming anxious about the Soviet action in Afghanistan. In a way, the Soviet Union had threatened India's unstated but unwavering goal of regional dominance. Moreover, India realized that any instability in Pakistan due to the Soviets would be dangerous for India. An unstable Pakistan would be open to outside intrusion and in turn it would endanger India's ability to control the region's stability and security.

India realized that as long as the Soviets in Kabul threatened the American and Western interests in the Persian Gulf, America would continue its relationship with Pakistan. So, New Delhi tried to gain whatever influence it could in Washington. Finally, India was in a position to deal with Pakistan despite the arms transfers to that country by the United States. The initial Indian fears of a possible United States – Pakistan– China alliance also subsided. India's own relations with China improved. Finally, India was motivated to better its relations with the United States so as to modernize its economy through trade expansion, acquisition of high technology and financial assistance from America. But all these moves on the part of India would only prove fruitful if America responded to them positively.

Fortunately significant changes did occur in the Reagan administration's perception of India. Infact Cancun was a forerunner of improved Indo-American relations. Indira Gandhi's visit to Washington was also a success. She referred to it as a "good visit" and the Vice-President of the United States George Bush talked about a "special relationship" between India and America. Reflecting on the visit, Senator Claiborne Pell (Democrat, Rhode Island), a ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said :

The trip unquestionably improved the climate for US-Indian relations and this, rather than any concrete result, was in my view the most important result. The visit gave Americans a new appreciation of India.... Mrs. Gandhi certainly heard the message that the Administration and Congress take India seriously and want to do business. Hopefully, the days of ignoring each other and of snide attacks on each other's policies are past.<sup>13</sup>

As a result of this visit, it was decided that France would be the sole supplier of enriched uranium for Tarapur. So now India would get its uranium and the United States would preserve the letter of its 1978 non-proliferation law which forbade American sale of nuclear fuel to countries that refused full safeguards.

Indira Gandhi's visit resulted in cooperation in various other fields. There was exchange of scientists between the two countries and an Indo-American cooperative research program covering areas of food production, health, biomass and materials research and earth sciences was outlined. Both countries showed a keen interest in economic cooperation. Meetings and seminars were organized in many of the American cities to boost American business interest in India.

Since Reagan was obsessed with the Soviet Union it was significant that he now realized that India shared America's interest in a Soviet withdrawal and was opposed to further Soviet expansion southward. Though America did perceive India edging away from the Soviets they understood that this did not mean a break in Indo-Soviet relations. America did not put India in an awkward position by publicly dwelling on it. Moreover, towards the end of the 1980s, United States – Soviet relations themselves improved. This further strengthened Indo-American relations.

The Reagan administration now began to distinguish between the nonaligned movement as a whole and India's place in it. Reagan went to New York in late 1983 to meet Indira Gandhi and attend a meeting of world leaders convened by the Indian leader. India's improving relations with Pakistan and China were helpful to American objectives. Now, it would not have to deal with two regional antagonists in a zero-sum manner and this helped in America's goal of stemming Soviet influence in the area. Thus we can conclude that between late 1981 and late 1984, both India and America made cautious efforts to enhance Indo-American relations.

The Tarapur settlement reached in July 1982, represented an accommodation by both the countries, perhaps more by India than the United States. After all, India did not carry out its threat of unilaterally terminating the 1963 agreement and thereby free itself from the

safeguards and reprocessing obligations contained therein. Nor did India take the dispute to the World Court. All these steps would have been vehemently opposed by the Reagan administration. India's self-restraint was motivated by a number of factors. India had to face a lot of domestic pressure to terminate the Tarapur agreement. So, India's accommodation was all the more noteworthy. The Tarapur settlement was in India's "national interest and overall bilateral relations with the US." By staying on in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union posed a more serious threat to India's regional interests, including peace and security in the subcontinent. Hence the United States became more important to India as a counterpoise. If India would be on good terms with America she would feel less isolated and vulnerable.

The Reagan administration too accommodated India on the Tarapur issue by finding a way to get around the full-scope safeguards criterion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act which was detested by India. They assured India that she would be able to continue to operate Tarapur with fuel from a non-United States source. This was certainly a shift from the earlier stand taken by America that India should not be allowed to have fuel for the Tarapur facility. The Reagan administration too had to face domestic opposition on this issue. By the end of 1981, the Reagan administration had recognized the need to accord renewed attention to India as South Asia's major power and principal hope for stability in that



area. In this way America was able to maintain some semblance of nonproliferation controls on Tarapur,i.e., safeguards.

By early 1983, the issue about spare parts for Tarapur was being publicly debated in both countries. India claimed that the spare parts were necessary to avoid significant radiation contamination and leaks at the Tarapur reactors. Infact India shut down one of the two Tarapur reactors on June 17,1983. While in New Delhi, Secretary of State George Shultz announced that America would export parts for Tarapur out of concern for health and safety, only if India was unable to receive them from another source.What was significant was that the Reagan administration took the responsibility to provide the items to India.Though there were limits of accommodation where Tarapur was concerned, what was significant was that it marked the first major indication of the changing attitudes and policies of both countries.

In the end, then, both sides found the Tarapur link a convenient channel for improving their relationship and were reluctant to sacrifice it to the demands of their respective declaratory nuclear policies.<sup>14</sup>

Indira Gandhi's assassination on 31 October 1984, shocked the world. During her lifetime Indira Gandhi never concealed the fact that she was suspicious of and disliked the American policy towards India and the United States foreign policy in general. But first of all she was logical and

an Indian nationalist. It was because of this that she tried to better Indo-American relations during her last years.

She did alienate the Americans by her cold manner, her sarcastic remarks, her decision to explode a nuclear device in 1974, imposing Emergency in 1975 and by aligning closely with the Soviet Union whom she was unwilling to condemn when they invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1980. But gradually, she was recognized as a major world figure by the American leaders. They realized that in spite of her leanings towards the Soviet Union she was not a puppet in their hands, but rather a patriot pressing India's interests as she saw them.

Rajiv Gandhi, the next Prime Minister of India was rather a reluctant politician:

In foreign policy, Rajiv continued the policies inherited from his mother and grandfather. He accepted the Soviet Union as India's chief foreign partner and quickly made friends with its new leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. When Rajiv became Prime Minister, Washington and New Delhi were still in the early stage of groping their way out of the impasse which had made their relations largely hostage to US ties with Islamabad and India's relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>15</sup>

During his first year in office, Rajiv Gandhi first tried to solve the Sikh problem in the Punjab and proposed measures to modernize and reform

the Indian economy. In October 1984, a team from America went to New Delhi to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on technology transfer. This had been under discussion between the two governments for quite sometime. In December 1984, an agreement was reached on the MOU.

In June 1985, Rajiv Gandhi visited Washington. There, he told the reporters that he did not have sufficient confidence in Washington as an arms supplier because America could change its conditions and there was no certainty about the supply of spare parts. In an earlier interview with the Financial Times, London, on May 21, 1985, he had observed that, "one or two defence items where we spent a long time talking to them (US), they put conditions that were just not acceptable to us."<sup>16</sup> To the Americans he seemed more approachable because of his interest in modern technology and his "American" management style.

Rajiv Gandhi's visit did have a positive effect on Indo-American relations. America was willing to provide a highly sophisticated Cray supercomputer model XMP-24 to the Indian Institute of Science to help the country's weather research program. This proved Reagan administrations seriousness in improving relations. Further, discussions and decisions were taken about the transfer of military technology and financial assistance to fund science, technology, and education programmes.

Rajiv Gandhi again went to the United States to attend the United Nations General Assembly session. Personally, he was able to impress Reagan but his speech on India's foreign policy in the United Nations was not upto the mark. This time he seemed to take a more pro-Soviet line. On his way back to India, he also visited Moscow. He told the press, when he came back to New Delhi, that it had taken thirty years to build good relations with the Soviet Union. Therefore it would take time to develop good relations with America.

Though both India and America were at odds on certain issues, there was certainly improvement in style and form since Rajiv succeeded his mother as prime minister. In his welcoming remarks on the occasion of the visit of Mikhail Gorbachev on 25 November 1986, Rajiv outlined the basis of the existing bonds of friendship between the Soviet Union and India:

You represent a country and a people who have been with us through times of trouble and times of triumph. The Soviet Union has remained a tried and trusted friend in our hour of need.... Our friendship is testimonial to the historical imperative of a world order based on co-existence and cooperation.<sup>17</sup>

Rajiv Gandhi proved ineffective in handling pressing domestic matters and in foreign affairs he lacked a sure touch in dealing with

substantive issues. But, on the whole he made a favourable impression abroad. He continued the course outlined by Indira Gandhi in 1980. He tried to improve relations with America and showed his willingness to assert India's importance on the subcontinent. The final year of the Reagan administration in 1988, saw Rajiv plagued by domestic political troubles. Relations with Pakistan were more normal during this time leading to further improved Indo-American relations. The Defense Secretary of America visited India during this time. Since India's independence, this was the first time that a Defence Secretary of America had come to India.

This gradual improvement in Indo-American relations basically came about due to less confrontational United States - Soviet relationship. This change was due to Gorbachev's policy of perestroika and Moscow's intention to move out of Afghanistan. Rajiv Gandhi also let the Russians know that India wanted the Soviets to move out of Afghanistan. He tried to mend relations with China as Gorbachev also tried to remove the friction between Moscow and Beijing. In December 1988, Rajiv Gandhi visited China- the first by an Indian Prime Minister after Nehru's visit to China in 1956. All this created a better climate for Indo-American relations.

Thus, one can conclude that with Rajiv Gandhi as prime minister, America saw new opportunities. There was technology transfer and high - level dialogues greatly increased. This led to mutual understanding

between the two countries. Both understood what they could and what they could not expect from each other. Though there were areas of differences, compared to the period before 1981, Indo-American relations had now warmed up.

A significant irritant in Indo-American relations is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which came into existence in 1970. Those who signed the treaty were not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. In India's opinion, the treaty seeks to disarm the unarmed while allowing those who are already armed to keep arming. The non-nuclear weapons states are being pressurized to renounce acquisition of military weapons while the same is not being applied to the weapon states.

Under various agreements, the United States had been cooperating with India to develop its nuclear capabilities for peaceful purposes. But when India detonated a nuclear bomb in 1974, Indo American relations soured. The United States refused to accept that the explosion was only for peaceful application. Further export licensing of fuel for the Tarapur atomic reactors was held up. The issue of international control of atomic energy caused a lot of tension in India-United States relations during the period 1974-82. Now, the United States was not even willing to provide any nuclear material to India, even for peaceful purposes.

Due to numerous factors, India was forced to explode a nuclear device. First of all India could not depend on America to avert the threat of Chinese nuclear blackmail, as America was drawing closer to China. Moreover, India wanted to secure a pre-eminent place in South Asia. India was of the opinion that America recognized China because of her nuclear capability. The overall course of Indo-American relations changed and was complicated with India's detonation of a nuclear device. India's nuclear explosion, speeded up Pakistan's nuclear energy program. This is what America wanted to prevent. Pakistan has said that it will only sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty if India signs it first.

India is justified in not signing the NPT. The Treaty is discriminatory in nature. It does not stop the nuclear weapon states from making more nuclear weapons. Moreover only the non-nuclear weapons states had to expose their nuclear facilities to international safeguards. These safeguards would interfere with India's research program. Finally, India refused to sign the NPT due to the development of its indigenous nuclear industry as it was less vulnerable to external pressures for signing the treaty.

America was very concerned as it wanted to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons since it would have an adverse impact on global and regional stability. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger during his visit to India in October 1974 said that, "a world in which an ever-increasing

number of nations possess nuclear weapons vastly magnifies the risk of both regional and global conflict. When Jimmy Carter became the President, he was in a dilemma. He had to give nuclear nonproliferation top priority but at the same time he wanted to improve relations with India. India was persuaded by Carter to sign the NPT and to accept full scope safeguards on the nuclear facilities. Carter could not respond positively to Indian requests for nuclear cooperation as the American law limited his ability to do so..

Indo-American relations were further complicated with the enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) in 1978 by the United States Congress. Countries which refused to accept full scope safeguards on all their nuclear facilities would not be supplied fuel and nuclear technology after a grace period of eighteen months. At the same time, the nuclear weapons countries were exempted from the full scope safeguards requirement as a pre-condition for American nuclear cooperation.

India hoped to be treated at par with China after its nuclear explosion. But the Nuclear Non Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978 dampened India's hopes. Referring to this fact, Richard, P. Cronin, of Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service, observed :



It is especially galling to India, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, China qualifies as a nuclear weapons state, while India does not. Thus the United States could enter into a nuclear cooperation agreement with China, without requiring the full-scope safeguards that are demanded from India, if China would agree to other conditions laid down in the Act.<sup>18</sup>

India was not given the status of a weapons state even though America considered India's peaceful blast equivalent of a nuclear weapon from a proliferation stand-point.. Had India been given the status, she would have been exempted from the full-scope safeguards. Hence, the 1978 Act, was highly discriminatory in nature. In a way, America was trying to blackmail India into accepting the full scope safeguards or else the United States would not supply nuclear fuel for Tarapur reactors. This would have been a breach of the 1963 agreement of cooperation and then India would be free of its obligations to maintain safeguards on the spent fuel and to obtain the approval of the United States for reprocessing.

It seems America was perturbed by the fact that India might emerge as a great power. If this happened the developing world would no longer depend upon America for the transfer of nuclear technology. Moreover, it would upset the precarious balance of nuclear terror that had been achieved through the "mutual deterrence tactics" of the two super powers. It seems that America maintained double standards because they downgraded their objections to Pakistan's nuclear program in the wake of

the Soviet invasion. Infact America provided Pakistan with economic and military aid. It became more essential for India not to sign the NPT.

There were supporters as well as opponents in America on the issue of continued export of nuclear fuel to India. Thus, the Tarapur issue became very important. The supporters were of the opinion that it would be very beneficial for America to build a reliable and multifaceted bilateral relationship with India as it was the most stable country in South Asia at a critical time that is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While the opponents felt that the credibility of the United States to pursue its nonproliferation objectives would be questioned and it would increase the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation in the South Asian region.

After 1981, Reagan and his team of advisers formulated the non-proliferation strategy. Like Carter, the Reagan administration also treated non-proliferation as one of the most important foreign policy objectives. But in some ways it differed sharply from the non-proliferation policy of the Carter administration. Reagan felt that instead of imposing sanctions and cutting off nuclear ties, close political cooperation should be forged with "proliferation-problem" countries. These countries should be provided with conventional arms so that they feel secure. Once this happens they would not be motivated to develop nuclear weapons.

Further, the Reagan administration wanted America to be a world leader in commercial nuclear power technology. Hence, they promoted

new American commercial nuclear power plants and lifted curbs on the civil plutonium economy. Whereas Carter had tried to make the American nuclear power program consistent with the larger non-proliferation goals. He did this by strengthening controls on the domestic nuclear industry and by putting off commercial reprocessing. America's close allies and industrial partners were effected when America had reshaped its nuclear export policy in response to India's 1974 explosion. Therefore the Reagan administration tried to remove some of the export controls for America's allies. For the first time, non-proliferation was discussed by Reagan during his meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev. Earlier they had worked secretly on non-proliferation issues.

Reagan administration followed a policy of discrimination on the non-proliferation issue. For instance, a nuclear cooperation agreement was signed with China which rejected the NPT. Beijing was permitted to import American nuclear technology without adequate safeguards. This was despite the fact that China was involved in Pakistan's nuclear program. Japan was authorized to extract plutonium for thirty years from the United States origin spent fuel. Moreover, Pakistan's nuclear program was not dealt with severely because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. According to the Reagan administration, the strategic ties with Pakistan were meant to prevent Pakistan from the acquisition of nuclear arms. In his January, 1988, national security strategy report to Congress, Reagan said:

In dealing with the problem of nuclear proliferation in South Asia, we have followed a two-track approach. First, we have made clear to the government of Pakistan that our provision of security assistance requires Pakistani nuclear restraint. At the same time, provision of U.S. military and economic assistance helps Pakistan meet legitimate security needs without resorting to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Secondly, recognizing that there is a regional context for the Pakistani nuclear programme, we have encouraged India and Pakistan towards an agreement on confidence building measures.<sup>19</sup>

For its security it is essential for India not to sign the non-proliferation treaty. India should only sign the treaty when it becomes non-discriminatory. After all, history is proof of the fact that India's security has always been threatened by Pakistan and China. Since India is surrounded by hostile neighbours, it is essential to eliminate the threats or to build up its military strength so as to deter the enemies from attacking India. Wishful thinking can only lead India astray. India will have to increase its defence spending. Since India has the expertise, in the near future it could acquire nuclear weapons.

There is no more time to lose. India has no options left except the nuclear one. By keeping away from nuclear weapons capability, India does not in any way make itself credible in the fight against nuclear weapons. India should not waste time in diplomatic initiatives, for, external security threats cannot be totally met by diplomacy alone.<sup>20</sup>

Pakistan also feels that its security is threatened by India. Hence, it has refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pakistan wants to pursue its nuclear program. The Pakistanis believe that their bomb will be an Islamic bomb and it will reinforce the power of the Muslim world. In this way, Pakistan is actually trying to make itself the leader of the Islamic world. According to Professor Stephen Cohen,

a Pakistani nuclear capability paralyzes not only the Indian nuclear decision but also Indian conventional forces and a brash, bold, Pakistani strike to liberate Kashmir might go unchallenged if the Indian leadership was weak or indecisive.<sup>21</sup>

This seems to be the politico-strategic doctrine of a nuclear Pakistan. The Reagan administration's contribution to the non-proliferation regime was significant despite some controversial actions. Supplier nations were made to tighten their export controls and checks on delivery capabilities were incorporated in the non-proliferation system. Once again one of the primary targets of these controls was India. The Reagan administration sought closer political cooperation with countries of proliferation concern instead of denying nuclear materials to prevent proliferation. But Reagan did not totally discard this approach. His was a "cooperative" approach. He sought close cooperation with both India and Pakistan. The manner in which the Reagan team pursued its non-proliferation campaign was officially explained this way:

The struggle we are waging is not on the battle field. It goes on in the quiet of diplomatic chanceries, at meetings of technical experts, and in safeguards laboratories. Success is measured not in terms of territory liberated or new allies gained, but rather in terms of confidence established, restraints voluntarily accepted, and destabilizing military options foregone.<sup>22</sup>

Indira Gandhi had made it very clear that India had the right to carry out more peaceful nuclear explosions and was ready to explode one if India's security interest so demanded. It was now therefore left to America to assure India that America would make efforts to stop Pakistan from acquiring various elements of a nuclear weapons capability. The dispute over the supply of the uranium fuel for Tarapur was settled in 1982 when Indira Gandhi visited Washington. Subsequently, there was further improvement in Indo-American relations when America offered advanced technology to India in 1985. There was an increase in Indo-American trade and investment. Military sales to India was resumed. At this time the Soviet Union was trying to improve relations with China. Therefore it provided the right backdrop to this effort. There were however, limits to the progress of Indo- American relations.

The Indians resented the fact they were not eligible to receive the most advanced American technology, owing to understandable U.S. fears that it would end up in Soviet hands. For years the United States would not allow India access to the F-20 fighter technology.<sup>23</sup>

This seemed to be a test of America's willingness to treat India as an independent, non-aligned country. America's willingness to supply arms to Pakistan was explained in context of Afghanistan. But in the past, Pakistan has used the arms supplied by America against India and America was not able to prevent it.

In India's security planning China plays a crucial role. India has not forgotten its humiliating defeat in the 1962 war with China. With the improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, the problem of India's security has increased as it has led to the erosion of the "Soviet Card" for India. Further Beijing's nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan has increased the significance of the China factor. Recently Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability drive has prompted India to speed up its nuclear program.

During the seventies and eighties, the Soviet Union was with America in exerting considerable pressure on India to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. With the signing of the strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) by the Soviet Union and America the pressures have increased on India. Infact, Gorbachev had asserted at the Moscow Summit that the progress in the reduction of strategic nuclear arms should be accompanied by a global effort at controlling nuclear proliferation. Moreover, China's announcement on August 10, 1991 that it was prepared to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty has highlighted the question of

India's response to the broader nuclear issues. But all this, did not change the discriminatory nature of the non-proliferation treaty. Besides this, the nuclear weapon capability of China prevented India from signing the treaty. It is worth recalling the statement made by the then External Affairs Minister to the Parliament. He said:

.... In so far as India is concerned, aside from its anxiety to see the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty .... India has a special problem of security against nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail. This aspect which hardly needs elaboration must necessarily be taken into account before our attitude to non-proliferation treaty is determined.<sup>24</sup>

There is no surety that even if China signed the non-proliferation treaty it would give up its nuclear weapons. Hence, the threat to India will not diminish in any way. For the treaty to be effective it is essential that it should be renegotiated and reformulated in such a way, so as to take care of the nuclear sensitivities of the non-nuclear nations. While the non-nuclear countries should have an open mind on question of regional arms control and regional denuclearisation. One good aspect of the post cold war era is the decline in the interest of America and the Soviet Union to heighten Indo-Pak tensions. But the tensions between India and Pakistan still exist and this acts as a disincentive for any regional arms control talks. Both countries are faced with serious economic problems. Therefore, they



should cut down their defence expenditure. Bringing China into the picture will clear India's apprehensions further.

Thus the proliferation trends discussed so far cannot be blocked by the United States on its own. The developed and developing countries together cannot hope to find a solution to the intricate problem. What the United States can do, is to take the lead in making the world aware of the explosive problem by setting an example for other nations.

It is also clear that unless the United States takes firm and comprehensive action, the world risks the turn from one arms race to a globe-threatening arms stampede. There could be no greater tragedy, and no greater failure of American policy and resolve.<sup>25</sup>

The end of the Cold War with the break up of the Soviet Union exposed the world to uncertainty and tremendous potential. The probability of a major war in Europe is less likely to take place. On the other hand all the states who were in the Warsaw pact or who were under Soviet protection have been left militarily isolated. With the advent of a new world order an unipolar world where there is only one super power and that is the United States, hopes have flickered regarding the resolution of conflicts in the Third World without the danger of being linked to super power global conflicts.

During the Bush administration (1988-1992) Indo-American relations were again affected by Pakistan. With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War, the importance of Pakistan for America has been considerably reduced. The Bush administration urged Pakistan to settle the Kashmir issue on the basis of Simla agreement and to desist from instigating secessionist in Punjab and Kashmir. This is in contrast to the White House's earlier pro-Pakistan stand on Kashmir. Further, an annual economic and military aid of \$ 580 million dollar to Pakistan was suspended because Bush was not able to certify as required under the Pressler amendment that Islamabad did not possess a nuclear device. Therefore, during the Bush administration, Reagan's strategy of linkage between Pakistan Nuclear restraint and American aid disappeared. But India cannot ignore the fact that Pakistan may go nuclear independently. In that case, America would envisage a regional non-proliferation treaty between India and Pakistan. In the view of India, regional solutions to nuclear non-proliferation is not a sensible way to approach the problem. This problem has to be viewed globally and it should include the process of general nuclear disarmament. Richard N. Haass, special assistant to United States President and senior Director for Near East and South Asian affairs said:

It is important to note that we will do every thing possible to resist making our relation with India and Pakistan an either / or zero sum proposition....

In the modern age it is neither prudent nor possible to have a successful relationship with only one of these two states. We will require good relations with both or we will likely end up with good relations with neither.<sup>26</sup>

With the break up of the Soviet Union, nuclear proliferation assumed crucial dimensions in global strategic thinking . Since Sept. - Oct.,1991, America has increased its pressure on India to sign the non-proliferation treaty. America can even indulge in arm twisting tactics. The chances of an all out nuclear war between the two super powers has become very less and so have the strategies of nuclear deterrence and Mutual Assured Destruction. But the nuclear or traditional arms race between the local powers has not ceased to exist.

With the break up of the Soviet Union, India's policy of non-alignment is now in question. America will also be less interested in Third World countries since much of America's previous concern arose from a desire to counter Soviet influence. But at the same time if the policies of the United States towards India was largely an extension of her anti-Soviet postures, the years ahead should be free of this strain in view of the decline of communism and disintegration of the Soviet Union. The former United States Under - Secretary for Defence Policy, Dr. Fred Ikle, observed:

India could be a power that contributes to world stability as the United States will see it, and want to shape it in 1995 and the year 2025, and a power with which we could work together with other major powers now to enhance our long term national security aims. And that I think is an exciting possibility that (opens) a new chapter in United States - Indian relations.<sup>27</sup>

The post-cold war world order is truly a classic case of uncertainty. But one thing is certain that the world will be free from most of the complications of the cold war. For the post cold war era to yield the desired results, sustained efforts should be made by India and the United States to get at the root of the Indo-American mistrusts and suspicions. In this way the divergences might be removed. The end of the Cold War should also have a positive impact on Indo-American relations. Earlier friction between the two countries centered around American arms aid to Pakistan and India's tilt towards the Soviet Union. Since this aspect is of no more importance, both the countries should take advantage of it to improve their relations. Their relations should not be influenced by the past estrangement.

If both the countries pursue their respective national interests they can come closer together on many issues. India is a large country and is economically and militarily quite important. Therefore, it will be pragmatic for the United States to continue to treat India as a significant

Asian power with which America should seek friendly relations. This policy had begun in the late 1970s and was resumed in the mid 1980s. Now, with the end of the Cold War the need for forging a more constructive relationship is even greater.

As mentioned above the arming of Pakistan by the United States was a major hurdle in Indo-American relations. Hence, America should respect the security concerns of India and avoid such actions. Pakistan's threat to India may sound illogical but for India it is real. Moreover, India should reform its economic policies so as to expand its commercial and economic ties with the United States. On the other hand, India should also strengthen its ties with America. This process had been initiated by the Janata government in the late 1970s and resumed after Indira Gandhi's visit to Washington in 1982. In order to neutralise Pakistani influence in United States of America, India will be well advised to convince America that the interests of both the countries are identical and that it would be in the interest of both India and United States of America to come closer to each other.

The nuclear question is also bound to have a tremendous impact on the future of Indo American relations. Both India and Pakistan have been recognized as nuclear capable countries. This has increased the role of the United States as now America has to ensure that an armed conflict is

avoided between both the countries. Renewed efforts should be made by United States of America to persuade both India and Pakistan to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. With the end of the Cold War there is an immense opportunity for positive Indo-American relations. The past should only serve as a lesson for both India and America to forge a more constructive relationship in the years to come.

## NOTES

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<sup>5</sup> B.M. Jain, *South Asia, India and U.S.* (Jaipur : R.B.S.A. Publishers, 1987) 152.

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<sup>7</sup> Robert M. Crunden, ed., *New Perspectives On America and South Asia* ( Delhi : Chanakya, 1984) 86.

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<sup>11</sup> T.V. Paul, "Influence Through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the U.S.-Pakistani Relationship," *Asian Survey* XXXII, 12 (Dec 1992) : 1092.

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<sup>13</sup> Robert M. Crunden, 92-93.

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